APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the trial court's denial of a recusal motion. We affirm the trial court's decision to deny the motion to recuse, but vacate the order entered by the trial court while the recusal motion was pending.

The Petitioner, David Wayne Britt, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County‘s denial of his third petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court‘s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State‘s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A man was injured in an accident, and his relatives initiated conservatorship proceedings in the probate court of Rutherford County.  The conservators were dissatisfied with the probate court’s handling of the case and moved to have the case removed to the chancery court.  The probate court granted the motion to remove, but the chancery court determined the removal was improper and sent the case back to the probate court.  The conservators appealed the chancery court’s decision to review the probate court’s order granting the removal.  On appeal, we note that the probate court and the chancery court in Rutherford County have concurrent jurisdiction over conservatorship proceedings.  Neither court is inferior to the other, and an appeal from either court is to the Court of Appeals.  The chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine any issues in the conservatorship once the case was filed in the probate court.  We vacate the judgment by the chancery court and remand the case to the probate court for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Douglas Wayne Young, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2009 Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and four counts of aggravated rape, claiming that the post-convction court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellee commenced a lawsuit in the Shelby County Chancery Court seeking to invalidate a writ of possession that previously had been filed pursuant to an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the Chancery Court entered an order granting Appellee her request for relief. Because we conclude that Appellee’s lawsuit constituted a collateral attack of the Circuit Court judgment, and there is nothing in the record indicating that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction, the Chancery Court’s order is hereby vacated. We remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order dismissing Appellee’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Sebastian Pegues, of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect. The trial court merged the two first degree felony murder convictions and sentenced the Defendant to life. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent twenty-year sentences for the aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect convictions. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. We remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3, indicating that the convicted offense is aggravated child neglect.

A Dyer County jury convicted the Defendant, Jerry Edward Lanier, of two counts of selling more than .5 gram of cocaine in a drug-free zone. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve concurrent thirty-year sentences for his convictions. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This case involves a petition for grandparent visitation filed by the paternal grandparents of the child at issue. The trial court granted the petition for visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306. Because the trial court did not make appropriate written findings in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we do not reach the merits of this appeal. We vacate and remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Petitioner, James Roskam, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to twenty years in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. Petitioner challenged his conviction on appeal, and a panel of this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. James Randall Roskam, No. M2011-02071-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3611749 (Tenn. Crim. App., Aug. 20, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 26, 2012). On appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial, failing to investigate whether exculpatory video evidence existed, failing to acquire 911 recordings, and failing to communicate with Petitioner during voir dire. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, James Harrell Driver, of violating the Sexual Offender Registry residency restriction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range II offender, to four-years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly imposed a four-year sentence; and (3) Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(c) is unconstitutional as applied in this case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint in a negligence case. After Appellant’s case was dismissed, he filed a notice of appeal pro se. Significant procedural shortcomings in Appellant’s brief on appeal prevent this Court from reaching any substantive issues. We therefore affirm.

Petitioner, Evan Kenyon Knox, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder and for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and the trial court dismissed the firearm charge. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner received an out-of-range sentence of 30 years to be served at 100 percent. Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that Petitioner’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Tipton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Justin DeWayne Rogers, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed and this Court affirmed the conviction. State v. Justin DeWayne Rogers, No. W2009-00982-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4812776, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 19, 2010). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and after a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment as a City of Clarksville police officer in August 2010. The trial court affirmed, and Plaintiff appealed. We determined that the City had failed to follow its disciplinary procedures when it terminated Plaintiff’s employment, vacated the termination, and remanded the matter. Upon remand, the City upheld termination of Plaintiff, and the trial court again affirmed. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Willie L. Taylor, was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, both Class C felonies.  He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to fourteen years for each conviction, to be served concurrently.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated burglary conviction and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence.  Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth L. Williams, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery with a sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed, pro se, a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the motion and dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his guilty plea was not knowingly entered and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgments.

