APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Gibson County jury convicted Defendant, Eric Wayne Herndon, of violation of an order of protection and aggravated stalking. Defendant received an effective sentence of two years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for violation of an order of protection and aggravated stalking. After review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for violation of an order of protection, and we reverse that judgment and dismiss that conviction accordingly. We also conclude the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking, but we determine that the proof was sufficient to support the lesser-included offense of stalking, which was charged to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking, and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction for stalking and for resentencing on this modified conviction.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a will contest for failure to prosecute.
We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this case that began as a breach of contract action, the defendant property owner attempts to appeal from two cases that were not consolidated in the trial court but resulted in the entry of a single order in favor of the plaintiff roofing company. Because the order appealed from did not adjudicate all of the claims of all of the parties, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Alonzo Fishback, of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony, for which he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of seventy-five years. The Defendant appealed his convictions, and this court affirmed, and he then unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. The Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his sentence was illegal because the proven facts of his case did not meet the necessary requirements to be convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court denied this motion, stating that the Defendant’s claim was not colorable under Rule 36.1. The Defendant maintains his argument on appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash Plaintiffs’ post-judgment subpoena for financial records he alleges are statutorily exempt from the subpoena process. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment and that no good cause exists to waive the finality requirement. As a result, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and we grant Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Christopher Bassett, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for one count of first
degree murder; five counts of attempted first degree murder; three counts of attempted
second degree murder; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm; eight counts of
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and eight counts of
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been convicted
of a drug offense, and his effective sentence of life plus thirty-five years. The Petitioner
alleges that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Vincent Olajuan Morrison, appeals his convictions for aggravated
burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and
especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’
incarceration. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient
to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting certain statements through
the victim’s testimony, which violated the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation
Clause; (3) the State’s cross-examination of a defense witness improperly shifted the
burden of proof to the Defendant; (4) the trial court violated the “spirit” of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by permitting the Defendant to be tried by an all-white jury;
and (5) his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bernard Strowder, pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The parties agreed that he would be sentenced to an effective term of ten years but that the trial court would decide the manner in which the sentence would be served. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the full sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the denial of an alternative sentence, but the State argues that this appeal should be dismissed because his notice of appeal was untimely. Upon our review, we agree that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the interest of justice does not require us to waive the timely filing requirement. We respectfully dismiss the appeal.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found three statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Because clear and convincing evidence supports that at least one of the termination grounds exists and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The parental rights of Chasity H.1 (“Mother”) were terminated by the Knox County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”) on January 22, 2024. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

For over a decade, Leah Gilliam’s vehicle displayed a personalized license plate that read “69PWNDU.” The State eventually revoked the plate after deeming the message offensive. Gilliam sued state officials, alleging that Tennessee’s personalized license plate program discriminates based on viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. The State argues that the First Amendment’s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination does not apply to the alphanumeric characters on Tennessee’s personalized license plates because they are government speech. In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs were government speech. 576 U.S. 200, 213 (2015). Although personalized alphanumeric combinations differ from specialty plate designs in some respects, a faithful application of Walker’s reasoning compels the conclusion that they are government speech too. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding and reinstate the trial court’s judgment in favor of the State.

This appeal arises from the termination of a tenured teacher. The trial court determined that the school district terminated the teacher without legal cause and ordered that she be reinstated with backpay but denied her request for attorney’s fees. Finding that the teacher waived any issue pertaining to whether the school board followed the procedural requirements of the Teacher Tenure Act, and that she engaged in conduct which constituted two of the three charges levied, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

An out-of-network hospital sued a TennCare managed care organization (“MCO”), seeking additional payment for healthcare services rendered to the MCO’s members. The MCO moved for summary judgment on the hospital’s claims for payment for post-stabilization services provided to both existing and retroactive members. With respect to the existing members, the MCO argued that the hospital could not show that the MCO had a legal obligation to pay for the post-stabilization services at issue. So the hospital could not establish that the MCO was unjustly enriched. The trial court agreed and summarily dismissed these claims. It also certified the dismissal as final. We vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

A wife appeals from the final judgment in a protracted divorce. Based on the proof at trial, the court classified and divided the marital estate, adopted a permanent parenting plan, set monthly child support, and awarded the husband retroactive support back to the date of the divorce filing. The wife raises numerous issues on appeal, many of which we deem waived for failure to comply with our procedural rules. Because the final order lacks sufficient factual findings with respect to the calculation of retroactive child support, we vacate that award and remand for additional findings. Otherwise, we affirm.

