APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to twenty-five years incarceration. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his attorney at trial was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant pursuant to his plea agreement to two concurrent ten-year sentences. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request that he serve his sentence on community corrections. Because we conclude that the sentence imposed is adequately supported by the record, and that the trial court did not err by refusing to allow the Defendant to serve his sentence on community corrections, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Terry Lee Robinson, appeals from his conviction by a jury for first degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient, (2) the trial court erroneously prohibited a defense expert from testifying as to the victim’s cause of death, (3) the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior conduct in violation of Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b), (4) he was denied a fair trial because the jury was composed of ten women and two men, and (5) he was denied a fair trial because a television movie about a man fatally poisoning his wife with cyanide aired during the trial. Although we hold that the trial court erred regarding the defendant’s expert and the prior conduct evidence, we conclude the errors were harmless. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, William Orlando Crutcher, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of attempted rape of a child. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a ten year sentence for each of the Defendant's five convictions and ordered that the three aggravated sexual battery convictions be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky Lynn Earls, appeals from his conviction for theft of property valued over $1,000, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, Quentin D. Armstrong, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. The trial court merged the second count into the first and sentenced the Defendant to six years. In his appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated assault and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury concerning self-defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his consecutive sentences totaling 29 years for two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. He contends the trial court erred in setting the length of each sentence and in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James David Alder, appeals from his convictions and sentences which he received in the Franklin County Circuit Court. After a change of venue from Sequatchie County and a jury trial in Franklin County, the trial court imposed the following convictions and sentences: aggravated assault, ten years (Range II); kidnapping, ten years (Range II); and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon, eleven months and 29 days (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court ordered the felony sentences to run consecutively to each other but concurrently with the misdemeanor, for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant complains that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to grant a mistrial after the victim testified that she had obtained an order of protection against the defendant and (2) in imposing the sentences. After our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the lower court's felony judgments but vacate and modify the misdemeanor judgment.

A Maury County grand jury indicted the defendant, Jerry Lane Rubert, for two counts of aggravated kidnapping and three counts of especially aggravated rape. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, as well as the evidence and statements derived from that seizure, on the grounds that the evidence was illegally seized. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, and at trial the prosecution introduced the evidence at issue. After the conclusion of this trial, a Maury County jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The defendant now brings this appeal, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find that the defendant's allegations do not merit relief, and therefore affirm his convictions.

The Appellant, Donald Ray Pannell, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pannell was convicted by a Marshall County jury of burglary, burglary of an automobile, and theft. He was sentenced as a Career Offender to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Pannell argues: (1) that the trial judge erred in not recusing himself from presiding over the case, and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Frank C. Pease, appeals his conviction for criminal contempt. The sole issue for our determination is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Since the contempt finding was based upon defendant's anticipated, rather than actual, refusal to follow the court's order, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eric Bernard Howard, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery in the Criminal Court of Davidson County and sentenced to consecutive terms of seventeen years for each conviction. The Defendant now seeks post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. We affirm.

The petitioner, Parrish L. Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentences are illegal and void. Because the convicting court had no jurisdiction to impose an agreed upon sentence in excess of the statutory limits, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for the grant of habeas corpus relief.

This is a state appeal from the dismissal of an indictment based upon a violation of mandatory joinder Rule 8(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendants, Baird and Fisher, and other individuals were first indicted on July 23, 1999, for aggravated gambling promotion. The indictment alleged the illegal activity occurred from August 1998 through December 1998. On October 18, 1999, the defendants pled guilty to aggravated gambling promotion. The defendants and other individuals were again indicted for aggravated gambling promotion on March 21, 2000. This indictment alleged the illegal activity occurred from January 1999 through June 1999, which was prior to the return of the first indictment. The trial court dismissed the second indictment, finding that it violated Rule 8(a) requiring joinder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

One day before his scheduled jury trial for first degree murder, the appellant sought and was granted the right to represent himself. He now appeals from his conviction by a Shelby County jury for the offense of first degree murder, asserting that the convicting evidence was insufficient and that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An Obion County jury convicted the defendant for one count of felony evasion of arrest, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of misdemeanor evasion of arrest. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six (6) years as a Range II multiple offender for his conviction for felony evasion of arrest, which was merged with his conviction for reckless endangerment. The trial court also sentenced the defendant to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for his conviction for misdemeanor evasion of arrest, to be served concurrently with his sentence for his felony conviction. The defendant filed for a motion for new trial, and the trial court held a hearing on that motion on the same date that it held the sentencing hearing. Subsequently, the defendant filed a second motion for new trial, which the court treated as an amended motion for new trial. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, his sentence, and the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for new trial based on the threatening statements made to jurors during a break in their deliberations. After reviewing the record, we find that none of these claims merit relief and therefore affirm the defendant's conviction.

The defendant appeals his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. He contends that (1) insufficient evidence exists to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by not allowing into evidence the guilty plea of co-defendant Dickerson; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing into evidence statements made by co-defendant Dickerson; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (D.U.I.) second offense, sentenced to fifty days in jail, and ordered to pay a $2,500.00 fine. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of D.U.I., (2) that the trial court erred in admitting the breath alcohol results, and (3) that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and sentenced to twelve years in confinement. His conviction was affirmed by this court on direct appeal. He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for premeditated first degree murder. The defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to 24 years as a violent offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously neglected to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (3) the defendant's sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the failure to charge the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide was, at most, harmless error. The defendant's remaining allegations of error are without merit; thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Although I agree with Judge Welles that it is problematic to use voluntary
manslaughter as the intermediate offense for the purposes of applying the Williams harmless error rule, I concur with Judge Riley in affirming the conviction, based on the facts of the present case and the defendant’s use of those facts in formulating a theory of defense. Given the facts, the defendant’s theory of defense, and the jury’s verdict of second-degree murder, I conclude that the failure to charge the included offenses lesser than voluntary manslaughter was harmless error.

The defendant, Daniel Ray Styles, was convicted of felony escape, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, theft over $1,000, and aggravated criminal trespassing. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to dismiss his case on the ground that his right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictments; (3) whether the indictment charging felony escape was facially void because it was unsigned; and (4) whether the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election between aggravated assault and aggravated robbery. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court regarding Defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated robbery, felony escape, and aggravated criminal trespassing. However, we reverse and dismiss Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and theft as violative of constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

The Appellant, Barry N. Waddell, proceeding pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found Waddell's petition was time-barred. On appeal, Waddell argues that: (1) his petition was timely filed, and (2) alternatively, if the petition was untimely filed, the statute of limitations was tolled under the holding of Dexter Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court’s erroneous failure to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses of first degree murder is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.