An employee of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”) fell while at work and suffered injuries; pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-101, et seq., she began receiving medical treatment. She subsequently relocated to Minnesota and made a request to Goodyear that she be provided a second panel of physicians in order to continue her treatment; Goodyear denied the request. At the employee’s request a workers’ compensation specialist from the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development ordered Goodyear to provide a second panel of physicians. Goodyear requested and received an administrative review of the specialist’s order; the Department affirmed the order. Thereafter, Goodyear filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Chancery Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 asserting that the Department exceeded its authority by ordering Goodyear to provide a second panel of physicians and a physician outside of Tennessee. The Department moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the court denied the motion and considered the merits of the petition. The court held that the Department did not exceed its authority in ordering the panel of physicians; Goodyear appeals. The Department of Labor also appeals the holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to review its decision. Concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment of the court and dismiss the petition.  

This is a post-divorce case concerning the enforcement of a marital dissolution agreement, which the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree. The marital dissolution agreement required Appellant to pay Appellee’s monthly rent. Appellant made two or three payments, then stopped. The Appellee filed several petitions and complaints seeking to enforce the marital dissolution agreement. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure rule 52.01, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to issue sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.

This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights proceeding. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Ashley L. (“Mother”) and Aaron B. (“Father”) to their minor child Autumn L. (“the Child”) in the Juvenile Court for Claiborne County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child on a number of grounds. Mother and Father appeal to this Court. In addition to challenging the termination of their parental rights to the Child, Mother and Father argue that the case should be remanded to the Juvenile Court because the Juvenile Court did not enter an order within 30 days of the hearing as required by statute. We hold, inter alia, that remand is not an appropriate remedy for this noncompliance with statute and would serve no purpose. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in all respects.

Wife appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of transitional alimony in this divorce action. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further findings and proceedings, consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendants, Kenon Pack and Jennifer Banks, were both indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated child abuse for injuries inflicted upon Defendant Banks's five-year-old daughter. After a jury trial, both Defendants were convicted as charged, and the trial court merged the two sets of convictions into a single count of aggravated child abuse for each Defendant. On appeal, both Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence as well as the trial court's rulings regarding the admission and exclusion of certain evidence. Upon thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, Robert Allan Inman, Jr. (Husband) appeals the trial court's decision awarding Glenna Randolph Inman (Wife) alimony in futuro of $1,900 per month. We hold that the court's decision is supported by a number of relevant statutory factors, including the twenty-nine year duration of the marriage, Wife's age, sixty-three at the time of trial, her poor physical condition, Husband's good physical condition, his higher earning capacity, Wife's demonstrated need, and Husband's ability to pay. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, J.L.B., Jr. (Father), appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor daughter, T.L.G. (the Child). The Department of Children's Services (DCS) removed the Child from the home of her mother, G.M.G. (Mother) after Mother was arrested for domestic violence. DCS took temporary custody and placed the Child in foster care. The Child was subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected. Some eight months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate each of the parents' rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition.1 The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) multiple grounds for termination exist, and (2) termination is in the Child's best interest. Father challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but does not question the court's decision that termination is in the Child's best interest. We affirm.

Borla Performance Industries, Inc. (Borla) entered into two contracts with Universal Tool and Engineering, Inc. (UTE), by the terms of which UTE was to repair and refurbish six of Borla's pipe bending machines, which machines are used in Borla's business of designing and manufacturing automobile exhaust systems. Borla later sued UTE for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Borla alleged that as a result of UTE's failure to timely repair and deliver the machines, which are also known as “benders,” Borla incurred lost profits in the amount of $486,166. After a four-day bench trial, the court dismissed Borla's negligent misrepresentation and TCPA claims; the court did grant Borla a judgment for $11,839.98 on its breach of contract claim. The trial court held that Borla failed to prove that it incurred lost profits as a result of a breach of contract by UTE. Borla appeals the trial court's judgment denying its claims for lost profits. Borla also appeals the court's judgment dismissing the TCPA claim. UTE appeals the judgment against it for breach of contract. We affirm.

Dontavis K.W. (“Defendant”) appeals the order of the Criminal Court for Hamilton County (“the Criminal Court”) committing him to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) for an indefinite term based upon findings of delinquency and violation of probation. We find and hold that pursuant to Tenn. R. Juv. P. 35 and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-131(a)(4) and 37-1-137(a)(1)(A) the Criminal Court did not err in the probation revocation proceeding when it ordered a disposition which would have been permissible in the original delinquency proceeding. We, therefore, affirm.