APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, after having his authority to write bonds in the 30th Judicial District revoked, appeals the trial court's decision and asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings. Furthermore, the defendant asserts that the trial court's action was excessive. After review, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

This is an appeal of a denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner and two codefendants were each convicted of murder in the perpetration of robbery and of especially aggravated robbery for the robbery and killing of a man who had given them a ride in his car. The petitioner appealed her convictions to the post-conviction court, arguing, inter alia, that her counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to petition for a severance of trial from her codefendants. The post-conviction court denied relief, finding the petitioner's claims to be without merit. Based upon a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

The Defendant, Joseph Vella, appeals as of right from his criminal trespass conviction. He asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced by the jury to life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction. He also received a sentence of twenty-five years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. The events of this case arose out of a confrontation between rival gangs living in the Hurt Village Apartments in Memphis. The defendant, a high-ranking member of the Gangster Disciples, was prosecuted for the crimes on a theory of criminal responsibility. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the extensive record in this case, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant, acting with the intent to promote the commission of the charged offenses, directed and aided other members of the Gangster Disciples in the commission of the offenses. His convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping are, therefore, affirmed.

The defendant, Srirasack Srisavath, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to sell. The trial court imposed a sentence of one and one-half years and assessed a fine of $2,000.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the propriety for the investigatory stop which led to the discovery of the marijuana. Because the stop was not adequately supported by articulable facts, the trial court erred by overruling the motion to suppress evidence. The judgment is, therefore, reversed and the cause dismissed.

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting the results of his breath-alcohol test. The Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he was continuously observed for twenty minutes prior to taking the test, and that one of the requirements for the admissibility of the test results was therefore not satisfied. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1977, Richard Hale Austin was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of accessory before the fact to the first degree murder of Julian Watkins. Austin's conviction stemmed from his role in commissioning the murder of Watkins, a reserve deputy sheriff. The jury subsequently found the presence of aggravating factor (i)(4), murder for remuneration, and imposed a sentence of death. In 1997, Austin was granted habeas corpus relief in the form of a new sentencing hearing by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the re-sentencing hearing, twenty-two years after his original trial, a jury again found the presence of the (i)(4) aggravating factor and again imposed a sentence of death. It is from this sentencing decision that Austin appeals. In this appeal, Austin presents numerous issues for our review, including (1) the disqualification of the Tennessee Supreme Court; (2) challenges to the selection of various jurors; (3) the admission and exclusion of evidence; (4) the introduction of victim impact evidence; (5) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (6) the propriety of the jury instructions; (7) whether application of the (i)(4) aggravator violates State v. Middlebrooks; (8) prejudice due to the delay in imposing a sentence of death; (9) the constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty statutes; and (10) whether the jury imposed a proportionate sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the imposition of the sentence of death.

The Defendant, David Lunsford, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary. In this appeal as of right, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We respectfully disagree; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act and one count of driving under the influence, eighth offense, both Class E felonies. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of one year and six months for each offense. In this appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Raymond Hardie Cox, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. He asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition as barred by the statute of limitations. We find no error; thus, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant pled guilty to four counts of obtaining prescription drugs by use of a forged prescription, and the trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of fourteen years incarceration. The defendant contests the sentences imposed. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant Michael R. Floyd pled guilty to possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine and over one half ounce of marijuana. For these offenses he received agreed upon sentences of eight (8) years and one (1) year, respectively, as a Range I, standard offender. In addition, his plea agreement included two-thousand dollar ($2,000.00) fines for each offense. Following a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently to one another and the defendant to serve six months of this period in the county jail with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. The defendant thereafter brought this appeal contending that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve a period of incarceration. However, we are unable to determine whether error occurred because of the insufficiency of the record on appeal. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner challenges the trial court's denial of his habeas corpus petition for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. We affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Anthony M. Freeman, appeals the dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and/or post-conviction relief. We conclude the petition does not state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, and the petition was filed beyond the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Crockett County jury convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. In this appeal as a matter of right, the defendant challenges (1) the introduction of statements he made to officers, and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffery S. Shands, challenges the trial court's order upholding the District Attorney General's denial of pretrial diversion for the charges of criminally negligent homicide and reckless driving. He contends that the District Attorney abused his discretion in failing to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors presented in the evidence. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's order denying pretrial diversion.

The defendant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motions seeking relief from the collection of litigation taxes and trial court costs. Because we have no jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 3 appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, indicted for aggravated sexual battery for intentionally engaging in sexual contact with a child under the age of thirteen, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and received a two-year sentence. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve ninety consecutive days in jail, with the remainder of the sentence suspended, and the defendant placed on three years' probation. Counseling was ordered as a condition of probation. The defendant challenges the sentencing imposed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his requests for full probation, service of his sentence of incarceration on weekends, or judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case raises issues of first impression in Tennessee. The defendants are convicted felons from Montana who were sent to serve portions of their Montana sentences at a private, for-profit prison facility in Tennessee. Following their escape from the Tennessee facility, the defendants were each convicted of one count of escape, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-16-605. The defendants now appeal their convictions, raising two interrelated issues: 1) whether Tennessee's escape statute makes it a crime for a prisoner who has not been convicted under Tennessee law to escape from a private prison in this state; and 2) whether they were unlawfully imprisoned in Tennessee. After a thorough review of applicable law, we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-16-605, by its plain language, applies to the escape of an out-of-state prisoner from a private prison facility in this state. We further conclude that the defendants, duly convicted of crimes in Montana and incarcerated at the private prison pursuant to a contract between the Montana Department of Corrections and a private prison company, were not unlawfully imprisoned in Tennessee. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted defendant of one count of premeditated first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder and twenty years for each attempted first degree murder conviction. The two twenty-year sentences run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the defendant's life sentence. In this appeal as of right, defendant challenges: (1) the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his identification by the two surviving victims, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence, and (3) the length and consecutive nature of his sentences. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to the maximum term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served as a split sentence with five months and twenty-nine days served in confinement at the workhouse, and the balance served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the victim, his former wife, to testify as to two other bad acts committed by the defendant, one a prior beating incident and the other an act of vandalism of the victim’s car. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Paul Freeman appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Freeman collaterally attacks his DUI conviction in the City Court of Jackson upon grounds that his uncounseled guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered. Freeman asserts that at the time he entered his guilty plea, he was still under the influence of alcohol from his arrest approximately eight hours earlier that same morning. After review, we find that the proof does not support a knowing and voluntary plea. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court, vacate Freeman’s judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the City Court of Jackson for further proceedings.

As noted in the majority opinion, the appellant does not contend the City Court did not advise him of his constitutional rights. The sole issue in this case is whether the appellant was impaired to the degree that he did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea.

Abebreellis Bond was convicted by a Carroll County jury of two counts of sale of cocaine. Based upon trial counsel's failure to perfect a direct appeal, Bond sought post-conviction relief in the Carroll County Circuit Court asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court granted Bond's request for a delayed appeal. Additionally, the post-conviction court ordered that all remaining ineffective assistance of counsel issues raised in the post-conviction petition be consolidated with the delayed appeal. Bond now perfects his delayed appeal before this court, raising the following issues for our review: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find the post-conviction court's procedural ruling, wherein the court refused to dismiss the remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims after granting the delayed appeal, conflicts with our previous holding in Gibson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, we remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to rape. After a hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years and six months in confinement. The Defendant appealed and asks this Court to shorten his sentence. He contends that the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor and failed to apply at least two mitigating factors. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.