APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Carlos C. Beasley, referred herein as “the defendant,” appeals as of right from a conviction for especially aggravated robbery by a Shelby County jury. The same jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, from which the defendant does not appeal. The Shelby County Criminal Court imposed a sentence of twenty-five (25) years for especially aggravated robbery in the Department of Correction. The defendant presents two appellate issues: 1) whether the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that every element of especially aggravated robbery has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and 2) whether the record shows that the trial court in its capacity as thirteenth (13th) juror failed to independently weigh the evidence upon consideration of the motion for a new trial.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding a final decree of divorce entered in the Shelby County
Circuit Court. The Husband appeals the trial court’s order claiming error in several aspects of the
decision, including the determination as to his alimony obligation.

A jury found the defendant guilty of selling 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance.  He received a 15 year sentence as a Range II offender, consecutive to a prior felony. The defendant asserts error in allowing the state’s expert witness to testify to the aggregate weight of cocaine sold, when the witness did not test every particle of the submitted evidence. The defendant further asserts error in the trial court’s admitting a video tape of the sale and in the trial court’s sentencing. The judgment from the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County which convicted the
defendant of aggravated arson. The defendant appealed and argued that the aggravated arson statute applies only when an individual other than the arsonist sustains serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, because he was the individual who sustained serious bodily injuries, the defendant contended that the aggravated arson statute was inapplicable. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The appellant, Donald E. Griffin, brought suit seeking damages for injuries he sustained when his vehicle was struck from the rear in Maury County by a car driven by Richard Vaughn. After obtaining a judgment against Vaughn in the amount of $225,000, Griffin learned that Vaughn had only $50,000 of liability insurance coverage. Griffin then requested that his uninsured motorist carrier, the appellee Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), pay the remainder of the judgment up to its policy limit of $100,000. When Shelter refused the claim, Griffin brought this action against Shelter in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Chancellor granted summary judgment to Shelter, finding that Griffin had failed to comply with the notice provisions of the insurance policy and with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a). The Court of Appeals agreed that Griffin had failed to comply with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a) and thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Shelter. This Court thereafter granted Griffin’s application for permission to appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed DROWOTA, J.,

The dispositive issue in this case is whether an appeal as of right from a trial court’s judgment in an attorney-disciplinary proceeding initiated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-201–2041 lies in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. Because we hold that jurisdiction over an appeal as of right in a statutory disciplinary proceeding lies in the Court of Appeals, we reverse the intermediate appellate court’s order transferring the case to the Supreme Court, and we transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for its review on the merits. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Transfer Order of the Court of Appeals Reversed; Case Transferred to Court of Appeals