APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Cedric Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days of confinement at the county workhouse, with six months of the sentence to be suspended. On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court erred in failing to set a minimum service percentage for his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Stewart, was convicted of destruction or interference with utility lines, a Class E felony, following a bench trial in the Criminal Court of Shelby County. He was sentenced as a multiple offender to three years and three months in the county workhouse. On appeal, Stewart claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not rebut his defenses of duress and necessity beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority’s sound conclusion that Williamson County was required to collect the new development tax at the time of the application for the building permit, I disagree with the ruling that ultimate tax liability must be based on the projected – rather than the actual – square footage of construction. I would, therefore, hold that when the developer has paid a sum based on projected square footage and later built a larger structure than initially anticipated, the County would be entitled to recover the deficiency in payment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-6-108(6) (2005), 9-3-202 (1999).

The Defendant, Gary Lynn Morgan, pleaded guilty, just prior to trial and in front of the jury, to two counts of evading arrest, one a felony and the other a misdemeanor. He proceeded to trial on the remaining counts of the indictment, and the jury found the Defendant guilty. On appeal, the Defendant argues that, because the trial court failed to question him in accordance with constitutional and supervisory authority mandates, the trial court erred by denying his request to set aside his guilty pleas. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. We remand solely for the purpose of entry of corrected judgments.

The petitioner, Terrance D. Nichols, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life with parole following his conviction for first degree murder. On appeal, he raises the single issue of whether the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. The State argues that the petition for post-conviction relief was untimely and, despite being heard and ruled upon by the post-conviction court, asserts this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain review. We agree that the record supports this argument; therefore, the appeal must be dismissed.

This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation of the Williamson County Adequate Facilities Tax Act, which imposes a privilege tax based upon the gross square footage of new construction in Williamson County. In 2005, the County notified certain builders of new residential construction that a review for the period from January 1, 1998, through December 31, 2003, indicated that the builders owed an additional amount of privilege tax because the actual square footage of the completed construction was greater than the projected square footage at the time the privilege tax was paid. The builders objected to payment of the additional privilege tax and filed an action for declaratory judgment, contending that the County’s belated collection attempts were in derogation of the Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We accepted this case for review to determine whether, after the privilege tax is paid based upon the projected square footage of new development before construction, the County is authorized to collect an additional privilege tax after construction based upon the actual completed square footage. We hold that after the County collects the privilege tax
based upon the projected square footage, the language of the Act prohibits the County from later collecting additional privilege taxes based upon the actual square footage of the completed project. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County, grant summary judgment in favor of the builders, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings as necessary.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the
parental rights of Candis D. (“Mother”) with respect to her minor daughter, Dravyn L.D.
(“the Child”). The petition alleged multiple incidences of abandonment, substantial
noncompliance with a permanency plan, and persistent conditions. The juvenile court
terminated Mother’s parental rights upon finding that each of the grounds alleged was
established by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. She contends that DCS’s
handling of the case effectively denied her the right to due process. She further challenges
the juvenile court’s finding that she was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency
plan. We affirm.

The Appellant, Richard E. Brown, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for driving under the influence, second offense. Because the Appellant failed to prepare an adequate record on appeal, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Judgment creditor sued defendants to collect a judgment against a defunct nonprofit corporation, claiming defendants were the alter egos of the defunct corporation. In a prior appeal, this court instructed the parties to focus on whether certain transactions were or were not loans. If they were loans, then the plaintiff could not prove her case to make the defendants responsible for the judgment against the defunct corporation. The trial court found that the transactions were loans. We affirm.

The Defendant, J. Steven Brasfield, pled guilty to three counts of violating trapping regulations. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve thirty days of probation and ordered him to pay $5500 in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that restitution is not proper in this case and that the trial court erred when it set the amount of restitution. After a thorough review of the evidence and the applicable authorities, we reverse and remand the case for the trial court, in determining the appropriate restitution in this case, to consider the Defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay.

Plaintiff sued defendants, seeking to enforce the restrictive covenants on defendants' property as to an outbuilding constructed on defendants' property and seeking an injunction against defendants' alleged operation of a business on their premises in violation of the restrictive covenants. The Trial Court ruled in favor of defendants, and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

