APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a wrongful death negligence action arising out of a fatal automobile collision that occurred on Long Lane, a public road in Franklin, Tennessee, which abuts a TA Travel Center. On October 6, 2016, Kenneth Page (“Mr. Page”) was traveling northbound on Long Lane in a vehicle with his wife as passenger. As he began to turn left into the entrance of the TA truck stop marked for semi-trailer trucks (“the trucks only entrance”), where there was a limited view of oncoming traffic due to a hill that crested shortly ahead, Mr. Page was hit by Rondell M. Mershon (“Mr. Mershon”), who was traveling southbound on Long Lane on a motorcycle. The collision occurred on Long Lane before Mr. Page could enter the TA Travel Center. Mr. Mershon died soon after the collision. Mr. Mershon’s wife, Melba P. Mershon, brought a wrongful death negligence action on behalf of herself and her two daughters (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Mr. Page. She later amended the complaint to add the owner and operator of the TA Travel Center, HPT TA Properties Trust and TA Operating LLC d/b/a Travel Centers of America (collectively “the TA Defendants”), alleging that the TA Defendants created a hazardous condition by failing to display clearly visible signage at the “trucks only” entrance of the TA truck stop directing passenger vehicles to the proper entrance located a short distance down Long Lane. Thereafter, Plaintiffs settled their claims against Mr. Page, leaving the TA Defendants as the only defendants in the case. In 2017, the trial court granted the TA Defendants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that they owed no duty of care to Mr. Mershon. Plaintiffs appealed. In the first appeal of this action, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the TA Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs could not come forward with any evidence to show that they “owed a duty of care to Mr. Mershon related to the applicable sight distances and visibility of signs on TA’s property and that TA Defendants breached that duty.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs failed to present any genuine issues of material fact, and that the TA Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiffs could show no evidence that the TA Defendants owed a duty to Mr. Mershon or that any act or omission of the TA Defendants constituted a cause in fact or proximate cause of Mr. Mershon’s injuries. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the TA Defendants. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Petitioner, Lacy L. Austin, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for two counts of possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense; possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony involving the use of force or violence; simple possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s entry of a parenting plan naming Appellee/Father primary residential parent, awarding him sole decision-making authority, and awarding Mother 80 days of visitation. Because the trial court did not engage in a best-interest analysis as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106, and because the trial court’s orders are too vague to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful review of its decisions, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I concur in the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s ruling should be vacated in this case. Because I conclude that the record clearly reflects that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in this case, however, I write separately.

The State appeals a judgment against it for an injury caused by the gross negligence of its employees in the creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition on state-owned property. Because we conclude that the Tennessee Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims for gross negligence, we reverse.

In 2015, the Defendant, Ryan Leath, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over $10,000, and the trial court sentenced him to six years, suspended, and ordered him to supervised probation. In May 2023, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation for being arrested for driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license, and harassment. The trial court returned the Defendant to probation, extending it by six years, and ordered him to sign up and attend a mental health treatment program. In October 2023, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had not attended the program. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation after a hearing, and on appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Lonnie K. Cody, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary
sentence for aggravated burglary, vandalism of $1,000 or less, and unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); (2) persistent conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds relied on by the trial court and its determination that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.

In 2018, the Defendant, Joey Lasean Scribner, pleaded guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years to be served on probation.  The Defendant violated his probation, and the trial court reinstated his probation.  In April 2023, the Defendant was stopped by law enforcement for speeding.  Law enforcement determined that he was intoxicated.  After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had again violated his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to place adequate findings in the record to support its decision to fully revoke his probation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal after the trial court denied a motion to recuse. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

In this appeal, we examine the intersection of the rule governing the voluntary dismissal of a civil action, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, and the statutory scheme of the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (2021). Robert E. Lee Flade filed suit against several defendants over what he considered to be disparaging remarks that were made on social media. Two of the defendants, Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (“the BCLP”), each filed not only a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but also a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA. The TPPA petitions sought dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and an award of sanctions. Mr. Flade filed responses, and both the motions and the petitions were set for hearing. However, before the trial court conducted the hearing, Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. As a result, the trial court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice. Ms. Isaacs and the BCLP sought to have the trial court adjudicate their TPPA petitions notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court determined that Mr. Flade’s nonsuit concluded the matter and declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Flade v. City of Shelbyville, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 9, 2023). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that although the right to take a voluntary nonsuit is subject to certain limitations, the mere filing of a TPPA petition is not among them. Thus, we hold that the trial court correctly declined to adjudicate the pending TPPA petitions after Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s claims for the return of funds held by the plaintiff hospital as untimely filed. We reverse the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that the plaintiff revived the obligation throughout its repeated negotiations with the defendant.

A dental patient brought this negligence action against the dentist who performed implant procedures on her and his dental practice. After the patient voluntarily dismissed the case against the dentist, the trial court granted the dental practice’s motion for summary judgment. We have determined that genuine issues of material fact exist as to when the dental patient reasonably should have discovered that the dentist had acted wrongfully. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision.

