APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Lauderdale County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for robbery, and following a trial, a Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant of the offense charged. In this direct appeal, the defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction; (2) whether evidence introduced at trial was illegally obtained in contravention of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; (3) whether the defendant was deprived of an "independent analysis of the evidence"; and (4) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury. Finding no error in the record, we affirm the defendant's conviction.

We granted review to determine whether a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution occurs when a police officer activates the blue lights on his patrol car and orders a person to stop, but the person flees and does not submit to authority. The trial court suppressed evidence obtained from the defendant after determining that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the defendant had committed a crime before seizing the defendant by activating his blue lights and ordering him to stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that there was no seizure because the defendant fled and did not yield to the officer’s show of authority and reversed the judgment.

After a thorough review of the record and the relevant authority, we hold that under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was seized when the officer activated the blue lights on his patrol car, ordered the defendant to stop, and pursued him for several blocks. Because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to effect such a seizure, the evidence seized from the defendant was properly suppressed by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Yasmond Fenderson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief to challenge his Knox County convictions of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing but denied post-conviction relief. The petitioner appeals and claims the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding that the record supports the post-conviction court's denial of relief, we affirm.

In this post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner alleges that his pre-trial counsel failed to accompany him while he gave statements to the police and that trial counsel failed to offer the testimony of an expert pathologist. These failures, the petitioner asserts, deprived him of the constitutionally-grounded right to the effective assistance of counsel. Our review is guided by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Strickland v. Washington, which requires petitioners alleging ineffective assistance of counsel to prove that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient representation. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). We readily conclude that pre-trial counsel's representation fell below reasonable standards. Because we hold, however, that the petitioner has failed to prove he was prejudiced by the deficient pre-trial representation, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought. As far as trial counsel's failure to offer the testimony of an expert pathologist is concerned, we hold that the petitioner failed to sufficiently articulate this claim in his post-conviction petition. Thus, the trial court properly refused to hear evidence concerning that claim. It results that the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

Convicted by a jury of third-offense driving while under the influence (DUI), the defendant, Jacquie Upchurch Giardina, challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and her sentence of eleven months and 29 days to be served in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the conviction and the sentence.

I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the convictions as to both defendants. With regard to the imposition of the death sentences in this case, however, I cannot agree. My concerns, as expressed below, pertain to: (1) the comparative proportionality review protocol imposed by the majority; and (2) the trial court’s refusal, during the sentencing phase, to address a jury question related to the amount of time the defendants would serve under a life sentence.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Gregory Scott Payne, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of sexual battery, one count of attempted rape, and two counts of rape. Following a trial, the jury found defendant guilty of one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony, as a lesser-included offense of one of the rape charges, and not guilty of the remaining offenses. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant as a standard Range I offender to two years in confinement. In this appeal, defendant asserts that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike the victim's testimony or declare a mistrial (based on the failure of the police to produce the taped recording of the victim's statement). Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence length and by denying him probation or any other form of alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of DUI and driving in violation of a Habitual Traffic Offender Order. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence corroborating the defendant's statement that he was driving. Furthermore, the trial court is presumed to have fulfilled its role as thirteenth juror when, as in the instant case, the trial court overrules a defendant's motion for new trial without comment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed

The petitioner originally pled guilty to aggravated rape and, by agreement, was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Petitioner timely sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for driving on a revoked license. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment

The petitioner appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition. The issue presented for appeal is whether the petitioner's post-conviction petition is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of intentionally evading arrest in an automobile, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to six years incarceration. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by classifying him as a career offender. Concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's determination that the defendant is a career offender, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for re-sentencing.

The defendant was convicted of reckless aggravated assault and sentenced as a Standard Range I offender to two (2) years, with all but ten (10) days suspended. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant acted recklessly in causing serious bodily injury to the victim. However, applying the appropriate factors for consideration, we conclude that the defendant is eligible for judicial diversion, and there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for judicial diversion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

The appellant, Russell Lane Overby, appeals from the Hardin County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On December 8, 1997, Overby was found guilty of rape by a Hardin County jury, and was sentenced to a term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this collateral attack of his rape conviction, Overby alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, both at trial and on direct appeal. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.