APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jeffery E. Long, was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to thirteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in three areas: admission of a photographic lineup, failure to grant a mistrial, and failure to require a different jury panel when it was possible some members saw the defendant led into a holding cell in the courthouse prior to trial. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The appellant, Joseph Bloodgood, pled guilty to facilitation of aggravated burglary and received a sentence of two years. The trial court denied the appellant alternative sentencing, and the appellant now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The last court to consider the petitioner’s mental fitness was the trial court that dismissed his post-conviction case without prejudice in 1988 because the petitioner was mentally incompetent to proceed. We are presently faced with a Motion to Reopen form that is quite limited when compared to the form for a petition for post-conviction relief. It does assert, however, that the petitioner was found incompetent and that he did not seek an appeal because he was unaware of the process due to his incompetence.

In 1982 the petitioner, Lebron Moore, was convicted of aggravated rape and second degree burglary and sentenced to forty years in the Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed in 1988 on the ground that he was mentally incompetent to proceed. In 2005, the petitioner filed a pleading styled “Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Petition,” which the post-conviction court treated as a new petition for post-conviction relief and dismissed as untimely. The petitioner argues on appeal that the post-conviction court erred in finding the petition untimely. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Johnny B. Cox, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of two counts of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to the maximum sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, to be served consecutively, with his release eligibility set at seventy-five percent. The defendant was ordered to pay a fine of $2500 for the first count and a fine of $500 for the second count. In this appeal, the defendant raises the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud in case number S50,151 in exchange for an eight year sentence to be served on probation. He also pled guilty to one count of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and one count of fraudulently obtaining benefits for medical assistance in case number S50,727. For the controlled substance conviction, he received an eight year sentence to be served on probation concurrently with the sentence in case number S50,151. For the medical assistance conviction, the agreed sentence was six years, run consecutively to the other two sentences, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve his six year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court failed to make his pre-sentence report available and erred in sentencing him as a Range III offender. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Richard Burton, was convicted of one count of introducing contraband into a penal institution. On appeal, he argues that he was erroneously convicted of an offense for which he was not indicted. In addition, the defendant argues that the trial court’s interpretation of the statute resulted in a duplicitous indictment and the trial court’s jury charge prevented a unanimous jury verdict. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the conviction and dismiss the charges against the defendant.

The appellant pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served on probation supervised by Community Corrections. On appeal, the appellant  ontends that the trial court erroneously denied her request for judicial diversion. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Anthony T. Robertson, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for sexual battery. The trial court issued a written order dismissing the petition and denying habeas corpus relief for failure to state a cognizable claim. The petitioner filed an untimely appeal of the written order denying his petition. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner failed to timely file his notice of appeal and therefore his appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Matthew Dixon, appeals from the post-conviction court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the denial of relief was error because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective. Consequently, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Robert Rubin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of the first degree murder of Michael Gross. He was also convicted of the attempted first degree murder of Charles Gross, a Class A felony. The defendant is serving consecutive sentences of life for the first degree murder conviction and thirty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of first degree murder, and (2) that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a thirty-five year term for attempted first degree murder and in imposing the sentences consecutively. We hold that no error has been shown, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The appellants, Derrick Quintero and William Eugene Hall, Jr., were each convicted on two counts of murder during the perpetration of first degree burglary, three counts of grand larceny, one count of petit larceny and three counts of first degree burglary. They both received the death penalty for the murder of one of the victims, a life sentence for the other murder conviction, and an effective eighty year sentence for the remaining convictions. The appellants were unsuccessful in their direct appeals. See State v. Hall and Quintero, 976 S.W. 2d 121 (Tenn. 1998). Appellants filed individual pro se post-conviction petitions and simultaneously joint petitions for writ of error coram nobis. Appellants alleged various constitutional violations, including the ineffective assistance of counsel and the existence of newly discovered evidence. Following a joint hearing on the petitions the trial court denied relief. We affirm the judgments.

