APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a healthcare liability action against a surgeon and the hospital where the surgeon practiced. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

John W. McClarty, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. Michael Swiney, C.J., and Kristi M. Davis, J., joined.

Ira M. Long, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, and William Cameron, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Susan Oakes and Randy Oakes.

Rachel Park Hurt, Devin P. Lyon, and Raymond Grant Lewallen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Mark A. Fox, M.D. and Covenant Medical Group, Inc.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Baeho Shin, guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual battery, and domestic assault, among other offenses. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-two years’incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confrontation. More specifically, he argues that the court prohibited him from cross-examining the victim about her potential interest in obtaining a U visa, which is a non-immigrant visa available to certain victims of crime. Although the trial court later allowed the Defendant to recall the victim and question her on the topic, he argues that the delayed timing of the examination rendered the remedy inadequate and prejudicial. Upon our review, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in controlling the scope and timing of the cross-examination and that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2017, a Washington County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jamarcus Jackson, of misdemeanor assault, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree murder. The trial court imposed a forty-year sentence. The Petitioner appealed and this court affirmed the judgments. State v. Jackson, No. E2017-01182-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3409927, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following a hearing. We affirmed that decision on appeal. Jackson v. State, No. E2021-00642-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 984341 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2022), no perm. app. filed. In 2024, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely and without merit. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition is entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations because of the unavailability of the newly discovered evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A property owner sued his neighbors, claiming that he acquired title to a part of their land by adverse possession or, in the alternative, that he held a prescriptive easement. He asserted additional causes of action against one of the neighbors, including private nuisance, trespass to land, and forcible entry and detainer. The neighbors sought dismissal of the action via Tennessee Rule of Procedure 12.02(6) motions. The trial court dismissed the claims for adverse possession and prescriptive easement based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-2-110(a). It dismissed all other claims except for private nuisance based on deficiencies in the complaint. We vacate the dismissal of the prescriptive easement claim because facts warranting application of the statutory bar do not clearly appear on the face of the complaint. Because the appellant waived review of all other issues, we otherwise affirm.

The Defendant, Dalton Bryce Patterson, filed a motion through counsel seeking review of the Blount County Criminal Court’s June 4, 2025, order revoking his release on his own recognizance bond and imposing a monetary bond in the amount of $100,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144; Tenn. R. App. P. 8. He contends that the trial court’s use of “hold without bond” warrants for violations of pretrial release supervision violated his due process rights, see State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tenn. 2015), and that the court improperly modified his bond based on alleged violations of his release conditions. The State opposes the motion, asserting that the trial court’s actions were consistent with due process. Upon our review, we respectfully deny the Defendant’s motion.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for consideration of the Defendant’s appeal from the Smith County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of her two consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences for her guilty-pleaded misdemeanor convictions for marijuana possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. See State v. Shenessa L. Sokolosky, --- S.W.3d. ---, No. M2022-00873-SC-R11-CD, 2025 WL 2016420 (Tenn. July 18, 2025) (reversing State v. Shenessa L. Sokolosky, No. M2022-00873-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 1780085 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2024)). This court concluded in its previous opinion that the Defendant’s appeal was moot because she had fully served her sentence and was no longer constrained by confinement or probation supervision. The Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the mootness doctrine does not apply because a probation revocation may result in future adverse consequences, even after completion of a sentence. Upon further review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further findings of fact pursuant to State v. Wade, 863 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tenn. 1993). We, likewise, remand for the entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 6 to reflect consecutive service with Count 5 and for the entry of judgment forms, if necessary, reflecting a dismissal of the charges in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 7.

I respectfully dissent. This case comes to us on a probation revocation where, even taking the State’s evidence at face value, the proof does not establish a violation. The trial court found absconsion and failure to pay fines and costs, but the record supports neither finding. And because the probation warrant was already admitted and considered, a remand to supply a “good cause” hearsay finding cannot cure the problem. Whether the hearsay is excluded or admitted again, the result is the same: the State’s proof remains insufficient to sustain the revocation.

Nathan Allan Wallace, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review, we determine Petitioner failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective or that any of the alleged deficiencies were prejudicial. Consequently, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to one of her five children. After a five-day termination trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We vacate one ground for termination but otherwise affirm the termination of parental rights.

A tenant was evicted by a housing authority for failure to permit access to his unit and failure to pay rent. The tenant appealed. Because the tenant’s pro se brief has severe deficiencies under the Rules of Appellate Procedure and because we are unable to determine the nature of the error asserted by the tenant, the appeal is dismissed.

