APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Based on the foregoing conclusions and the record as a whole, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Appellant is an inmate of the Department of Corrections serving two life sentences for two first degree murder convictions with sentences imposed in 1978. He became eligible for parole, and on July 3, 2001, a hearing was held before the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. His application for parole was denied on July 3, 2001 and review of parole was set for July of 2011. Final disposition denying parole was entered October 2, 2001. On October 29, 2001, Appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, which petition was dismissed by the trial court on January 10, 2003. We affirm the trial court Order of Dismissal relative to the merits of the denial of parole but hold that postponement of parole review until July of 2011 was an arbitrary exercise of power by the parole board and, therefore, reverse the Order of the trial court.

The defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to reckless homicide and agreed to a sentence of seven years as a Range II, multiple offender. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined following a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve one year in the county jail followed by six years in community corrections. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in requiring any confinement in this case. We conclude that the defendant is not eligible for community corrections and remand for re-sentencing.

Petitioner, James Dison, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted for rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years confinement. This Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. James Dison, No. 03-C01-9602-CC-00051, 1997 WL 36844, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, January 31, 1997), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. 1997). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was appointed counsel and subsequently filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, simple possession, and driving on a suspended license. The defendant contends on appeal that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and aggravated assault, (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of inactive marijuana metabolites found in the defendant's blood after the accident, (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning extrapolation of the defendant's blood alcohol concentration back to the time of the accident, (4) the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant to plead guilty to driving on a suspended license, (5) the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning extradition and instructing the jury on flight, and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Charles Beard, Sr. ("Father") filed a petition seeking to have primary residential custody of the parties' two children transferred from Florence E. Beard ("Mother") to him. In the alternative, Father sought a reduction in his child support payments. After a hearing, the Trial Court refused to change the custody arrangement, again designating Mother the primary residential parent. The Trial Court did not alter Father's child support payments. Father appeals. We affirm.

A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Bobby Blair, of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a continuance when the state announced a few days before trial that it was going to call an expert witness to testify; (3) the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress and exclude evidence because the defense was not able to examine and test the equipment and chemicals found at the crime scene; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the state's expert to testify that the defendant was not manufacturing methamphetamine for personal use; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine; and (6) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on "immediate precursor." We conclude that no error occurred, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Honnie Gunnoe and Virginia Ott Gunnoe ("Plaintiffs") sued their neighbors, Gerald Lee Lambert and Janice Lee Lambert ("the Lamberts") and L.D. Simerly and Geraldine Simerly ("the Simerlys") seeking, among other things, to quiet title to a parcel of land. After a bench trial, the Trial Court found, inter alia, that Plaintiffs did not own the land in question. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The petitioner appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his appeal and petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that he was entitled to a criminal court review of the general sessions court's ruling on his motion to suppress evidence. Because we conclude we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellant, Joe Robert Osborne, was convicted by a jury of one count of Driving Under the Influence (DUI). As a result, he was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, with probation after service of 48 hours in jail, revocation of his driver's license for one year, mandatory attendance at Alcohol Safety School and assessed a $350 fine. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the "missing witness" inference. Because we conclude there was no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Chitwood, pled guilty in the Clay County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and agreed to a five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his entire sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that he should have received an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Morgan Susanne Foxx (“Wife”) sued Steven C. Bolden (“Husband”) for a divorce. After a lengthy trial, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce, divided the marital property, and awarded Husband $25,000 in attorney fees. Wife appeals claiming, among other things, that the Trial Court erred when it failed to classify any of Husband’s TVA funded retirement pension as marital property and equitably distribute it. Wife also claims the award of attorney fees to Husband was an abuse of discretion. We agree with Wife regarding the pension and, therefore, vacate the judgment as to the marital property division and remand this case to the Trial Court to determine how much of Husband’s TVA funded retirement pension is marital property and to make an equitable distribution of all the marital property, including this additional asset. We likewise vacate the award of attorney fees to Husband since the propriety of that award may be affected by the marital property distribution. We affirm the granting of the divorce.
 

