APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Dickson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for rape, and the defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of sexual battery. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was subsequently withdrawn. Almost two months later, the defendant filed a pro se motion alleging his motion for new trial was unilaterally and improperly withdrawn by counsel. Eventually, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion for new trial since the defendant's original motion had been withdrawn, and no timely motion was pending. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court's jury charge authorized the jury to convict based on lack of consent, when "force or coercion" was alleged in the indictment. We conclude the motion for new trial was not properly before the trial court, thereby waiving this issue. Nevertheless, we have examined the issue for plain error and conclude defendant's allegation of error is totally without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Davidson County jury found Donald Lee Reid guilty of driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, suspended after service of 15 days confinement, and a fine of $500.00. Reid challenges his conviction, his sentence, and his fine. He raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in not conducting a jury-out hearing on the defendant's motion in limine regarding the admissibility of the defendant's BAC test results; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the results of the BAC test into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on driving while impaired as a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence; (4) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive; and (5) whether the trial court unconstitutionally imposed a fine of $500.00 since the defendant did not waive his right for the jury to assess the fine. After a careful review of the record, we remand for a jury to assess the fine but affirm in all other respects.

The defendant, Barry Marable, appeals from his convictions for aggravated burglary, felony reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, and misdemeanor theft, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of conviction except for the one for the evading arrest. We modify that conviction from a Class D felony to a Class E felony and remand the case for sentencing.

The defendant, James David Alder, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. He was sentenced as a Range III Persistent Offender to twenty (20) years for the attempted second degree murder, eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for assault, and three (3) years for reckless endangerment. His sentences were ordered to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the sentence ordered in a case for which the defendant was on bail at the time he committed the present offenses. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear expert testimony concerning the extent of the victim's injuries, the length of her hospital stay and the number of surgeries she had; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless endangerment; and (3) the trial court failed to follow the sentencing guidelines and improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After a review of the law and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Lawrence A. Strickland, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, which challenged his 1997 guilty-plea-based, Roane County conviction of aggravated sexual battery. Based upon our de novo review of matters of law, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the conviction court was void, although we reject the petitioner’s claim that the indictment is invalid. We reverse the judgment of the lower court and grant habeas corpus relief in the form of declaring the petitioner’s Roane County sentence void.  Because the conviction rests upon a guilty plea that, in turn, was premised upon the agreed sentence being valid, we vacate the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The conviction court shall afford the petitioner the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(4).

A Grundy County jury convicted the defendant, James Larry Cox, for the attempted second degree murder of Jimmy Sweeton. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to ten (10) years of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant questions whether he was denied a fair trial due to the trial court's exclusion of evidence relating to the victim's reputation for violence, and whether he was improperly denied the right to question the victim about a prior conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As the result of an altercation with the manager of a fast food restaurant, the defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; assault, a Class A misdemeanor; unlawful possession of a handgun while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor; and the unlawful possession of a weapon with the intent to go armed, as a Class C misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of four and one-half years, with 150 days in confinement, and the remainder of his time on intensive probation. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely appeal to this court, raising the issues of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions of possession of a weapon with the intent to go armed and possession of a handgun while under the influence, and whether the trial court erred in enhancing his aggravated assault sentence to four and one-half years and sentencing him to intensive probation. Based on a careful review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions, and that the trial court did not err in enhancing the defendant's sentence for aggravated assault. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a police search of their home pursuant to a warrant, the defendants, mother and son, were each indicted on one count of possession of marijuana with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, a Class E felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. At the conclusion of their joint trial, the son was found guilty of both counts as charged in the indictment. The jury found the mother guilty of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court denied their motions for new trials, and the defendants filed timely appeals to this court. On appeal, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of their respective convictions. The State raises the additional issue of whether the defendants may properly be represented by the same appellate counsel when the record is silent concerning whether the trial court addressed the possible conflict created by the joint representation. After a careful review of the record and an analysis of applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Randall Keith Smith, appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized in his residence during the execution of a search warrant. A written "motion to suppress" was filed with the clerk on the day prior to Smith's scheduled trial for drug charges. On the date of trial, following the close of all proof in the case, Smith's trial counsel orally moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search, based upon the grounds recited in the written motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that (1) there was no factual basis to support suppression; and (2) the motion was untimely. The jury found Smith guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and he received a three-year community corrections sentence. After review, we find the Appellant's suppression motion untimely. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief which alleged that the charges against him were untrue, that the statutes of limitations as to the charges had expired before he was charged, and that his counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court determined that the allegations contained in the petitioner's pro se petition did not entitle him to habeas corpus relief. After careful review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, John Clark Garrison, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his two convictions for theft of property over the value of $10,000.00 but less than $60,000.00. Petitioner was represented by counsel who filed the petition for post-conviction relief on his behalf. The State filed a response to the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding that all of the issues were either previously determined, waived, insufficient to assert specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, or presented no question of constitutional deprivation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition for failing to be properly verified under oath. The issue is whether a petition for post-conviction relief must be verified under oath and whether the petitioner's "affidavit and sworn statement" was sufficient to satisfy that requirement. We conclude that the post-conviction court was correct in summarily dismissing the petition for failing to be properly verified under oath.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Petitioner for one count of rape and one count of assault. The Petitioner's first trial ended with a hung jury. Following a second trial, the Petitioner was convicted of rape and assault, and sentenced to an effective thirty years of incarceration. His convictions and sentences were upheld on direct appeal. See State v. George D. Fitzpatrick, No. 01C01-9709-CR-00398, 1998 WL 775665 at *1, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 4, 1998), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1999). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. After a hearing the court below dismissed the petition, from which ruling the Petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Richard Burt McKee, No. 01C01-9606-CC-00278, 1998 WL 155558, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Mar. 31, 1998). The Defendant filed for post-conviction relief in December 1998 alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal and that juror misconduct during deliberations entitles him to a new trial. The post-conviction court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. The Defendant now appeals as of right. Finding no merit in the Defendant's contentions, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The appellant, Melvin E. Beard, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of one count of the sale and delivery of less than .5 grams of crack cocaine, a class C felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and imposed a fine of two thousand dollars ($2000). On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the appellant's conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the portion of an audio tape recording of the drug transaction that occurred outside the presence of the appellant; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant the appellant's motion for mistrial; and (4) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On September 25, 1998, the petitioner entered best interest pleas to four counts of child rape. For these offenses he received concurrent sixteen year sentences. According to the announced plea the convictions arising out of Pickett and Overton Counties were set to be served at thirty percent while the Putnam County convictions were at one hundred percent with the potential to be reduced to eighty-five percent. Within the statute of limitations the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered concerning the consequences thereof. Subsequently, the trial court conducted a hearing and later denied the relief sought in the petition. It is from that denial that the petitioner brings the present appeal continuing to maintain that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After reviewing the record and applicable caselaw, we find that the sentences imposed are illegal and, therefore, reverse and remand the matter.

