APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Norman B. Thompson, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation. We find no abuse of discretion in the revocation; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant’s probation.

The Defendant was convicted of DUI, second offense, and driving on a revoked license, second offense. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, and he subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his request for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial; that he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge refused to recuse himself; and that the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence. We affirm the denial of the Defendant's request for post-conviction relief.

Defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder and received a life sentence. In this appeal, defendant alleges: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress both his oral and written statements given to authorities; and (2) the state improperly exercised its peremptory challenges based upon race and gender. Upon our review, we are unable to resolve the suppression issue due to inadequate findings of fact and, therefore, remand for further findings regarding the oral and written statements. We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that there were legitimate race and gender-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges. The judgment of the trial court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further findings and/or proceedings.

The defendant pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement he agreed to a three-year sentence as a Range I Standard Offender, with the manner of service to be determined after a hearing by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 270 days in the workhouse on weekends ("day for day") from 7:00 p.m. on Fridays to 7:00 p.m. on Sundays and five years probation with a 10:00 p.m. curfew on weekdays. The defendant contends he should have received full probation or some other less restrictive form of alternative sentencing. We affirm the trial court's denial of full probation but modify the time of service in the workhouse on weekends to 104 days.

In 1982, the Petitioner pled guilty in Shelby County to two counts of rape, three counts of robbery, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, four counts of burglary, one count of attempted burglary, one count of first degree criminal sexual conduct, one count of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, and one count of a crime against nature. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of ten years. In 1991, the Petitioner was convicted in Davidson County of twenty-one counts of rape, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of first-degree burglary, one count of second-degree burglary, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of robbery, and one count of assault with intent to commit rape. In 1997, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition challenging his 1982 convictions and sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals the trial court's ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, George Thurman Haynie, Jr., filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking a felony conviction for passing a worthless check and a misdemeanor conviction for passing a worthless check. The Circuit Court of Williamson County dismissed the petition and Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record, the pro se brief filed by the Appellant, the brief filed by the State, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

ThePetitioners filed pro-se petitions for post-conviction relief on September 25, 1997, in accordance with the Post Conviction Relief Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-101. Amended petitions were subsequently filed by court appointed counsel on November 14, 1997. The Petitioners’ petitions were later dismissed and this appeal followed. In this appeal, the Petitioners set forth several grounds upon which they claim that post-conviction relief should have been granted. Specifically, the Petitioners allege ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that counsel: failed to file a motion for judgment of acquittal; failed to appeal the judgment of conviction for second degree murder; failed to dismiss two jurors who were alleged to be biased against the Petitioners, which resulted in a denial of their right to a fair and impartial jury; failed to interview and cross-examine a witness of the State’s; and failed to file a motion to suppress photographs that were entered into evidence.  Petitioner Donnie Wheeler also contends that post-conviction relief should have been granted because counsel failed to request an instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal responsibility for the facilitation of a felony, and because the trial court failed to charge the jury with the same lesser-included offense. After careful examination of the issues set forth herein, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief to the Petitioners.

The Petitioner, George Todd, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 1985, the Petitioner entered into a negotiated plea agreement and pled guilty to second degree murder. As part of the plea agreement the Petitioner received a forty-five year sentence as a Range II offender. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was denied and the Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition to this Court. On December 21, 1989, this Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. On August 24, 2000, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lake County Circuit Court, alleging that the passage of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 served to void his sentence and all other sentences in the State of Tennessee, and was the equivalent of a pardon. The Lake County Circuit Court denied the Petitioner's petition.

The defendant pled guilty to felonious possession of a handgun for an agreed sentence of one year.  The parties reserved a certified question of law; namely, whether an individual, who was previously convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but subsequently had his full citizenship rights restored pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-101--105, can lawfully possess a handgun. We conclude that a convicted felon, otherwise prohibited from possessing a handgun under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A), may lawfully possess a handgun in his residence after his “full citizenship rights” have been restored.