APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Darren Eugene Fleshman, alias (“the Defendant”), was convicted of theft 1 of property of at least $10,000 but less than $60,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years, suspended to supervised probation, and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $42,815.93. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the following: the trial court’s interpretation of the definition of “owner” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(26) (2006); the sufficiency of the evidence at trial; and the amount of restitution imposed by the trial court. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction. We, however, vacate the trial court’s order of restitution and remand this matter for a new hearing as to the amount and manner of restitution.

The plaintiff, as surviving spouse, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action against the defendant doctor who treated the plaintiff’s wife prior to her death and the hospital wherein the treatment occurred. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2013). We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff had to strictly comply with the provisions of the notice requirement and conclude that the plaintiff substantially complied with said requirement. We affirm, however, the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff could not rely upon the statutory 120-day extension of the statute of limitations due to his failure to properly serve the notice. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims as barred by the statute of limitations.

Following a bench trial Defendant, Randall Grainger, was convicted of three counts of knowingly violating a condition of community supervision for life, with each condition violated not in itself constituting a criminal offense, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-526 (a),(b)(1). Each conviction is a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with each other. The trial court suspended all of the effective sentence of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days except for ten (10) days’ incarceration, followed by eleven (11) months and nineteen (19) days of probation. In his appeal Defendant presents two issues for this Court’s review. First, Defendant asserts that the convictions should be reversed and the charges dismissed because Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524(d)(1) violates Article II, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. Second, Defendant argues that the conviction based upon his failure to successfully complete sex offender treatment violates his right to due process guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Timothy Barbee, pleaded guilty to possession of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, with intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced petitioner to the agreed-upon term of eight years at thirty percent release eligibility. In his timely petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found four grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights: substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, failure to support financially, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions; the court also determined that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals arguing the evidence is insufficient to establish any of the grounds and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported two of the grounds, that of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. We have also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Jonathan T. Deal (“the Defendant”) filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant set forth a colorable claim. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.

This case arose out of a contract for the sale of real estate. The contract included a provision requiring the buyer to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to sell the property, and to split any profits with the seller if the property was resold within 36 months. The buyer did not sell the property, and the seller brought suit, raising numerous claims, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, the Consumer Protection Act, RICO, wrongful foreclosure, promissory fraud, civil conspiracy, collusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive trust, conversion and unjust enrichment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the buyer’s motion to dismiss thirteen of the seller’s claims, denied the motion to dismiss another six of his claims, and certified its order as final for the purposes of appeal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court.
 

Appellant, William Creggar Snodgrass, was convicted of attempted rape, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding flight; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony from an unsequestered witness; and (3) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Jacqueline M. Hiyama, was indicted on alternative counts of driving under the influence (DUI) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(1) and (a)(2). She filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of her arrest, asserting that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. The trial court denied the appellant’s motion. The appellant pled guilty to the indicted offense reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) concerning whether the stop of the appellant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Charles Deon Calhoun, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery. He then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for failing to state a colorable claim for relief. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the court erred in dismissing his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing and without appointing counsel to assist in presenting his claim. Upon review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.
 

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. The juvenile court found the Department of Children’s Services established four grounds for termination of father’s parental rights: 1) parent sentenced to ten or more years for any criminal act and the children are under eight years of age pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6); 2) parent sentenced to more than two years for conduct against a child or sibling/half-sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5);
3) abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); and 4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). The juvenile court also found that termination of Father’s rights was in the children’s best interest. Father appealed. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, petitioner, Tavares D. Braden, was convicted of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, promoting prostitution, possession of marijuana, and evading arrest, for which he received an effective eighteen-year sentence. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming two instances of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) failure to advise him of his potential sentence exposure and (2) failure to adequately prepare for trial and prepare a defense. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a tenured teacher. The Union County Board of Education (“the Board”) dismissed Tina Wilder (“Wilder”) following an incident involving underage drinking at Wilder’s lake cabin. Wilder, contesting her dismissal, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Union County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court concluded that the evidence sustained Wilder’s dismissal. Wilder raises several issues on appeal. We hold, inter alia, that Wilder was afforded due process, that the Trial Court applied the correct standard of review, and that the evidence supported the Trial Court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Appellant, Glenn Climer, Jr., was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury with attempted second degree murder, attempted aggravated child abuse, child abuse, assault, and resisting arrest. Appellant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated child abuse, child abuse, assault, and resisting arrest. As a result, he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of twenty-six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant sought this appeal. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated child abuse, and child abuse; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing counsel for the State to present an improper argument; (3) whether Appellant’s conviction for child abuse violates double jeopardy; and (4) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the issues raised on appeal, this Court determines that the evidence was sufficient to support the offenses; Appellant waived any issue with regard to improper argument by failing to object at trial; Appellant’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
 

The Defendant, David Frazier, appeals as of right from the Polk County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his motion without a hearing. The State concedes that the trial court erred. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing on the Defendant’s motion.

Former employee brought an action for retaliatory discharge and intentional interference with employment. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Having determined the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we affirm the dismissal.

The defendant, Christopher Lee Richardson, appeals his Bedford County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; disorderly conduct; simple possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance; resisting arrest; simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance; and attempted promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to sever the counts of the indictment; that the trial court erred by refusing to disqualify a juror; that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of attempted theft of property and attempted promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine; and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Paul Epps, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to show that a violation of probation occurred and that the trial court erred in failing to consider a disposition other than incarceration after revoking his probation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Guy Graves, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. He was convicted of two counts of burglary and received an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Billy Joe Harris, was convicted in the Obion County Circuit Court of violation of the sexual offender registry, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 40-39-208 (2012). The trial court imposed a one-year sentence with ninety days to be served in the county jail and the balance to be served on community corrections. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terry R. Whitefield, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Davidson County Criminal Court
guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received a sentence of 16 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Robert D. Ewing (“Defendant Robert”) and Anthony T. Ewing (“Defendant Anthony”) (collectively “the Defendants”) each pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor. The Defendants reserved a certified question of law as to whether information received several months prior to obtaining and executing a search warrant was too stale to support probable cause. Pursuant to plea agreements, the trial court sentenced each of the Defendants to two years, suspended to supervised probation. This Court consolidated the Defendants’ appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reject the Defendants’ challenges to the search warrant and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Cornelius O. Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and involuntarily made. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Shawn Thompson, was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. The trial court ordered the defendant’s attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions to run concurrently with one another, but ordered the reckless endangerment conviction to run consecutively to the first three counts and the weapons conviction to run consecutively to all counts. On appeal, the defendant asserts error in the trial court’s failure to dismiss the weapons charge in light of what he asserts is a material variance; in the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the issue of self-defense; in the State’s improper argument to the jury; and in the trial court’s allegedly erroneous consideration of non-statutory factors in imposing a consecutive sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff in this case brought suit to recover uninsured motorist benefits. The insurance company moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff was not entitled to coverage because he was not “upon” the insured vehicle so as to “occupy” it. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and we affirm.