The petitioner, Larry Wade, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County. He asserts that the ineffective assistance of counsel and the unknowing and involuntary nature of his guilty pleas entitle him to relief from his convictions of attempted second degree murder and possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Darlene Renee Blackhurst, pled guilty to second offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI"), leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, and three counts of reckless aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, to be served on intensive probation following a mandatory period of 45 days in confinement for the DUI second offense. In this appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it placed Defendant on full probation because the trial court failed to properly consider the victim's testimony during the sentencing hearing. Our de novo review reveals that the trial court did err in its application of the law concerning victims' statements and in granting probation for the full time remaining in Defendant's sentence following confinement. However, our conclusion regarding the impropriety of probation is based on sentencing considerations other than the testimony of the victim. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment regarding the manner of service of Defendant's sentence and remand this matter to the trial court to determine whether Defendant should be incarcerated for the full term of her sentence or, in the alternative, serve the balance of her sentence in split confinement.

The petitioner, Deborah Louise Reese, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of life imprisonment. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were neither voluntarily nor knowingly made. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. The petitioner now appeals this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Edward Drummer, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. In September, 1997, Drummer pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape and was sentenced to fifteen years confinement in the Department of Correction. In 1998, Drummer filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court, finding the claims unsupported, dismissed the petition. On appeal, Drummer contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal, Mark A. Doolen, Jr. challenges the order of the Dickson County Circuit Court requiring the appellant's payment of restitution in the amount of $6,611.76 for his vandalism of two antique automobiles. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the appellant should have filed his appeal with the Tennessee Court of Appeals.

Jeffrey Miller appeals the Meigs County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petitions for writ of error coram nobis and writ of habeas corpus. Both petitions seek redress for Miller's grievance that he has been required to serve felony sentences in the Department of Correction, although his plea agreements designated the location of confinement to be the Meigs County Jail. Because neither coram nobis nor habeas corpus relief is available to address a concern of this nature and because the petitioner's claims are factually unfounded, we affirm.

The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years, six months in the county workhouse. In this appeal as of right, he raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to include "moral certainty" language in its reasonable doubt instruction to the jury; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factor (10). Based upon a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition for reinstatement of a motor vehicle operator's license pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 55-10-615(b). The court ruled that a subsequent conviction for driving without a license precluded the court from restoring the petitioner's driving privileges for a period of three years after the new conviction. After a careful review, we hold that the court incorrectly concluded it did not have discretion to grant driving privileges and remand to the court for reconsideration of the petition.

The Sullivan County grand jury issued presentments against the defendant on one count of operating a motor vehicle without a face shield; two counts of speeding; three counts of driving under the influence; three counts of driving on a revoked license; two counts of driving on revoked license after second or subsequent conviction for driving while intoxicated; one count of driving on revoked license after second or subsequent conviction for driving under the influence; one count of driving while intoxicated, fourth offense; and one count of driving under the influence, fourth offense. The charges resulted from three separate cases. The defendant pled to all of the crimes in two different plea hearings and the defendant was sentenced as a career offender to a total of eighteen years, with a minimum jail time of 585 days, and with his last six years to be served on probation. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender and did not apprise the defendant of the possibility that he could be sentenced as a persistent offender, as opposed to a career offender. He moved to withdraw his guilty pleas on this ground. The trial court denied his motion, and he appeals the denial. Furthermore, the defendant waived his right to request probation or alternative sentencing in one case, and the state agreed to allow the defendant to serve probation in one case. In the third case, the defendant requested probation or alternative sentencing. The trial court denied his request, citing his extensive criminal history in support of its denial. The defendant also appeals this denial. After reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find these issues to be without merit and therefore affirm the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and its denial of probation or alternative sentencing.