APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a bench trial, the appellant, Greg Stewart, was convicted of two counts of simple possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the appellant to two concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Coffee County Jail. On appeal, the appellant contests the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the drug evidence due to the lack of proper consent to the search. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Darrell S. Miller, was convicted by a jury in the Benton County Circuit Court of two counts of possessing controlled substances with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspending all but one year and placing the appellant in a community corrections program for the remainder. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted drug exhibits; (2) whether the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of Stacy Mumper regarding a prior transaction between the appellant and Mumper's companion; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (4) whether the trial court approved the verdict as thirteenth juror; and (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial when the appellant produced sworn affidavits that Brenda Wynn perjured herself on the witness stand. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served at seventy-five percent. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court incorrectly applied two enhancement factors, thereby causing his sentences to be excessive, and (2) whether the trial court erred by ordering that certain of his sentences run consecutively. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Willie G. Lofton, appeals his conviction for driving under the influence. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury as to the offense of driving while impaired as a lesser included of driving under the influence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Antonio Dewayne Carpenter, was indicted for premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. The state filed notice seeking the death penalty. The defendant was convicted on each count of the indictment and the trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court ordered concurrent twenty-year sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery. All of these sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to three life sentences for federal convictions stemming from the same incident. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the dual sovereignty doctrine, which permits successive federal and state prosecutions for the same acts, should be abandoned. The judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Yevette Somerville, was convicted of theft of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail. As her sole issue on appeal, the defendant argues that the State’s failure to inquire about and preserve potentially exculpatory evidence violated her due process rights under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the loss of the evidence did not unfairly prejudice the defendant’s case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On October 5, 1998, the defendant, Barry Dunham, pled guilty in the Macon County Criminal Court to one count of second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant filed for post-conviction relief which was granted by the post-conviction court. The State now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for new trial.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of a substance containing cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to five years incarceration in the workhouse. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for five years. Approximately four months later, a warrant was issued against the Defendant alleging that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The warrant alleged that the Defendant had been arrested for evading arrest and aggravated assault, that the Defendant had failed to report these arrests to his probation officer, and that the Defendant had failed to report to his probation officer after being released from jail. Following a hearing on the warrant, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant now brings this appeal, in which he challenges the trial court's order requiring him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court of five counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Defendant received an effective sentence of seventy-five years incarceration. This Court subsequently reversed the five rape of a child convictions and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the remaining two twelve-year sentences for aggravated sexual battery should be served consecutively or concurrently. The trial court determined that the sentences should be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-four years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering that the Defendant's sentences for aggravated sexual battery run consecutively. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case returns to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The defendant appeals his jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially
aggravated robbery. He raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant’s request for a mistrial based on a juror’s response during voir dire; (2) whether the trial court erred in directing a witness to answer questions on cross-examination; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser-included offenses. This court initially reversed the appellant’s
conviction for aggravated assault, based on double jeopardy considerations, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court on all other issues. See State v. Reginald Merriweather, No. W1999-
2050-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 242570 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, March 6, 2001) (perm. to appeal granted). On June 5, 2001, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of State v. Curtis
Jason Ely and State v. Laconia Lamar Bowers, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001). In Ely and Bowers, the Court announced new standards regarding the duty to instruct on lesser-included offenses. In
light of the decision in Ely and Bowers, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this court to determine whether error in not instructing facilitation was harmless. See State v. Reginald Merriweather, No. W2001-02206-CCA-RM-CD, Madison County (Tenn., September 10, 2001).  After revisiting this issue under the standards announced in Ely and Bowers, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand this matter for a new trial. 

