APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to “Set
Aside, Amend and/or Correct Improper and Unlawful Judgments.” The Defendant argues
(1) that her judgments are void due to noncompliance with the statutes and rules governing
the entry of judgment forms and (2) that she is entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Criminal Procedure 36. Following our review, we have determined that we lack
jurisdiction to hear the Defendant’s voidness arguments and that the Defendant has waived
review of her Rule 36 claim. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, William Patrick Robinson, appeals pro se from the Circuit Court of
Carroll County’s dismissal of his third request for post-conviction relief. Following
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Jason White, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues: (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itself; (2) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner a full and fair post-conviction procedure; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in numerous areas; and (4) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court, but remand the case to the post-conviction court for the entry of amended judgments that properly reflect the offenses for which Petitioner was indicted and convicted.

Appellant, Mark T. Stinson, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court
that was entered on January 27, 2023. We determine that the January 27, 2023 order does
not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Appellant, Jason Lee Schutt, of alternative counts of possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-408(b)(1)(F), -417(a), -417(c)(2)(A). The trial court properly merged the above counts, and following a sentencing hearing, the Appellant was ordered to serve nine years and six months in confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the alleged controlled substance was not verified by chemical analysis as hydrocodone, and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“Juvenile Court”) seeking the termination of the parental rights of Horace L. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Amayzha L. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. Determining that DCS presented insufficient evidence to establish that the Child was removed from Father’s home or physical or legal custody, we reverse the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The Petitioner, Joseph Marquis Jeffries, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, and one count each of domestic assault, interference with emergency communications, trafficking for a commercial sex act, promotion of prostitution, and evading arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately explore racial bias during voir dire and (2) failing to seek additional time for the Petitioner to consider the State’s plea agreement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Nicholas Kentrell Dickerson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s
orders revoking his probation and imposing his original sentences for various drug
convictions and a felony evading arrest. The Appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking his probation because (1) the alleged violations were based on new
charges that were subsequently dismissed, and (2) the remaining violations were technical
in nature and not a valid basis for full revocation under Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-311(e)(1)(A) (2022). Upon our review, we affirm.

The Appellant, Eleanor Grace Hoffman, filed a motion to suppress challenging the search of her purse during a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant was convicted as charged by a Warren County jury of simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Appellant’s application for judicial diversion was granted, and she was sentenced to two concurrent terms of eleven months and twentynine days suspended to supervised probation after service of ten days’ imprisonment. A probation violation order was entered, and the Appellant conceded to violating the terms of probation before the trial court. The trial court revoked her probationary judicial diversion sentence, entered judgments of conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and ordered the Appellant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment, with the possibility of furlough to an inpatient drug treatment facility after service of ninety days’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Alternatively, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking her diversionary probation and ordering service of her original sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and revocation of the Appellant’s probation but remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation.

In this appeal from the termination of parental rights, the mother does not challenge the
grounds for terminating her rights. Rather she argues that the evidence was less than clear
and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a review of both the
statutory grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

The Defendant, Stacy M. Miller, was convicted by a Meigs County Criminal Court jury of
three counts of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at less than $1000.
See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony
murder), 39-13-212 (2018) (criminally negligent homicide), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially
aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft).
The trial court merged the three first degree felony murder convictions and imposed an
effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support her first degree felony murder convictions and (2) the trial court
erred in failing to merge the criminally negligent homicide conviction with the first degree
felony murder conviction and to merge the theft conviction with the aggravated robbery
conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected
judgments reflecting the requested mergers of convictions and for correction of the
judgment form in Count 6 to reflect the correct conviction offense, aggravated robbery.

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. The issues on appeal concern the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem in the amount of $1,060. The trial court assessed the fees against the petitioners and the respondent, jointly and severally. The petitioners appeal, contending that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-125, the court had no discretion but to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent. The petitioners and the estate of the respondent also challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent on other grounds. We have determined that the trial court was statutorily required to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent and that it lacked the discretion to assess the fees against the petitioners. We have also determined that the petitioners have no standing to challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent and that the issues raised by the estate of the respondent lack merit. Thus, we reverse the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem against the petitioners but affirm the assessment of the fees against the respondent.

