APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Eric T. Davis appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's revocation of his probationary sentences and order that he serve the sentences as originally imposed in the Department of Correction. He claims that the lower court erred in finding that he committed a criminal offense based upon the uncorroborated testimony of a law enforcement informant. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.

The State appeals from the order of the Maury County Circuit Court reversing the district attorney general's decision to deny the Defendant pretrial diversion for the charge of arson. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant seeks review of the state's denial of pretrial diversion for the offense of sexual battery. We conclude that the prosecutor failed to consider and weigh all relevant factors and, under the circumstances of this case, improperly relied upon the defendant's refusal to take responsibility for his actions. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this matter to the district attorney general for further consideration of the defendant's request for pretrial diversion in accordance with this opinion.

Jerome D. Manning appeals a certified question of law regarding a police officer's stop of him which resulted in his arrest for illegal possession of narcotics. Because we agree with the trial court that reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts existed for the stop and that the scope and duration of the detention were not unreasonable, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Deandre M. Broaden, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for possession of marijuana and for possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Defendant pled guilty to both offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to four years probated under the Community Corrections Act of 1985. Defendant violated the conditions of his sentence, and the trial court resentenced him to five years confinement, crediting him four months for time served in community corrections until the date of his first violation. On appeal, Defendant argues that he should have received full credit for the amount of time served up until the filing of the petition seeking revocation of his community corrections sentence. We agree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the revocation of Defendant's community corrections sentence and the new sentence of five years, but reverse the trial court's order insofar as it provides only four months of credit. We remand this case for entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Michael Thomason, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court summarily denied. The defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry Burke, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends that his trial attorney was ineffective for (1) failing to request a mental evaluation; (2) failing to investigate his case; and (3) failing to subpoena witnesses and cross-examine witnesses adequately. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

Glenn D. Gold appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court's dismissal of his pro se petition in which he seeks post-conviction, habeas corpus, and coram nobis relief. Because his attempts to receive post-conviction and coram nobis relief are untimely and his attempt for habeas corpus relief does not state a claim cognizable in that type of action, we affirm the lower court.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions in the Shelby County Criminal Court for three counts of felony murder and four counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide; and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Kynaston Scott a.k.a. Kynaston L. Olawumi, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree murder and felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight, and the trial court erred in admitting an inflammatory photograph. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Glenda Ponder appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court's revocation of her probationary sentence and ordering into effect her incarcerative sentence in the Department of Correction. Upon review, we are unpersuaded that the lower court abused its discretion and therefore affirm.

The defendant, Ricky Lee Inscore, pled nolo contendere to aggravated burglary and sexual battery. The Sullivan County trial court sentenced the defendant to three years for aggravated burglary and two years for sexual battery as a Range I standard offender to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In this appeal of right, the defendant presents the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying him probation or alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant, Dondie Eugene Tidwell, of two counts of first degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft over $10,000. The trial court merged the defendant’s two first degree murder convictions and ordered the defendant to serve twenty-three years for his conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction, twenty-three years for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and four years and six months for his theft conviction.  The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently to each other and consecutively to the defendant’s sentence for his merged first degree murder conviction, life without the possibility of parole. Thus, the defendant received an aggregate sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-three years. The defendant now brings this appeal, challenging his convictions and his sentence on the bases that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to excuse a juror using a peremptory challenge; (2) the evidence introduced at trial is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the prosecutor made inappropriate comments when delivering the state’s opening statement; (4) the trial court erred by allowing an expert to testify on subjects beyond the scope of that witness’s expertise; (5) the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of the drugs that were present in the victim’s system at the time of the victim’s death; (6) the trial court instructed the jury incorrectly on the charge of conspiracy; (7) the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim taken after the victim’s death during the sentencing phase of the trial; (8) the trial court erred by refusing, in the sentencing phase, to allow the defendant to compare his potential sentence to the sentence received by his co-conspirator; (9) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of certain hearsay evidence; (10) the prosecutor exceeded the permissible scope of his rebuttal closing argument; and (11) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did err by refusing to allow the defendant to exercise a peremptory challenge and that therefore the defendant is entitled to a new trial on this basis.
However, we find that the remainder of the issues presented in this appeal have either been waived or lack merit.