This is the second appeal arising from this declaratory judgment action. The defendant died during the pendency of this action. After a suggestion of the defendant’s death was filed with the trial court, the defendant’s probate estate was substituted as the defendant. More than one year after the defendant’s death, the defendant’s estate filed a motion to dismiss on the ground the plaintiffs failed to properly revive the action against the defendant’s estate as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-320. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action on the ground the plaintiffs did not follow the procedures of Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-320 because they filed “neither an order of revivor nor the complaint [from] this case in the Decedent’s probate proceeding, In re Estate of Doris Etheredge, Putnam Co. Probate Court No. 20739 at any time, much less within one (1) year of the Decedent’s date of death.” We affirm.

The Defendant, Koalis Peete, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Timothy McKinney, of one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. State v. McKinney, No. W2016-00834-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1055719, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 19, 2018). The Petitioner also pleaded guilty to three counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a repeat violent offender to life without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentence. Id. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, amended by appointed counsel, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in multiple ways. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal ensued. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jason A. McCain, pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to six years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender because the State did not file its notice of intent to seek enhancement punishment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a) until the day of his sentencing hearing and that his six-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a doctor as time barred and for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Leonard Harrison Beard, Jr., was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment involving a habitation, a Class C felony; vandalism valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder); 39-13-103 (2018) (reckless endangerment); 39-17-1307 (2018) (felon in possession of a firearm); 39-14-408 (Supp. 2024) (vandalism); 39-14-105 (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading); 39-17-1324 (2018) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony). The trial court imposed an effective fifty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Joseph Raymond Cacciatore, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in which Defendant sought a reduction of his effective ten-year sentence of incarceration resulting from his guilty pleas to two counts of solicitation of a minor, three counts of coercion of a witness, and one count of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. On appeal, Defendant contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that he was arrested and confined without being properly indicted. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Appellant, Quadarius Deshun Martin, pled guilty to seven offenses on April 4, 2024, and received an agreed-upon sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. Eighteen days later, the Appellant filed an unsigned, untitled, handwritten pleading in which he stated he wished to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that he pled guilty under duress and that trial counsel failed to investigate his case. The trial court entered an order construing the filing as a petition for post-conviction relief and appointing counsel. At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated that it would hear both the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas and his petition for post-conviction relief. Following the hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief but did not rule upon the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas. The Appellant appealed, arguing the trial court erred by failing to find he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to address whether the trial court erred by construing the Appellant’s filing as a petition for post-conviction relief despite his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for consideration of the Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding for consideration of Appellant’s pleading as a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) because I conclude that Appellant abandoned any claim of relief on appeal based on Rule 32(f).

This appeal involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his young daughter. The trial court found that the ground of failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody of the child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff concedes that the order in the previous action filed in circuit court satisfied the first three of the four elements of the doctrine of res judicata but denied that the prior action had been adjudicated on the merits. As for the fourth element, the chancery court ruled that the judgment in the circuit court action constituted an adjudication on the merits because the dismissal was “with prejudice.” On this basis the chancery court dismissed the action at bar. The plaintiff appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

This interlocutory recusal appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal filed by the plaintiffs in the underlying action. The plaintiffs timely filed their petition for recusal appeal in this Court pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Upon thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal. We deny as moot the plaintiffs’ request for a stay.

The Defendant, John Mark Hall, appeals his Knox County jury conviction of domestic assault, for which he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days on unsupervised probation after service of 192 hours in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence was lacking, and that the trial court erred by failing to rule on his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a long-standing conservatorship, which was created in 1981. The primary issues pertain to the fees the conservator is entitled to receive for the various services she renders in administering the estate of the conservatorship and services the conservator renders as one of the caretakers for the ward, Patricia L. Capelli (hereinafter “Ms. Capelli”). Following an evidentiary hearing on the conservator’s fee applications for services rendered, the trial court bifurcated the conservator’s rate of compensation for caregiving as distinguished from management of the conservatorship. The court reduced the hourly rate of compensation for caregiving services to $25 per hour while allowing the conservator to be compensated at the rate of $115 per hour for services rendered in the management of the conservatorship, the rate the court had previously authorized for all services. The court also reduced the total hours claimed for both types of services. The court then ruled that, going forward, the conservator’s rate of compensation for any services would be $25 per hour. This appeal followed. We affirm the bifurcation of the rate of compensation for service previously rendered. However, finding this to be a complex conservatorship case, we modify the fee schedule going forward and hold that the conservator shall be paid the previously authorized rate of $115 per hour for services rendered in the management of the conservatorship but affirm the rate of compensation of $25 per hour for caregiving services rendered by the conservator. We also modify the trial court’s decision to disallow blocks of time for the caregiving services billed by the conservator. Further, we find that the conservatorship shall pay the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the conservator in this appeal but not the attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Joseph Capelli. We also remand for the court to consider the applicable law and relevant facts regarding the construction of a pool on Ms. Capelli’s property. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

The Defendant, Michael Malik Tashaw Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of filing a false police report, possession of marijuana, and leaving the scene of an accident. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about a shotgun found in his vehicle, and that the State failed to establish that he possessed illegal marijuana rather than legal hemp. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.