APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Jeffrey Boyd Trusty, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $1,000 by a Smith County jury. The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. Petitioner’s sentence and convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Trusty, 326 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and various violations of due process. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

Plaintiff appeals judgment in favor of Defendant apartment complex. We affirm.

Petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for possession with intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine and resulting sentence of 13.5 years as a mitigated offender. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary by the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a lawsuit alleging unauthorized cremation. The plaintiffs’ mother, a Tennessee resident, died in Arkansas while visiting a friend. The plaintiffs hired a Tennessee funeral home to transport the decedent’s body back to her hometown of Medina, Tennessee, for an informal family viewing. The plaintiffs instructed the Tennessee funeral home operator that, after the viewing, the decedent’s body was to be taken to Nashville, Tennessee, to be cremated there. The Tennessee funeral home retained the defendant Arkansas funeral home to handle the matter. The Arkansas funeral home delivered the body to an Arkansas crematory. The plaintiffs’ mother’s body was cremated by the crematory in Arkansas, so the plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity to view their mother’s deceased body in Tennessee. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against several defendants, alleging various causes of action arising out of the unauthorized cremation of their mother’s body in Arkansas. The defendant Arkansas funeral home filed a motion for summary judgment as to all counts of the complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Arkansas funeral home on all counts and certified the order as final under Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 54.02. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Michael Tyrone Gant, guilty of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to thirty years for the aggravated robbery conviction, a concurrent fifteen-year sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, a consecutive six-year sentence for the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon conviction, and a consecutive twelve-year sentence for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony conviction for a total effective sentence of forty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when ordering his sentences to run consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The circuit court denied Appellants’ Rule 60.02 motion on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion. We affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted appellant, Timothy Lamont Thompson, of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to life without parole for the aggravated robbery conviction and as a career offender to a concurrent sentence of fifteen years for the aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress pretrial eyewitness identifications; the sufficiency of the convicting evidence; the admission of testimony regarding the discovery of a BB gun one month after the robbery; and the trial court’s refusal to modify the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction on identification. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment form for the aggravated robbery conviction reflecting appellant’s status as a repeat violent offender.

I concur fully in the result in this case as well as in the reasoning espoused to reach such. However, I write separately to clarify this Court’s holding in Jacob I. The majority implies that Jacob I required the filing of an appeal bond “with no monetary limit” to satisfy the requirements of section 27-5-103. Such was not the holding in Jacob.

This appeal involves and Administrative Procedures Act proceeding in which the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners appeals an order of the trial court which vacated a civil penalty imposed by the Board on a licensed pharmacist when the Board found that the pharmacist illegally practiced naturopathy and practiced medicine without a license. We affirm the judgment of the trial court vacating the penalty and remand the case with instructions for the court to remand the case to the Board of Medical Examiners for reconsideration of the penalty.

This is an appeal from an order of terminating a biological father's parental rights. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal calls into question the validity of a covenant not to compete. A former employee of a seller and distributor of brick brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that his agreement not to compete for two years with his former employer in the employee’s sales territory is unenforceable. Following a bench trial, the court held the covenant unenforceable and void. We hold that, because the employee had access to confidential pricing and profit margin information and was the sole commercial brick salesperson for the company in the Chattanooga area, the employer had a legitimate protectable business interest. We further hold that the terms of the non-compete agreement are reasonable under the facts of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher S. Kinsler, was convicted by a Hamblen County Criminal Court jury of fourth offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the State violated the rules of discovery by failing to provide notice of expert testimony, (3) trial testimony contained inadmissible hearsay, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a retrial, the Defendant, Tommy Earl Jones, was convicted by a jury of rape, theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered that the ten-year sentence for rape be served consecutively to the ten-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant again contends that (1) the trial court erred when it excluded him from jury selection, trial, and the return of the verdict in the absence of any waiver; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After our review, we conclude that the trial court complied with the dictates from this court upon remand. Accordingly, there is no error in the judgments of the trial court, and we affirm.

The Petitioner, William Darryn Busby, appeals the Lewis County Circuit Court’s denial of  post-conviction relief from his convictions for four counts of rape of a child. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he was denied a full and fair hearing by the post-conviction court, that he received ineffective assistance from both trial and appellate counsel, and that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a defense at trial and meaningful appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Frank J. Beasley, stands convicted of one count of facilitation of second degree murder and three counts of facilitation of attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The post-conviction court determined that appellant was unconstitutionally prevented from appealing his convictions and sentences due to ineffective assistance of counsel and granted him relief in the form of a delayed appeal, which is now properly before this court. On appeal, appellant challenges the length of his sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgment forms.

