APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Michael Anthony Huerta, was indicted for three counts of first degree murder and pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder. Defendant agreed to be sentenced as a Range IIoffender with the length of the sentence to be determined at a sentencing hearing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve thirty-eight years at 100 percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant challenges his sentence as excessive and argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. Because Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, we dismiss the appeal.

A plaintiff sued a physician and the physician’s practice, alleging the physician performed a biopsy during a medical office visit without the plaintiff’s consent. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement in the Health Care Liability Act. Because the court also determined that the action was time-barred, it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the plaintiff’s claim relates to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. So we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act. But because we conclude that the complaint does not clearly show that it was filed more than one year after the plaintiff discovered the injury, we modify the dismissal to a dismissal without prejudice.

This appeal stems from a trial court judge’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to recuse. Petitioner filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse.

This appeal requires us to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports: (1)
at least one statutory ground for termination of Appellant’s parental rights; and (2) that
termination is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant of one count of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to sell; one count of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver; and one count of driving with a cancelled, suspended, or revoked driver’s license. The trial court merged the drug convictions and subsequently sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of ten years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant claims that he should receive a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his drug convictions. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We further hold that the evidence is not sufficient to support the Defendant’s drug convictions. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the Defendant’s drug convictions and dismiss the charges.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Richard Higgs, Jr., of rape of a child,
sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest, and the trial court sentenced him to a total
effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Kimberly Ann Scott, pled guilty in separate cases to one count of second degree murder and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of nineteen years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that her guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered and that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the plea process. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, which affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims awarding death benefits. On
June 22, 2023, Employee, a professional truck driver, was stopped by a deputy sheriff after
the officer observed pieces of metal falling out of Employee's trailer. During this stop,
Employee suffered a heart attack and died on scene. Employee's wife filed a petition for
benefit determination, and the case ultimately proceeded to a hearing where the parties
disputed causation. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("Trial Court") awarded
benefits, finding that Employee's wife had shown to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the June 22, 2023 work incident contributed more than fifty percent to
Employee's heart attack and death when considering all causes. The Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") affirmed. Employer has appealed and
the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant
to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Defendant, Elliot Arnaz Price, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for one count of burglary. After trial, a petit jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court classified Defendant as a career offender and sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for burglary;(2) the trial court committed reversible error in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 by admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior charge for burglary and of Defendant’s conduct underlying the burglary charge;(3)the trial court committed reversible error by classifying him as a career offender; (4)the trial court committed plain error in violation of Defendant’s confrontation rights by admitting the arresting officer’s affidavit from a prior theft case; and (5) the trial court committed plain error by improperly instructing the jury that the “without the consent of the property owner” element of burglary applied to Defendant’s “actions” rather than Defendant’s “entry” onto the victim’s property.2 After review, we conclude there are instances of error made by the trial court, but determine such errors were harmless and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal addresses sealing judicial records. Three filings were sealed without a written order. The presiding judge later recused herself and the matter was transferred. Then The Nashville Banner intervened to unseal the records. The trial court denied the motion to unseal. The appellate court denied the Rule 10 appeal and then denied the petition for writ of certiorari. We reverse. Rule 10 interlocutory review is available to media intervenors when judicial proceedings are closed or documents are sealed. Sealing judicial records protected by the First Amendment right of access requires entry of a written order after finding that a compelling interest necessitates sealing. Any such order mustbe narrowly tailored and seal only those judicial records, or the portions thereof, necessary to protect the identified interest. After conducting a de novo review, we do not find a compelling interest necessitating sealing. The documents shall be made available to the public.

An employee suffered severe injuries while working for a subcontractor and sought workers’ compensation benefits from the logistics company that had retained the subcontractor. In response, the logistics company filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that it was exempt from liability as a “common carrier.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the logistics company, concluding that the company’s federal operating authority established its common carrier status as a matter of law. The injured employee appeals, arguing that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding the logistics company’s status because it exclusively served a single customer rather than the general public. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court entered a parenting plan setting parenting time and child support between Mother and Father. Mother appealed. Mother raises a due process challenge to the trial extending into the late evening of the last day. She also challenges the trial court’s analysis of the best interest factors, its allocation of parenting time, its designation of Father as the primary residential parent, its awarding to Father sole decision-making authority, and its denial of Mother’s motion to alter or amend. Father seeks attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling and award attorney’s fees.

I agree with many of the holdings in the majority’s good opinion, but I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s adoption of a new compelling interest standard for sealing documents.