On February 2, 2000, the defendant was convicted by a jury of the offense of aggravated robbery. He received a sentence of nine years in the state penitentiary. In this appeal he raises eight (8) issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury; (3) whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the offenses of assault or aggravated assault; (4) whether there was prosecutorial misconduct; (5) whether the defendant was subjected to a constitutionally flawed show-up shortly after the robbery; (6) whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to what they must do if they have a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for the offense; (7) whether the trial court should have dismissed the case because the state destroyed evidence fundamental to the defense; (8) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive.

The defendant, Richard Bokanper, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of burglary and theft. Following the guilty verdicts, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the evidence insufficiently corroborates the inculpative testimony of an accomplice, we reverse the convictions and dismiss the charges.

The petitioner, James Darrell Horn, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief. In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner challenged his jury convictions on more than 30 aggravated burglary counts and nearly as many theft counts. As a result of his many convictions, the petitioner is serving an effective 90-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, his convictions and sentences were affirmed by this court. See State v. James D. Horn, No. 03C01-9712-CR-00537 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jul. 20, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2000). The petitioner asserted that his previous appellate counsel was ineffective because she did not raise on direct appeal whether the trial court (1) erred in not suppressing the petitioner's pretrial statements and (2) in not suppressing physical evidence seized during a warrantless search of his residence. He also claimed that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective because they did not properly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on three or four specific counts of the indictments. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a very thorough order denying post-conviction relief. Upon our review, we affirm.

Defendant attempted to shoot and kill Johnny Maxwell, missed, and accidentally shot twelve-year-old Brittney Taylor, seriously injuring her. A jury convicted the defendant of attempted first degree murder of Maxwell and attempted first degree murder of Taylor. He appeals, claiming the trial court erroneously charged the jury, relative to the doctrine of transferred intent; that double jeopardy bars convictions of both offense; and the evidence was insufficient to sustain the attempted first degree murder convictions. We agree and affirm both convictions.

In December 1997, the defendant was convicted of the sale of cocaine over .5 grams, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eight years, with all but sixty days suspended, and the balance to be served on probation. In October 1998, his probation was revoked because he was convicted that year of possession of marijuana, criminal impersonation, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He was incarcerated for ninety days and again placed on probation, this time in community corrections. In December 1998, another probation violation warrant was issued, this time alleging that the defendant had absconded. In September 1999, his probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve the balance of his sentence in the Department of Correction. Apparently, he was again placed on probation, with the case transferred to Michigan. In April 2001, another probation warrant was issued, charging the defendant with failing two drug screens and attempting to adulterate a drug screen. Following a hearing, the court revoked the defendant's probation and he timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tina Cunningham, was convicted of two counts of introduction of contraband into a penal facility. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence and granted immediate probation. Later, the trial court extended the original six-year sentence by two years when the defendant was convicted of two counts of forgery, but permitted the defendant to remain on probation. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years for the forgery convictions, to be served on probation and consecutively to the sentence for introduction of contraband into a penal facility. At some point, the trial court ordered the defendant to complete a drug program. When she failed to do so, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentence in a community corrections program. When the defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the program, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of her sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the single question presented for our review is whether the trial court erred by ordering the defendant to fully serve the balance of her sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Robert L. Wilks, appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The trial court did not appoint counsel. In this appeal of right, the petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by denying the appointment of counsel and by entering the order of summary dismissal. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Nicole Beaudion, also known as Nikki Jo Napier, appeals pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). After pleading guilty to facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and agreeing to accept a fifteen-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction with a 30 percent release eligibility date, the defendant filed a timely Rule 35(b) motion to reduce her sentence to ten years. The trial court denied this motion, and the propriety of this action is now challenged on appeal.

The defendant, Antoinette Hill, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court imposed a life sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury. The judgment is affirmed.