I concur in the majority opinion because the majority accurately reflects State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012), in yielding to trial court discretion to affirm the imposition of a maximum sentence. I only write separately to voice a concern that, after holding that 75 percent of enhancement factors relied upon by the trial court were erroneously applied as matters of law, affirming the sentence per Bise portrays an image of a winking, nodding, judicial Chimera. Bise says that the misapplication of an enhancement factor does not cancel the presumption of reasonableness of the sentence, id. at 709, but surely at some point the number of legal errors in misapplying enhancement factors may reach a critical mass whereupon even an in-range sentence is no longer compliant “with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id. at 709-10. I hope our supreme court will be attentive to this issue.

The petitioner, Kerry Calahan, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal trespass, simple assault, theft of property valued at less than $500, and resisting arrest. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant, Jason Lee Fisher, stands convicted of four counts of aggravated burglary, three counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, one count of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, and three counts of vandalism valued at $500 or less. The trial court sentenced appellant as a career offender to an effective sentence of forty-five years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the effective length of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm appellant’s convictions and sentences but remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment.

This post-divorce appeal involves the suspension of parenting time. The mother made repeated allegations that the father was abusing their child; the father denied all of the allegations. After numerous proceedings, the father asserted that the mother was coaching the child to make false allegations of abuse and asked the trial court to terminate the mother’s parenting time. The trial court ordered a psychological evaluation of both parties and the child. After considering the evaluations and substantial testimony, the trial court determined that the father had committed no abuse and found that the child would be emotionally harmed by continued contact with the mother. The trial court then suspended the mother’s parenting time and enjoined all contact with the child until the mother obtains mental health counseling and treatment. The mother appeals. Based on our careful review of the record, we affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendant, Marvin Wendell Kelley, appeals from his jury convictions for first-degree murder, a Class A felony; felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery, a Class A felony; and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. In this appeal, he contends as follows: (1) that his indictment should have been dismissed due to lost evidence; (2) that the admission of his codefendant’s statements were hearsay and violated his right to confrontation; (3) that statements from a witness were improperly admitted over a hearsay objection; (4) that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion; and (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough examination of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Participant in protest action which took place at the Tennessee State Capitol brought an action alleging that former Governor and Deputy Governor retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights during the protest. Participant appeals the grant of summary judgment against him and the trial court’s ruling that certain documents created by the Governor’s legal counsel were protected from discovery by the attorney-client and deliberative process privileges. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.
 

In this divorce action, Stacy Ramsey (“Wife”) and Phillip Ramsey (“Husband”) stipulated grounds for divorce but proceeded to trial regarding several issues, including classification and division of the parties’ assets, as well as child support, spousal support, and attorney’s fees. Following a bench trial, the trial court valued the parties’ marital assets and divided the marital estate equally. The court awarded Husband both homes owned by the parties upon his payment to Wife of one-half the combined equity. The court found no basis to modify the parties’ mediated co-parenting agreement and set child support accordingly. The court also found that Wife was not entitled to alimony and awarded Husband $450 in attorney’s fees due to Wife’s failure to appear at a previous hearing. Wife appeals. We modify the trial court’s property division to correct mathematical errors, and we reverse the trial court’s calculation of child support. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

This is an appeal by Darlene H. from an order entered on May 21, 2013, which dismissed her petition for grandparent visitation on grounds that she lacked standing to intervene in the termination of parental rights and adoption proceedings involving her biological grandchild. A final order of adoption terminating the parental rights of Darlene H.’s daughter, Whitney H., to her daughter, Isabella S., was entered on April 24, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed by counsel for Darlene H. until June 21, 2013, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the May 21, 2013 order. The adoptive parents, Jason O. and Rachel O., filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss.

Decedent passed away in 1999, and Husband filed a petition for an elective share and a year’s maintenance. Days before the trial was scheduled to begin in 2012 Husband discharged his attorneys and requested a continuance to find replacement counsel. The trial court permitted Husband’s attorneys to withdraw but denied Husband’s motion to continue. The trial court denied Husband’s petition for an elective share because Husband had already received the bequest Decedent left him in her will. The trial court also denied Husband’s request for a year of maintenance because Husband had transferred to himself over $250,000 from Decedent’s accounts shortly before her death, and the amount Husband transferred to himself exceeded the amount Husband sought as maintenance. Husband appealed the trial court’s judgment, and we affirm in all respects