Husband-appellant appeals order of the trial court holding him in civil contempt and designating punishment and the order of the trial court denying motion to modify alimony order. The notice of appeal was filed 30 days from the date of the trial court’s order denying the motion to modify but the filing was approximately one year after the contempt order. On appeal, we dismiss the appeal of the contempt order as untimely and affirm the order denying modification. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Dismissed in Part, Affirmed in Part and Remanded W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J.,

Petitioner, Jacob Lee Davis, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel to assist him during the post-conviction hearing. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because they (1) failed to properly conduct voir dire or preserve for appeal the issues concerning the selection of jurors; (2) failed to pursue meaningful plea negotiations; and (3) failed to adequately apprize Petitioner of his right to testify. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Ernest G. Murphy, pled guilty in the DeKalb County Circuit Court to vehicular assault, a Class D felony; driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; and leaving the scene of an accident, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the defendant's vehicular assault and DUI convictions and sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to three years, nine months. For each misdemeanor conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days and ordered that all of the sentences be served consecutively. The trial court also ordered that the defendant serve four and one-half years in confinement and the remainder of his sentences on probation. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences and by denying full probation. Although we determine that consecutive sentencing and denial of full probation are justified, we conclude that the sentences stated at the sentencing hearing and the sentences reflected in the judgments of conviction are dissimilar. The judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing pursuant to law.

Defendant, Daniel L. Robinson, entered guilty pleas on December 19, 2001, to the offenses of felony possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine, in case 2000-C-1609, and attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell, in case 2000-C-902. Defendant was sentenced to five years probation for each conviction, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of ten years probation. On January 10, 2003, a probation violation warrant was issued against Defendant, alleging that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation based on a new arrest for homicide. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that Defendant's original sentences be placed into effect. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering revocation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the probation violation warrant.

The petitioner, Joseph Brown, appeals pro se the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for facilitation of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He argues that the trial court’s failure to advise him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination voids his guilty pleas and that the court’s failure to provide him with a transcript of the post-conviction hearing violated his constitutional rights. Additionally, he argues that the record does not reflect that counsel who represented him at the post-conviction hearing was relieved from continuing to represent him on appeal, and that he is entitled to counsel in his appeal to this court. We agree that the petitioner is entitled to be represented by counsel in the first tier appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal and remand to the post-conviction court with instructions to reenter its findings of fact and conclusions of law, with the petitioner’s time for appeal to start at the date of reentry, and the petitioner to be represented by counsel on appeal.

Plaintiff corporation sued former employees/officers alleging breach of non-compete
agreements, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unfair competition, intentional inducement to
breach a contract, and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted employees summary judgment on all claims and, on appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on breach of non-compete agreements and conversion of intangible personal property claims. This Court reversed the summary judgment on the remaining claims and remanded the case for trial. The pending case on remand was voluntarily dismissed in the trial court and, subsequently, plaintiff sued defendants for the same remanded claims. Defendants moved to dismiss on the doctrine of res judicata (splitting cause of action) and the trial court denied the motion. After a trial on the merits, the trial court entered monetary judgment against defendants. Defendants appeal. We affirm in part as modified and reverse in part.

The Petitioner, James E. Swiggett, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has not established that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence him or that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I concur fully with the majority’s well-reasoned opinion except in one respect. The majority concludes that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that B&L’s customer information, such as customer names, prices charged for services rendered, customer contract renewal dates and the identity of customer representatives, constituted confidential information. I disagree with the majority’s reasoning on this issue.
 

The appellant, Gene Booker, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of
aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of fifty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and 2) the trial court erred in determining that the offense of being a felon in possession of a handgun should be tried with the other offenses. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellee-wife of deceased spouse sued a notary public and his bonding company for damages resulting in the notary public’s taking the acknowledgment of the signature of wife’s imposter to a waiver of retirement benefits and completing the acknowledgment certificate. The trial court found that the notary public owed a duty of reasonable care which he breached resulting in damage to appellee-wife and entered judgment for wife. Notary public appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Adrian R. Arnett, timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, attacking his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of setting fire to personal property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, he raises one issue: his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly request funding for and obtaining the services of an independent expert in forensic DNA analysis in order to challenge DNA evidence introduced by the State. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves a dispute over the existence and location of two easements and a request for a mandatory injunction. The first disputed easement arises from the usage of the Plaintiff's property by adjacent owners and the second disputed easement arises from a transfer of property from the Defendants to Plaintiff. The trial court below found that only one of the disputed easements was before the court as an issue and found the easement existed over Plaintiff's land. In addition, the trial court did not issue, and made no findings regarding, the mandatory injunction requested by Defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and remand.

The Petitioner, Jason Warren Allen, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition is time-barred and the petitioner asserts no claim which would toll the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.