This is the second appeal in this action involving a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her child and to allow the petitioners to adopt the child. In the first appeal, the petitioners challenged the trial court’s determination that despite establishment of a statutory ground for termination, the petitioners had failed to demonstrate that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. This Court affirmed the trial court’s finding as to the statutory ground. However, concluding that the trial court had erred by applying an outdated set of statutory best interest factors, this Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of the updated factors. On remand and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court confirmed its previous determination that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the petition. The petitioners have appealed, and the mother has raised an additional issue regarding the statutory ground for termination. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Alexandre Kim, was charged with first degree murder for the October 2012 death of his mother, Estelle Kim. Following a bench trial in 2014, he was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was involuntarily committed to a mental health facility. In 2017, the Petitioner was transitioned to a Mandatory Outpatient Treatment (“MOT”) program pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303. In 2021, the Petitioner sought to terminate his MOT by filing a petition in the trial court. After several hearings on the matter, the trial court denied his petition based, in large part, on the Petitioner’s request to move out of state. The Petitioner now appeals from this denial arguing he meets all requirements for termination. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Caitlyn Brooke Henson, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion for expungement.  Defendant argues that she is entitled to expungement after her successful completion of a judicial diversion probationary period.  We agree with Defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an order of expungement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313.

The Defendant, Eric Joseph Mathis, was sentenced to a sum of twenty years of supervised
probation. After multiple probation violations, the trial court revoked the entirety of the
Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the sentences in the Tennessee Department
of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering the revocation of his probation because (1) he had treatable substance abuse issues
and financial needs that would be better addressed outside of prison and (2) the trial court
based its orders on the Defendant’s failure to pay restitution without conducting an
ability-to-pay hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to recuse. Because appellant failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Alec Byron Harrison, pled guilty to aggravated statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a three-year sentence in confinement with the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to confinement. Upon our review of the applicable law, the record on appeal, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Scott County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Brandon Cody Phillips, and his
Codefendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, on one count of aggravated assault, two counts of
especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated child neglect, and one count
of carjacking. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to sever his trial from his
Codefendant’s trial, which the trial court denied. At trial, the trial court dismissed the
Defendant’s carjacking count, and the jury convicted the Defendant on the remaining five
counts. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective twenty-fiveyear
sentence for the Defendant’s convictions. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court denied his right to an
impartial jury; (3) the trial court denied his right to a unanimous verdict; (4) the trial court
improperly conducted a “closed-door” severance hearing without the Defendant’s
presence; (5) the trial court failed to comply with the rules of criminal procedure during
this severance hearing; and (6) the trial court improperly denied his severance motion.
After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim for breach of contract filed by the personal representative of a deceased husband’s estate against his former wife, asserting that the former wife breached the parties’ marital dissolution agreement by accepting the proceeds of the former husband’s retirement account upon his death. The parties’ marital dissolution agreement had provided that the retirement account would be “the sole and absolute property of the Husband” and that any “marital interest” the wife had was divested from her and vested in the husband. However, the wife remained the designated beneficiary of the account when the husband died six years later. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by the estate and by the wife. The trial court granted summary judgment to the estate, concluding that the wife breached the marital dissolution agreement and that the estate was entitled to the entire sum in the account. The wife appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Crystal Lee Martin, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering her to serve her original six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm revocation of the defendant’s probation but reverse the trial court’s imposition of the original sentence and remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation in accordance with State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 753 (Tenn. 2022).

The petitioner, Joe G. Manley, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this custody case, the trial court adopted a parenting plan that ordered equal parenting time. The father appeals, seeking a reversal of the award of equal parenting time, an increase in the mother’s monthly income for child support purposes, payment of one-half the childcare costs, custody on alternating July the fourth holidays, and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision.