APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Rocky Joe Houston, appeals from the Roane County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus from his 2010 conviction of felony evading arrest, for which he served a one-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition. Because the Petitioner failed to state a cognizable basis for relief, we affirm.

Defendant, Bryant Lamont Thomas, was employed as a probation officer with the Tennessee Department of Correction. He pled guilty to Class E felony sexual contact with a probationer. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant judicial diversion and sentenced Defendant to two years to be served on supervised probation. Defendant claims the court abused its discretion by denying diversion. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Ida Veronica Thomas, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, but less than $250,000. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve twelve years on community corrections and scheduled a subsequent restitution hearing. At the restitution hearing, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $151,385 to be paid at a rate of $75 per month. On appeal, among other issues, the Petitioner challenges the trial court’s payment schedule for the restitution, $151,285 at $75 per month for twelve years, which cannot be completed during the length of the Defendant’s sentence. The State concedes this is error and agrees that a remand is the appropriate remedy as to this issue. After reviewing the record, we conclude that restitution is appropriate in this case, but we remand for the trial court: (1) to order a presentence report as required by statute in restitution cases; and (2) to consider the Defendant’s financial resources, future ability to pay, and length of her community corrections sentence as it relates to a payment schedule for restitution.

Craig Dagnan, Defendant, violated the conditions of probation, and the trial court revoked his probation but ordered his probation reinstated after eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. Defendant was granted a furlough from jail to attend an inpatient drug and alcohol program. After being dismissed from the inpatient program, Defendant failed to report back to jail and absconded. He was charged with escape, and a revocation warrant was issued. He was apprehended in Georgia and returned to Tennessee. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered Defendant to serve the balance of his six-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Derrick Jefferson, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to enter the Appellant’s prior mug shots into evidence; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to admit photographs of the victim’s body and the bullets taken from the victim’s body during the autopsy; (3) the trial court gave an erroneous oral jury instruction regarding the presumption of innocence; (4) the trial court gave an erroneous oral jury instruction that the stipulation regarding the Appellant’s mug shot, which revealed the Appellant’s prior arrests, was relevant only on the issue of the Appellant’s appearance; (5) the trial court erred by denying the Appellant’s request for a mistrial when, during voir dire, the jury pool entered the courtroom before the Appellant came out of “lockup”; (6) the cumulative errors require reversal of the Appellant’s conviction and a new trial. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur fully with the conclusion reached by the majority that there was overwhelming evidence to support the trial court's decision to revoke Defendant's probation and to order Defendant to serve the balance of his six-year sentence in incarceration. I write separately to simply express my belief that once a determination is made that a defendant has violated the conditions of his or her probation, neither an additional hearing not any additional findings are statutorily mandated of a trial court to determine the manner in which the original sentence should be served.¹ Thus, there is no opportunity for an abuse of discretion when a "second exercise of discretion" is not required by either sections 40-35-310 or 40-35-311 of Tennessee Code Annotated.

The Defendant, Ronald D. McCallum, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and vandalism, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery); § 39-14-408 (2018) (vandalism); § 39-14-105 (2018) (grading for vandalism). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to ten years’ confinement at 85% service for each aggravated robbery conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the vandalism conviction. The court imposed partial consecutive service, for an effective twenty-year sentence at 85% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during her closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Baldomero Galindo, of first degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. In this delayed appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial following the late disclosure of several discovery materials in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Javian Jakeil Hawkins, appeals from his twenty-five-year sentence imposed for his second degree murder conviction, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum in-range sentence and by denying his motion to reduce sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Following our review, we affirm; however, we remand for correction of a clerical error on the judgment form.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Tyrone Bohanna, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, aggravated burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 120 years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Tyrone Bohanna, No. W2011-01273-CCA-R3- CD, 2013 WL 2393050, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 29, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective at trial and during proceedings on his motion for new trial, that the State failed to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that the Petitioner did not receive a fair trial after his trial was severed from the trial of his co-defendant. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Pro Se Defendant, James Earl Gordon, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, in which he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and raises various constitutional issues. After thorough review, we affirm the denial of the motion.

The Petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which he sought relief from his convictions for three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. The Petitioner seeks coram nobis relief related to an undiscovered report matching his DNA to DNA from a ski mask used during the home invasion that led to his convictions. The Petitioner asserts he is entitled to due process tolling and a hearing. We conclude that because there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the evidence might have led to a different outcome, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition without a hearing, and we affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Charles Hampton, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder, arguing (1) the post-conviction court erred in refusing to consider an expert’s testimony, (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek the suppression of the Petitioner’s statements to police, and (3) his mandatory life sentence as a juvenile offender is unconstitutional because it is the “functional equivalent” of life without parole. After review, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

Michael Bland, Petitioner, was indicted for and convicted of first-degree murder. Petitioner received a life sentence. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and our supreme court denied further appellate review. State v. Michael Bland, No. W2014-00991-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3793697, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jack Edward Thomas, pled guilty to arson and received a five-year sentence, with one year of incarceration to be followed by four years of probation. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $4,320, with the Defendant to make installment payments of $90 per month. The Defendant appeals the restitution award, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the victim’s pecuniary loss because the victim’s testimony was uncertain and unreliable. The Defendant also asserts that the judgment form erroneously reflects a restitution award of $7,000, which was the victim’s total pecuniary loss as determined by the trial court, because it exceeded the total amount the trial court found that the Defendant was able to pay in $90 per month installments for four years ($4,320). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State introduced inadequate proof regarding the valuation of the loss. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new restitution hearing. The Defendant’s alternative argument regarding correction of the judgment form is rendered moot, though it does have merit.

Defendant, Floyd Antonius Taylor, was indicted for two counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance of .5 grams or more, with the second count occurring within a drug-free zone. The counts were severed, and Defendant received a jury trial on Count 2. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged. Count 1 was subsequently dismissed. Defendant received a fifteen-year sentence. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and argues that certain evidence was inadmissible under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Devin Torquin Watkins, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court denying the petition.

The petitioner, Ronald L. Cosper, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Aggrieved of the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of the sentence of probation imposed for his 2016 guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated assault, the defendant, Jarvis Tyvon Morgan, appeals. He argues that the trial court deprived him of due process by basing its decision on a ground not alleged in the violation warrant. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Tammy Lynn Walker, was convicted of passing a worthless check, a Class D felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that she made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to counsel and by requiring her to proceed pro se at trial when she had not executed a written waiver to the effect. The State, after initially contending that the trial court did not err, alternatively argues that the Defendant implicitly waived her right to counsel by failing to retain counsel in a timely manner. In addition, the Defendant, as a separate issue, contends that the trial court violated her constitutional rights when it compelled her to testify against herself. We conclude that the non-indigent Defendant knowingly and voluntarily explicitly waived her right to counsel by her statements and conduct and that she was not compelled to testify against herself. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Michael E. White, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original
nine-year sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of his probation by imposing the original sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Michael Ray Perna, pleaded guilty to a Class E felony violation of the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(d)(1)(A) Sex Offender Registry Act. At sentencing, the Defendant argued that he was acting as the minor victim’s legal guardian pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section (d)(2)(D) and thus was only eligible for a fine by way of punishment, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(g)(4). The trial court rejected the Defendant’s argument and imposed a two-year sentence, suspended to probation after ninety days in jail. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Brian Howard, Defendant, was indicted for one count of second degree murder, one count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. A co-defendant, Quinton Brown, was also indicted for his role in the offenses and the two were tried together. Defendant asked the trial court to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count prior to trial. The trial court denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter as well as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony as charged in the indictment. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 67 years, to be served consecutively to a fifteen-year federal sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals to this Court arguing that the trial court erred by denying the motion to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions where the proof indicated that Defendant acted in self-defense. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter for correction of the judgment form in Count 4 to reflect that the conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a felony is a class C felony.

The State appeals the trial court’s imposition of a community corrections sentence, arguing the defendant did not qualify for alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we find the trial court erred in not considering all the applicable factors. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Christopher C. Sullivan, was charged with violation of the sex offender registry and perjury. A Sullivan County jury found the Defendant not guilty of violating the sex offender registry and guilty of perjury. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of six years on probation, sixty days of which were to be served in confinement. The Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of perjury, that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting as evidence a judgment of conviction form from New York and the indictment underlying that conviction, that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent, and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.