APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Charles C. Phillips, Jr. sued United Services Automobile Association ("USAA") under his homeowners insurance policy. His suit was prompted by USAA's denial of coverage for water damage to the plaintiff's house. The plaintiff claims that the damage was due to water seepage as a direct result of the faulty design or negligent installation of the synthetic stucco system applied to the exterior of his house. The plaintiff amended his complaint, seeking class certification for all other USAA insureds who had sustained similar losses caused by the failure of synthetic stucco material and whose claims had been denied by USAA. Following a bench trial on the issues of coverage and class certification, the trial court determined that the plaintiff's policy provided coverage for the water damage that ensued as a result of water penetrating the stucco exterior. In addition, the trial court ordered that a class of plaintiffs be conditionally certified. USAA appeals the finding of coverage. We affirm.

The petitioner, Thomas Edward Reddick, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty-eight years imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which petition the post-conviction court dismissed for failure to state a colorable claim for relief. The petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we dismiss the petitioner's appeal as being untimely.

The defendant, Dexter Lineberry, was convicted by a Wayne County jury of assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six months with all but ninety days suspended for the assault conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days with all but ninety days suspended for the evading arrest charge, with the sentences to be served concurrently. In this appeal as of right, the defendant presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for assault; and (2) whether the ninety-day jail sentence was appropriate. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The controversy here concerns certain audio and videotapes which were introduced in a bench trial and marked as exhibits. Following this Court's rejection of the State's application for Rule 11 review, the Court of Criminal Appeals, on motion of the appellee, entered an order returning this evidence to the "permanent possession" of the appellee. The issue framed and briefed by the parties requires us to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' order returning the tapes to the appellee was consistent with statutes and regulations applicable to the retention and disposal of such evidence. At the threshold, however, we are confronted by an issue neither raised nor briefed by the parties: whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion in the first place. Upon consideration, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion for the following reasons: 1. The Supreme Court was the last court to exercise jurisdiction (prior to the motion) in its rejection of the State's Rule 11 application; 2. The case was not remanded; and 3. The mandate had issued. Additionally, in response to the issue raised and briefed by the parties, we hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 18-3-111 and Records Disposition Authorization (RDA) Number 1672, which control the disposition of the evidence at issue here, do not authorize the method of record disposition sought to be accomplished in the case under review. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is vacated.

The biological, custodial parent of a minor child appeals the juvenile court’s award of visitation rights to the child’s adult half-sister. We find no authority granting an adult sibling visitation rights to a minor child. We accordingly vacate the juvenile court’s order.
 

The petitioner, Marquez Crenshaw, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his five especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, his especially aggravated robbery conviction, and his aggravated burglary conviction and resulting effective sentence of twenty-seven years. He claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, primarily regarding the failure to present alibi evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Marc Adolph Lewin, pled guilty to obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, for which he received an eight-year suspended sentence. He was ordered to serve eight years of supervised probation with the conditions that the probation be supervised for a minimum of four years, completion of three hundred hours of public service work, and payment of costs on a schedule prepared by a probation officer. After the issuance of a probation violation warrant based on the appellant's failure of a drug screen, the appellant was ordered to serve his sentence in incarceration. He appeals the revocation of probation arguing that the trial court erred by basing its decision on allegations that were not supported by the evidence and an unsubstantiated laboratory report. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this class action, the Trial Court refused to permit Homebuilders and individual claimants to intervene. On appeal, we reverse as to Homebuilders, but affirm as to the individual claimants.