In 2016, Petitioner, Quincy D. Scott, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of
aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of seventeen years’ incarceration as
a Range II, multiple offender at eighty-five percent to be served consecutively to sentences
for convictions in other counties. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the
Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief,
alleging the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following a bifurcated
hearing only on Petitioner’s appellate counsel claim, the post-conviction court granted a
delayed appeal, finding that Petitioner had received the ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. A panel of this Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the post-conviction
court had failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the
post-conviction court again heard Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel as well as his trial counsel claims. The post-conviction court denied relief, and
this appeal followed. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel ineffectively crossexamined
the State’s witnesses, that trial counsel failed to file motions to suppress several
pieces of evidence, that trial counsel failed to appeal the general sessions court’s bind over
of his charges to the grand jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction,
that newly discovered evidence proves his actual innocence, and that appellate counsel
failed to file a reply brief on appeal.1 After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

In this consolidated appeal, the Defendants, Sanquez Keshawn Jones and Deion Jamaar Glover, appeal their convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. For these convictions, both Defendants received an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. Relative to Defendant Jones’s appeal, he contends the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b)’s general prohibition on propensity evidence by admitting a photograph depicting him possessing a firearm as a juvenile because such behavior is a criminal act. As to Defendant Glover, he first argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State’s proof failed to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of these offenses. He further alleges the trial court erred by admitting a photograph showing him possessing a firearm, arguing this photograph was irrelevant under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 402, unfairly prejudicial under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, and propensity evidence violative of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Next, Defendant Glover contends he is entitled to plain error relief because his right to confrontation was violated when his cell phone data was extracted by a non-testifying Federal Bureau of Investigation agent and admitted against him at trial. Finally, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing based upon the dangerous offender classification of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b). After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Sidarius Jackson, of multiple drug, gang,
and gun related felonies, including murder. Before trial, the Defendant filed a motion to
sever his offenses into four separate trials, and the trial granted in part and denied in part
the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied
his motion to suppress evidence found as the result of a warrantless search; (2) the trial
court erred when it denied his motion to sever the offenses, (3) the State’s gangenhancement
presentment was insufficient; (4) the criminal gang statute was not properly
applied to his conspiracy and unlawful possession of a firearm conviction; (5) the trial court
improperly considered acts he committed while a juvenile during sentencing; and (6) the
evidence presented is insufficient to sustain his conviction for conspiracy to possess with
intent to sell a controlled substance. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Following a bench trial on April 8, 2022, Defendant, Tanya Ilic, was found guilty of one count of aggravated child abuse. Defendant was sentenced to sixteen years and six months of confinement at a rate of 100 percent service. On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain her conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal concerning the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, specifically to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-203, 29-20-204, and 29-20- 205 of the Act. At issue is the trial court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a county government for damages sustained from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the washout of a road maintained by the county. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action.

This appeal concerns the statute of limitations for a will contest. David Estes (“Petitioner”) filed a will contest in the Probate Court for Wilson County (“the Probate Court”) seeking to set aside the will of Petitioner’s father, Joe Richard Estes (“Decedent”). Jennifer Brooke Estes Little, Executrix of the Estate of Joe Richard Estes (“Respondent”), Petitioner’s sibling, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the applicable two-year statute of limitations had expired by the time of day that Petitioner filed his will contest. The Probate Court granted Respondent’s motion. Petitioner appeals to this Court. Petitioner’s will contest was filed two years from the date that Decedent’s will was admitted to probate; thus, it was timely filed. The exact hour and minute of the day the will contest was filed is immaterial. We, therefore, vacate the judgment of the Probate Court, and remand for this case to proceed.

Pro se litigant sought to receive part of the proceeds of a delinquent tax sale. The trial court found that she failed to prove her case. She appealed. We dismiss the appeal due to her failure to follow Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Johnathan James Gilley, of aggravated
assault for which he received a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment. In this direct appeal,
the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
element of serious bodily injury to sustain an aggravated assault conviction. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order granting the motions of Defendant, Larry McKay, (“Defendant”) and Shelby County District Attorney General, Steven J. Mulroy, (“DA Mulroy”) to disqualify the Office of Attorney General and Reporter (“Attorney General”) from representing the State during Defendant’s capital error coram nobis proceeding. The trial court concluded that a recently enacted statute, which gave the Attorney General “exclusive control over the [S]tate’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases, see 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“Public Chapter 182”), violated Article VI, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Attorney General obtained permission from the trial court and this court to file an interlocutory appeal on behalf of the State to address this constitutional issue of first impression. After thoroughly considering the briefs and arguments of the parties and amici curiae, this court concludes that the trial court erred in finding that Public Chapter 182 was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant, Anthony Cornelius Baylis, appeals his Monroe County Circuit Court jury conviction of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; that the trial court erred in affirming his conviction as the thirteenth juror; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of the grand jury foreperson’s signature attesting that witnesses were sworn; that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony; that the State wrongfully commented on Defendant’s election to not testify; and that the trial court erred by imposing a fully-incarcerative sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant, Antwan Jacques Whitehead, was convicted by a Wilson County jury for second degree murder by unlawful distribution of fentanyl, for which he received a twenty-three year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain text messages and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew the substance was fentanyl. After review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The Defendant, Triston Robert Milke, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C
felony, in the Cumberland County Criminal Court and was placed on judicial diversion
with a probationary period of three years. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (Supp. 2023)
(aggravated assault). The trial court revoked the Defendant’s diversion and entered a
judgment of conviction imposing an effective sentence of three years to be served in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his
judicial diversion and ordering confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.