A Hamblen County jury convicted Defendant, Raymond D. Arwood, of one count of sexual
exploitation of a minor involving more than fifty images. The trial court imposed a
sentence of ten years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in confinement. On
appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
suppress certain photographs and that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction. After reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Dan E. Durrell, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a dispute arising from services provided by the appellee, CIC Services, LLC (“CIC”), a creator and manager of “captive” insurance companies, to the appellant corporation, SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”).  SRM hired CIC to form and manage two captive insurance companies to serve SRM in risk management, and the parties memorialized their relationship in two management agreements, one for each of the newly formed captive insurance companies.  When CIC subsequently ended its contractual relationship with SRM for cause, SRM demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the agreements.  The arbitrator dismissed all of SRM’s claims.  CIC then demanded a second arbitration, seeking attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration and stating claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement against SRM.  The second arbitrator ultimately awarded to CIC $261,487.04 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration proceeding, pursuant to the indemnity clauses in the parties’ management agreements, and $137,337.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs because CIC was the substantially prevailing party in the second arbitration.  When SRM did not respond to CIC’s demand for payment of this award, CIC moved for confirmation of the award in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”).   SRM responded by filing a motion with the trial court to modify or vacate the award.  After the parties fully briefed the issues, the trial court confirmed the award in full and concomitantly denied SRM’s motion to modify or vacate.  SRM timely appealed.  Upon review, we  affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, determining that because appellant Suresh Prabhu voluntarily participated in both arbitrations without raising objection to the potential attachment of liability against him as an individual, Mr. Prabhu and SRM have waived objection to the attachment of individual liability to Mr. Prabhu.  We further determine that the trial court properly denied SRM’s motion to vacate the award because the second arbitrator acted within her discretion to direct the arbitration procedure and SRM has failed to show any of the criteria necessary to meet the high standard for vacatur pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act or the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

Defendant, Jeffrey Wayne Seidel, challenges the denial of his pre-sentencing motion to
withdraw his guilty plea to second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”). Defendant
contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the factors set out by our
supreme court in State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Tenn. 2010), and that he established
a “fair and just reason” to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After a thorough review
of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Douglas R. Roach, was convicted of ten counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping and received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed especially
aggravated kidnapping because the evidence did not show that he accomplished the
kidnappings through use or display of a deadly weapon or that he used the victims as
hostages or human shields. The State responds that the evidence was sufficient to support
his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Archie Lee Meeks, of aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, assault by offensive touching, and aggravated criminal trespass, and
the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we
affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Charles Jonathan Murphy, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years at 100 % in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing him by misapplying an enhancement factor and ordering consecutive sentences. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal of a modification to a permanent parenting plan. Dawn Rushing
Strickland (“Mother”) filed a motion to modify the permanent parenting plan governing
the custody and visitation of two children from her prior marriage to Stephen Rushing
(“Father”). The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“Trial Court”) granted the motion
and modified the permanent parenting plan to designate Mother the primary residential
parent and grant her 265 co-parenting days and Father 100 co-parenting days. Father has
appealed. Upon our review of the final order, we conclude that the Trial Court
erroneously considered Mother’s gender in determining that a material change in
circumstance had occurred affecting the children’s best interest and that its finding that
the best interest factors did not favor one parent over the other demonstrates that Mother
failed to carry her burden of proof. We accordingly reverse the Trial Court’s
modification of the permanent parenting plan. Mother’s request for attorney’s fees on
appeal is denied.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 6, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not
filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until August 11, 2023, more than thirty days from the
date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice
of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this matter concerning the interpretation of a will, John Moon and Shannon Moon (“John” and “Shannon”) (“Claimants,” collectively) filed a claim in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) against the estate of their late sister, Mary Hutcheson Moon Ballard(“Mary”).1 Arthur Ballard (“Arthur”), Mary’s husband, filed an exception to the claim. Mary’s grandmother, Elise Chapin Moon (“Elise”), had established a trust for her grandchildren, including Mary. It is Claimants’ position that a bloodline provision in Elise’s will (“the Moon Will”) excludes spouses of grandchildren from receiving trust proceeds. The Trial Court, having put certain questions to a jury, ruled in favor of Arthur. Claimants appeal. We hold that once Mary received the funds from the trust, which dissolved in 2016, the funds were hers outright and no longer subject to the will’s “bloodline” restriction. We hold further that the Trial Court erred by putting questions to a jury when the case was resolvable as a matter of law. However, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Pro se Petitioner, Bruce Parks, Jr., appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because the Petitioner’s claim that the State failed to give notice
of enhancement factors or its intent to seek consecutive sentencing is not cognizable in a
Rule 36.1 motion, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of the motion to correct
an illegal sentence.

Following his convictions for felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially
aggravated kidnapping, the Petitioner, Mario Donte Keene, filed a petition for postconviction
relief. The Petitioner alleged that his confession was unconstitutionally
admitted into evidence during his trial. He also asserted that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to cross-examine a witness and failed to
present an expert to testify that he did not have the physical ability to commit the crimes.
After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, we respectfully
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Robert Lee Adams, Jr., was convicted in the Tipton County Circuit Court
of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence of thirty years in confinement.
On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.