On February 1, 2007, Petitioner, Robert D. Mendenhall, pled guilty in Rutherford County to thirteen counts of the unlawful sale of unregistered securities, theft over $60,000 and theft over $1,000. He agreed to a sentence of twenty years pursuant to his plea agreement. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting that he had been afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was entered involuntarily and unintelligently based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner had been afforded effective assistance of counsel and had entered his plea voluntarily. Therefore, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Appellants, Darrell Tywon Lockridge and Christopher Allen Turner, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in July of 2006 for attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree murder. After a jury trial, Appellant Lockridge was convicted of attempted second degree murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. Appellant Turner was found not guilty of attempted first degree murder but was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery. Appellant Lockridge was sentenced to an effective twenty-year sentence, and Appellant Turner received a nine-year sentence. Both Appellant Lockridge and Appellant Turner appeal their convictions and sentences. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court properly sentenced both Appellants. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Dorian Jones left his Jeep with Ron Hicks dba R and R Collision for restorative repairs in the
summer or fall of 2005. On or about November 3, 2008, Hicks sent Jones a letter stating that
the Jeep would be “auctioned unless all repair and storage fees are paid in full within fifteen
(15) days of receipt of this letter.” Jones called Hicks and, when he learned that Hicks had
not performed any repairs, insisted on return of the Jeep without any payment. Hicks
refused. Jones filed an action for replevin of the Jeep. Hicks filed a counterclaim asserting
that he was entitled to sell the vehicle for collection of his repair and storage fees. After a
bench trial, the court entered an order stating that Hicks was entitled to recover $564 without
specifying what was to happen with the vehicle. Jones filed a motion to alter or amend
simultaneously with a notice of appeal. The trial court entered an order amending its earlier
order by addition of a paragraph which provided that the vehicle would be returned to Jones
upon payment of the $564 plus accrued interest. Jones contends in this appeal that Hicks was
not entitled to any repair charges or storage fees under their informal unwritten arrangement
since Hicks performed no repairs and gave him no notice that he would be charging storage
fees. We agree with Jones and reverse the judgment in favor of Hicks.

The Defendant-Appellant, Bryan Ray Phillips, entered open guilty pleas in the Bedford County Circuit Court to one count of theft of over $10,000.00, a Class C felony; one count of evading arrest with risk of death or injury, a Class D felony; and one count of evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering Phillips to serve his felony sentences consecutively. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Paul Carr Moss, Jr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. After Petitioner was convicted of the second degree murder of his wife, he appealed his conviction and sentence. State v. Moss, 13 S.W.3d 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). On appeal, his conviction and sentence was affirmed. Id. at 389. A petition for post-conviction relief was filed by the attorney who represented Petitioner on appeal. Petitioner instructed the post-conviction court that the petition was submitted without his knowledge or consent and to ignore the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Once counsel was appointed, Petitioner filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals the denial. After a review, we determine that the Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This case involves a boundary line dispute. Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin Defendant Walker from entering property they claimed to own. However, Defendant Walker filed a counter-claim against Plaintiffs asserting, among other things, ownership by adverse possession. The trial court found that title to the disputed property had vested in Defendant Walker, and therefore, it granted summary judgment in his favor. We affirm.

In this action to establish paternity and recover back child support, plaintiff did not appear when the case was set for trial and the Trial Judge dismissed the action. Plaintiff then filed a Rule 60 motion to reinstate the case to the trial docket, which the Trial Judge denied. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Appellant, Aubrey Clark Baker, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for a reduction of sentence. Because the Appellant's motion was not timely filed, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff/Appellant sustained injuries after a fall through the
second-story floor of a water-damaged building. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Defendants/Appellees, finding that the danger was open and obvious, that
Defendants/Appellees had warned of the danger, and that Plaintiff/Appellant was at least
50% at fault for his own injuries, thus negating his negligence claim under McIntyre v.
Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.1992). Finding no error, we affirm.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petitions for habeas corpus and error coram nobis relief. Finding no error in the trial court's orders, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Sevier County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Kevin Allen Gentry, of one count of rape of a child. Following the conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting an audiotaped message recorded by the appellant, arguing that the statements on the tape were not relevant to the issues at trial, or, in the alternative, were overly prejudicial. Upon review, we conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Jermeil Tarter, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction for sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within a school zone. Upon preliminary consideration, the postconviction court found that the petition failed to state a cognizable claim and summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court should have appointed counsel, allowed amendment of the petition, and conducted an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for postconviction relief.

The employee filed a workers’ compensation claim for neck and lower back injuries
sustained while setting up a conference room during a temporary job assignment. The trial
court found that both injuries were work-related, assigned a six percent impairment to the
neck and a five percent impairment to the back, and applied a multiplier of 2.5. Both the
employee and the employer filed appeals, which have been referred to the Special Workers’
Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s award of alimony, division of marital property, and
grant of divorce. Husband filed the initial complaint for divorce. Subsequently, wife filed
a counter-complaint seeking a decree of legal separation. Wife later amended her  countercomplaint to allege fraud and sought damages based on her fraud claim. Because the trial court failed to rule on the wife’s claim of fraud, no final judgment exists. Accordingly, this
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.