APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Mario Merritt, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of especially aggravated robbery. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now brings this appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the decision of Anesthesia & Pain Consultants, P.C. ("A&PC") to terminate the employment of Dr. Alan Gardner. After A&PC fired Dr. Gardner, he brought this action alleging breach of employment contract, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and promissory fraud. The trial court granted A&PC summary judgment on the misrepresentation claims. At the close of Dr. Gardner's proof at trial, the trial court granted A&PC a directed verdict on his claims of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The jury returned a verdict in favor of A&PC on the promissory fraud claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Matthew Lawson, by his mother and next friend, Shirley Lawson, and Ms. Lawson, individually (collectively "the plaintiffs") brought an action for negligence against Edgewater Hotels, Inc., and Stokely Hospitality Properties, Inc. (collectively "the defendants"), alleging that Matthew sustained injuries as a consequence of swimming in the indoor pool at the defendants' hotel. According to the plaintiffs, Matthew sustained these injuries (1) due to the excessive amount of chlorine in the pool water and/or (2) because the defendants failed to properly ventilate the indoor portion of the pool. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as to both of the plaintiffs' theories. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants' pool contained excessive levels of chlorine. However, we vacate the trial court's judgment with respect to the allegation that the defendants' indoor pool was not properly ventilated. We hold that the defendants failed to meet their burden on summary judgment with respect to this claim.

The appellant, Christopher Kirkendall, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

Jeffrey Scott West (“Father”) filed a petition against his former wife, Sharon Ann West (“Mother”), seeking to modify the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan, which plan had not required Mother to pay child support due to the fact she was unemployed. The trial court, finding that, since the entry of the parenting plan, Mother had had a two-year gross income of over $25,000, held that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying an order requiring that Mother pay child support of $290 per month. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay child support and in the methodology used by the court in calculating child support. We affirm.

This appeal involves allegations of sexual abuse brought against Wilburn Lee Brown, Jr., ("Petitioner") by his stepdaughter. After the allegations were investigated, DCS concluded there was substantial and material evidence to support the allegations and the report of abuse would be "validated" pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0250-7-9-.02. Because Petitioner was employed at a youth development center, he was notified that his employer would be informed that he was the indicated perpetrator in a "validated" report of child sexual abuse and that Petitioner was no longer allowed to have access to children. After exhausting his administrative appeals, Petitioner appealed to the Trial Court. The Trial Court concluded there was substantial and material evidence to support the allegations of abuse and affirmed. Petitioner appeals and we, likewise, affirm.

I agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that, under the terms of the 1989 Sentencing Act, the trial court erred by applying enhancement factors (10), (11), and (17).  It is my view, however, that the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 2004), precludes the application of enhancement factor (21) in this case.

The Appellant, Rosendo Reyna, appeals his convictions for multiple felony drug offenses by a Shelby County jury. On appeal, Reyna raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After review, we find the evidence sufficient. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. However, because the record reflects that the offenses were not properly merged, we remand for merger and entry of corrected judgments.

This case involves a homeowner who defaulted on her home mortgage. After the holder of the note commenced foreclosure proceedings, the homeowner filed suit in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County asserting numerous claims against the original mortgagee, the subsequent purchasers of the note, and an executive employed by one of the subsequent purchasers. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the homeowner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The homeowner appealed and, while the appeal was pending, requested the trial court to vacate its earlier decision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the homeowner's motion. We now affirm both of the trial court's decisions.

The defendant, Jimmy Ray Dockery, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's decision to deny probation on his two-year sentence for attempt to fraudulently obtain a controlled substance. Based on our review of the record, we affirm the judgment.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the plaintiff sustained a 25% vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The defendant asserts that: 1) the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof of permanent injury; 2) the trial court erred in finding plaintiff had an operative disk lesion which necessitated surgery; 3) the trial court erred in not granting defendant's motion for additional facts or to amend judgement; and 4) the trial court erred in finding that Dr. Anthony Segal's charges were reasonable and necessary and in granting plaintiff's motion for discretionary costs. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded plaintiff a 25% disability impairment to the body as a whole, urging that the award should have been higher. We agree with the position of the     plaintiff, and for the reasons set forth below, we modify the judgment of the trial court to award a forty-five percent (45%) vocational disability to the body as a whole.