Because Ely and Bowers involve the issue of lesser-included offenses only, the remand does not alter the analyses in our original opinion as to other issues. However, the necessity of a new trial does render premature our earlier determination to dismiss the conviction for aggravated assault. So as to avoid confusion, sections I and II from our original opinion will be restated in their entirety.  Sections III and IV, dealing with the conviction for aggravated assault and the issue of lesser-included offenses, have been changed.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, with the murder convictions merged into a single conviction for first degree murder following the jury's verdict. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment on the murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years on the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to be served concurrently to the life sentence. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely appeal to this court, raising four issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony about a statement of denial he made to police; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing a photograph of the victim's body to be introduced into evidence; and (4) whether the jury should have been instructed that the State had taken the position, in a dismissed conspiracy indictment, that the defendant's accomplice was the shooter. After a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

The Defendant, Harold D. Arnold, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant and failure to maintain an accurate log book after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the results of a breath analysis test. The Defendant properly reserved a certified question of law for this Court to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Marvin Anthony Mathews, is currently serving a life sentence as an habitual criminal as a result of a larceny conviction. He filed for post-conviction relief, which petition the post-conviction court dismissed because of its untimeliness. The petitioner now appeals this ruling, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding the petition to be time-barred because the petitioner is serving an illegal sentence. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jermaine Driver, appeals his conviction of attempted first-degree murder, which was based on an assault by the defendant and two other men upon the victim. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the assault was a premeditated and intentional attempt to kill the victim. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. Defendant appeals on three grounds: (1) that insufficient evidence exists to uphold the conviction, (2) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of theft, and (3) that the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's guilty plea. We conclude there was no error and affirm.

The Appellant, Maurice LaShaun Nash, was found guilty by a Tipton County jury of possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to deliver, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Nash, as a Range I standard offender, to eighteen months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Nash raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the search warrant was issued upon probable cause; (2) whether introduction of Nash's presence during a prior drug sale at the same residence constituted evidence of a prior bad act in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; and (3) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find the issues presented are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The petitioner, Alan Dale Bailey, appeals the Coffee County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner sought relief from his 1999 Coffee County convictions of aggravated burglary and sexual battery on the basis that his guilty pleas to those charges were unknowing and involuntary and were prompted by ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner's primary complaints focus upon trial counsel's failure to inform the petitioner about the impact of a conviction of a sexual offense, including the risk that parole might not be granted. The trial court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing, and we affirm.

The Appellant, Maurice LaShaun Nash, was found guilty by a Tipton County jury of possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to deliver, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Nash, as a Range I standard offender, to eighteen months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Nash raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the search warrant was issued upon probable cause; (2) whether introduction of Nash's presence during a prior drug sale at the same residence constituted evidence of a prior bad act in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; and (3) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find the issues presented are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The Defendant, George Langford, was convicted of first degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to life without the possibility for parole for the murder and to concurrent sentences of four, five, and two years for the other crimes respectively. The Defendant appealed his convictions and this Court affirmed the convictions and the sentences. Our supreme court granted the Defendant's application for appeal and also affirmed his convictions and sentences. The Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Defendant now appeals to this Court alleging that the trial court erred in denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Anthony Richardson, was convicted of first-degree murder in the Shelby County Criminal Court. This Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Richardson, 995 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Petitioner filed a petition for post conviction relief, which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. Petitioner challenges the denial of his petition, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court's comments during a witness' testimony deprived him of his sixth amendment right to a jury trial; (2) whether Petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to a jury trial when the trial court "forced" counsel to proceed to trial; (3) whether the prosecutor's biblical reference at trial constituted reversible error; and (4) whether there was a conflict of interest when the same judge presided at both his trial and post-conviction hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Donald Mays, appeals the verdict of a Shelby County jury finding him guilty of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Mays was sentenced to 30 years for aggravated robbery and to 60 years on each count of kidnapping. The kidnapping sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, but consecutive to the aggravated robbery sentence, for an effective sentence of 90 years. On appeal, Mays raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof; and (3) whether Mays' two convictions for kidnapping constitute double jeopardy. After review, we find Mays' multiple convictions for kidnapping violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, one count of kidnapping is dismissed. In all other respects, the remaining judgments of conviction are affirmed.