This appeal arises from a general claim of negligence stemming from a dog bite. The plaintiffs adopted a dog from an animal shelter owned and operated by the defendant, a governmental entity. The dog bit one of the plaintiffs shortly after adoption. The plaintiffs sued, claiming that the shelter had a duty to warn them of the dog’s dangerous propensities but failed to do so. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the foreseeability of the incident, and therefore, the plaintiffs could not establish the defendant owed them a duty to warn. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

I join in Justice Kirby’s separate opinion. I briefly write separately to emphasize my specific concern with the majority’s unnecessary adoption of the compelling interest standard in this case.

The Defendant, Shay Tyler Little, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court conviction of aggravated burglary, for which he received a suspended sentence of six years’ supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court judge, which raised allegations of bias related to, inter alia, the treatment of her pro se status and her lack of personal notice of court filings, the lack of response to her ex parte communication, the failure to report alleged attorney misconduct, and the entry of certain court orders. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Ralphelle Antre James, of second degree murder, unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and felony reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective thirty-six years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant raises two related issues. First, he asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion to continue the trial to investigate alate-added witness. He also argues that the trial court erred in allowing thelate-added witness to testify,contending that the testimonyviolated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b)and denied him a fair trial. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant brought suit against his psychiatrist and the psychiatrist’s clinic, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. After appellate briefing and oral argument but prior to the filing of the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court, the psychiatrist died. The Appellant became aware of the death after the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his application for permission to appeal. He, subsequently, filed numerous motions for relief in the trial court. The trial court denied relief under Rule 60
and denied the other motions. We affirm.

After pleading guilty in federal court, the Petitioner, Robert Kerry Pickle, pled guilty in 2014 to eight additional offenses in the Coffee County Circuit Court. The circuit court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. Eleven years later, and while still serving his federal sentence, the Petitioner filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus. He asserted that his state sentences had expired and that the trial court lacked authority to impose consecutive sentences. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding that the Petitioner’s state sentences were aligned consecutively to his federal sentence and therefore had not expired. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Shaun Poole, pled guilty in the Henry County General Sessions Court to violating a no-contact order, and the court imposed a fully suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court and subsequently sought correction of his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The circuit court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a Rule 36.1 challenge to a judgment entered in the general sessions court and dismissed the claim. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment dismissing the Defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion. However, because the appellate record does not clearly establish the status of the Defendant’s remaining post-conviction claims, we remand the case for the circuit court to clarify the status of those claims and to conduct any further proceedings required by law.

Following a trial, a jury found Defendant, Brian R. Gadbois, guilty of ten counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated assault, seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, and four counts of indecent exposure, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 475 years. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in not granting his request for a mistrial; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to sever offenses while simultaneously granting the State’s motion to proceed on both of his indictments during the same trial; (3) the trial court committed plain error when it allowed the State to introduce two reports that were prepared by individuals who did not testify at trial; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110. The plaintiff-respondents, Jayesh Patel, Devesh Patel, and Vimal Patel (“Plaintiffs”),filed suit in Tennessee asserting claims for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and abuse of process against the defendants-petitioners, Shailesh Patel, BMGPC, LLC, Parul N. Patel, Dharmesh Patel, Ujval Patel, and Jyoti Patel (collectively, “Defendants”),who had initiated a related action against Plaintiffs in California state court. In response to the Tennessee action, Defendants filed a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA, asserting that Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in response to Defendants’ exercise of their rights to petition and of free speech. Plaintiffs responded to the TPPA Petition and sought to amend their complaint to add claims that predated the filing of the California lawsuit. At a joint hearing on both the TPPA Petition and the Motion to Amend, the trial court granted the Motion to Amend and instructed Defendants that, if they proceeded on the TPPA Petition, the court would apply it to the First Amended Complaint. Defendants decided to press forward with the TPPA Petition. After considering the evidence produced by the parties, the trial court denied the TPPA Petition, concluding that the statute did not apply because Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the action was based on, related to, or in response to their exercise of the rights to petition or of free speech. This appeal followed. We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s decision. We conclude that Defendants established a prima facie case that Plaintiffs initiated this action in response to Defendants’ exercise of both their right to petition and their right to free speech. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Tony Von Carruthers, a death-row inmate scheduled for execution on May 21, 2026, filed a motion requesting last-minute DNA testing of fingernail scrapings and bindings from the murder victims.1 Mr. Carruthers sought an expedited ruling on the motion without an evidentiary hearing. After analyzing the request under the mandatory and discretionary provisions of the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (DNA Act), the post-conviction court denied the motion. Mr. Carruthers appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon motion of Mr. Carruthers, this Court assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-201(d). Because Mr. Carruthers has failed to establish the statutory criteria for ordering analysis under the DNA Act, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Kelley Gambill, appeals her Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of aggravated cruelty to animals, for which she received a sentence of two years’ supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court misconstrued the statute's “no justifiable purpose” language and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.