Gibraltar Taft Highway Limited Partnership, through its general partner, The Raines Group ("the plaintiff"), filed an application with the Town of Walden's Board of Aldermen ("the Board"), seeking a permit to build a townhouse project on property located within Walden. The Board denied the plaintiff's application. The plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the trial court. Following a hearing, that court upheld the decision of the Board, finding that the Board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily, or capriciously in rejecting the application. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court erred in its determination. We affirm.

Action alleged retaliatory discharge for filing workers compensation claim. Employer defended termination on grounds employee was unable to perform his job due to disability. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. We affirm.

In this dispute between attorney and client, a jury awarded the client damages against the attorney which award was approved by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm.

In this breach of contract action based on a policy of insurance, the Trial Court determined defendant had breached the contract and awarded compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages. On appeal, we reverse in part,  affirm in part, vacate and remand.

The Trial Court awarded child support from birth of the child to marriage of the parties, subsequent to their divorce. The father appealed. We affirm.

The Chancery Court transferred this action to Circuit Court and plaintiff has appealed the transfer. We affirm.

The defendant, Jason D. Love, appeals the trial court's denial of alternative sentences. The defendant pled guilty to three counts of delivery of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing.

Following his guilty plea to two counts of theft, the defendant, Jody Lee Turner, was sentenced in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to an effective four-year term to be served on probation, supervised by a community corrections program agency. A few weeks later, the court revoked the community placement and ordered the defendant to serve his four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgments below.

The matter now before us finds its genesis in a divorce action brought by Ellen Hopson Bell ("Wife") against her husband, William Hall Bell ("Husband"). In her complaint for divorce, Wife sought, inter alia, reasonable attorney's fees. She renewed her request for fees at the conclusion of the divorce trial. Without conducting a hearing, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,000, representing one half of her reasonable legal expenses incurred in the divorce. Husband appealed. We subsequently vacated the trial court's judgment, remanding the matter to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of Wife's entitlement to a fee award. The trial court conducted a hearing and subsequently ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,250 as an allowance on her legal expenses. Husband appeals. We affirm and hold that Wife is entitled to her fees and expenses incurred on appeal.

The state appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's order granting Donald W. Streck's motion to receive jail credits toward his Tennessee sentence for time that he spent in federal custody serving federal sentences. Because the lower court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the motion, we reverse.

The Commissioner found defendant's physician breached the standard of care in the treatment of plaintiff, but refused to award damages. On appeal, we affirm Commissioner's finding of breach, but award damages and remand to enter Judgment.

Husband appeals property settlement award to wife in divorce action. On appeal, we affirm.

In this post-divorce case, Jeannette Cutrer Day Siniard ("Mother") sought to modify the parties' residential schedule pertaining to their children. That schedule provided that Caroline Siniard and Wesley Siniard (collectively "the children") would alternate weeks between Mother's home and the home of their father, Mark Alan Siniard ("Father"). The trial court granted Mother's request in part by designating her as the primary residential parent of Caroline. In a subsequent order granting Mother child support, the trial court went further and designated Mother as the primary residential parent of both children. Father appeals, contending, among other things, that Mother failed to show a material change in circumstances warranting a modification of the residential schedule. We affirm.

Homeowner’s insurance policyholders filed a complaint against an insurance carrier seeking benefits under policy and a declaratory judgment that policy language was ambiguous. Homeowners filed a motion seeking certification as a class action. The insurance carrier filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff Beckwith’s claim for benefits was time barred and plaintiff Simmons’s claim was non-justiciable. The insurance carrier filed separate motions to stay discovery and defer the class certification hearing until after the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court granted the insurance carrier summary judgment against all plaintiffs, thereby disposing of the class certification issue. Homeowners appeal from the order granting summary judgment. We affirm.