The defendant, George Lucas Jernigan, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault, one count of driving on a suspended license, and one count of reckless driving. The Bedford County Circuit Court imposed an effective six-year term to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals, alleging that community corrections placement was a more appropriate sentence and that the trial court erroneously applied statutory enhancement factors to increase the sentence that were not found by a jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgments below.

The Petitioner was convicted of possession of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to ten years as a Range III offender. He filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel when he represented himself at trial and that the indictment was defective. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The Petitioner pled guilty to rape and incest and agreed to allow the trial court to sentence him. After a sentencing hearing, the court imposed an effective sentence of ten and one-half years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed the sentence, and this Court affirmed. The Petitioner then filed his petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily. The post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Bedford County jury convicted the Petitioner of seventeen crimes involving his sexual contact with three minor girls, and this Court affirmed those judgments on appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he failed to receive the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Billy Clay Browning, was convicted by a Henry County jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder and received, as provided by  law, a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Browning has presented two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance because Browning was unable to assist trial counsel with his defense; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I would affirm the trial court because of the defendant’s failure to include the guilty plea hearing transcript in the record and the attendant presumption that the trial court’s determinations were correct. See State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (holding trial court’s ruling presumed correct in the absence of an adequate record on appeal).

A Warren County jury convicted the Petitioner of aggravated sexual battery and attempted aggravated sexual battery in separate cases, and this Court affirmed the judgments on appeal. The Petitioner filed two post-conviction petitions asserting various grounds for relief. The post-conviction court denied the petitions for post-conviction relief after a consolidated hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges: (1) he was denied the right to a fair trial because a case relied upon by the trial court and on direct appeal to exclude expert testimony proffered by the Petitioner has since been overturned; and (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Sunni Adkins, pled guilty to three counts of child abuse, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. She was sentenced to eleven months and twentynine days for each misdemeanor and to four years for the felony to be served as a Range I standard offender. The misdemeanor sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to the felony sentence. Additionally, six months of each misdemeanor sentence was ordered to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing her by improperly applying certain statutory enhancement factors and by denying full probation or another alternative sentence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we uphold the sentences ordered by the trial court.

The Appellant, Charles Michael Bean, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. A jury found Bean guilty of three counts of aggravated assault and two counts of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court merged the convictions for reckless aggravated assault with the three aggravated assault convictions, and a sentencing hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence of three years for each of the Class C felonies and ordered that Bean serve nine months in incarceration followed by four years of probation. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. On appeal, Bean argues that the trial court erred in denying him a sentence of total probation. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.

The defendant, Benjamin Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse. For the felony murder conviction, he was sentenced as a violent offender to life in the Department of Correction, and for the aggravated child abuse conviction he was sentenced to twenty-five years, to be served concurrently. In this direct appeal, he claims (1) that the trial court improperly allowed evidence of the defendant’s bad acts without conducting a hearing as required by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), (2) that the trial court committed plain error in allowing a state’s expert witness to testify about the victim’s cause of death without establishing a proper foundation, (3) that the court erred in failing to replace a juror who indicated she had some knowledge of one of the state’s witnesses, (4) that the trial court failed to give instructions on lesser offenses, and (5) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. We hold that although the state made an improper rebuttal argument, the error was harmless, and the remaining issues are without merit. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Sheffa, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective and, that because of the ineffectiveness of counsel, his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Jennifer Lynn Stinnett, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Marshall County Circuit Court. The Defendant was indicted for over two hundred offenses (Class D and E felonies and Class C misdemeanors) as a consequence of her scheme to unlawfully obtain prescription drugs. She subsequently pled guilty as charged. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective twelve-year sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve 365 days in jail, followed by probation for the remainder of her sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for full probation. After a review of the record, we find no error in the denial of total probation. We remand for entry of corrected judgments.

Petitioner, Dane Lee Duckett, was convicted by a Cumberland County Jury of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, driving on a revoked license, and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of six years. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Dane Lee Duckett, No. E2004-02321-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2777378, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 26, 2005). In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition because he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We determine that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.