The petitioner, Curtis E. Duke, was convicted of two counts of the sale of crack cocaine, one count of possession of crack cocaine with the intent to sell, two counts of criminal impersonation, and one count of failure to appear. As a result, he was sentenced to 39 years in the Department of Correction. See State v. Curtis Emery Duke, No. M2000-00350-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 252080 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Mar. 14, 2001), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Mar. 27, 2001). In this pro se post-conviction petition, the petitioner presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding that the petitioner waived the amendment of the indictment regarding variance; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the petitioner's convictions were not obtained in violation of double jeopardy; (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the petitioner; and (4) whether the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel. Because the first three issues should have been addressed on direct appeal, we conclude that they are waived. Further, petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel. We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

The Trial Court granted defendants Summary Judgment on claims of fraud in the inducement to contract. On appeal, we Affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court
pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Charles Crenshaw,
appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for arrest of judgment. Finding that the instant
petition is not proper as either a motion in arrest of judgment, petition for post-conviction relief,
or application for writ of habeas corpus relief, we affirm the dismissal of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of divorce proceedings brought in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, and the Chancery Court of McNairy County, Tennessee. In dividing the parties' real property, the chancery court reduced Husband's share by the amount of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court in its decree of divorce. We granted permission to appeal. We conclude that the chancery court erred in enforcing a decree that was not properly registered under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the chancery court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Blount County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael W. Maples, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A  felony. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent twenty-five-year sentences for the two convictions. In this appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations for filing a new action under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105(a) commenced on the date of the appellate court's judgment remanding the cause to the trial court for further proceedings or on the date of the trial court's order of dismissal following the remand. We hold that the statute of limitations commenced on the date of the trial court's order of dismissal and that the plaintiffs' re-filing of their action was therefore timely under the savings statute. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of issues pretermitted by its ruling.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, James Howard Davis, appeals the Benton County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief. Davis pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”) eighth
offense and violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. On appeal, he asserts that he
was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Administrator Ad Litem for estate of deceased-grantor appeals trial court's finding that deceased grantor was competent at the time he executed a deed of real property to his daughter, and that he was not acting under undue influence at the time of execution. We affirm.

The petitioner, Eddie Howard Pittman, appeals from a judgment denying post-conviction relief. As grounds for a new trial, the petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that there was error in the instructions to the jury. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Craig Stephen Bourne, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree murder, and aggravated burglary and effective thirty-two-year sentence. The petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys (1) failed to raise the issue of double jeopardy; (2) failed to raise the issue of the trial court's interference during plea negotiations; (3) failed to raise the issue that the trial court gave the jury inaccurate instructions on release eligibility dates; (4) failed to challenge a jury instruction on a crime that was not included in the indictment in his motion for a new trial; and (5) failed, in the petitioner's motion for a new trial, to challenge the trial court's denial of trial counsel's motion to withdraw before trial. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The City of Chattanooga abolished its school system which was then integrated into the Hamilton County system. Two and one-half years later the Plaintiffs, who were administrators in the City system, filed this action claiming that under Tennessee law their compensation was unlawfully reduced by the Board of Education of Hamilton County. The County insisted that the Commissioner of Education of Tennessee approved the Personnel Plan proposed by the Superintendent of Education of Hamilton, as required by law, and that the Plaintiffs were paid in accordance with the Plan. Moreover, the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City and its teachers expired concurrently with the abolition of the school system, and the Plaintiffs’ salary agreement also expired. Further, the salary of Ms. Hardaway, paid by the City, was in excess of the negotiated amount, and the duties of Ms. Settles were substantially less burdensome in her new position.
 

Although I agree with many of the conclusions set forth in the majority opinion, I respectfully disagree with its primary conclusion that the petitioner did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. In my view, he established deficiency and prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bill L. Williams, was convicted of theft of property over $10,000 in value, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to serve six years in the Shelby County Workhouse. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court revoked the probation of the appellant, Sherman T. Mason, Jr., as a result of his second probation violation warrant. Consequently, he was ordered to serve the balance of his effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve out the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Mother appeals the decision of the trial court which terminated her parental rights on two statutory grounds, abandonment and failure to comply with the permanency plan, and upon the finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. Mother claims the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing evidentiary standard necessary to prove the statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.

WILLIAM B. CAIN, J., concurring. I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights