APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Fred Thompson, Jr., appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of theft and theft of property valued less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He received a sentence of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of five years for the theft conviction. The Petitioner challenges the performance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Rodger Watts, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony; burglary of a building, a Class D felony; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to nine years for the theft and four years for the burglary, to be served consecutively as a Range II offender, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest, to be served concurrently to the felonies. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence with regard to his theft conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, James Rae Lewter, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, both Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced Lewter as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years at thirty-five percent in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Lewter argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence of eight years in violation of State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733, 740 (Tenn. 2007); and (3) the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. See State v. James Rae Lewter, No. M2007-02723-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1076716, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 9, 2009), rev’d, 313 S.W.3d 745 (Tenn. June 4, 2010). Upon initial review, this court, after concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, reversed and vacated Lewter’s convictions and dismissed the indictment. Id. Following the reversal, the State applied for permission to appeal this court’s decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and on August 17, 2009, permission to appeal was granted. Upon review, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 746 (Tenn. 2010). Consequently, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case to this court for consideration of the remaining two issues: (1) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in violation of Gomez, 239 S.W.3d at 740; and (2) whether the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. See Lewter, 313 S.W.3d at 751. On remand, we conclude that Lewter did not receive an excessive sentence pursuant to Gomez and that the State’s remarks during closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, as to the issues remanded for our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Aaron Benard Barnett, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and vandalism over $1000, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to six years for aggravated burglary and four years for vandalism, with the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas E. Campbell, was convicted by a Warren County jury of attempted child abuse, a Class B misdemeanor, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to six months in the county jail for attempted child abuse. For aggravated sexual battery, Campbell was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Campbell claims that: (1) both convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; and (2) his sentence for aggravated sexual battery was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Brian Hervery, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and one count of the employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court merged one of the convictions of aggravated assault into the conviction for attempted second degree murder and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of ten years for the attempted murder conviction and three years for the aggravated assault convictions. Because the defendant had a prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter, the court sentenced him to ten years at 100% for the firearm conviction and ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to the ten-year sentence for attempted murder, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324. The defendant raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that would have shown the victims’ bias; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial following the prosecutor’s improper closing comments; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (4) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Henry Lee Moore, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for two counts of violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act, a Class E felony, and one count of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and ordering the remainder of his effective four-year sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Deanna Machelle Fletcher, pled guilty to three counts of identity theft, a Class D felony; burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony; three counts of forgery, a Class E felony; and three counts of theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-150, 39-14-402, 39-14-114, 39-14-103 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years’ confinement for identity theft, four years’ confinement for burglary of an automobile, four years’ confinement for forgery, and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement for theft, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentences and ordering confinement. Without the guilty plea hearing transcript, we presume the trial court’s determinations were correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Devon O’Neal Wiggins, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered that this sentence be served consecutive to a thirty-year sentence for case number 07-CR-461. On appeal, Wiggins claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the jury  instructions should have included the offense of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bifurcated trial; (4) the testimony of an expert witness violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; (5) his sentence was excessive; (6) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence; (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (8) cumulative error. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sevier County Circuit Court jury found that the Defendant, Andrew Reginald MacKinnon, violated the implied consent law. See T.C.A. § 55-10-406 (2006) (amended 2008, 2009, 2010). The trial court ordered that his driving privileges be revoked for one year. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress because the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting a witness’s opinion testimony into evidence and (2) the jury instructions for violation of the implied consent law were insufficient because the trial court failed to define “reasonable grounds.” Because the trial court failed to determine the issue of the implied consent violation, submitting it to the jury instead, we vacate the judgment.

The defendant, Gregory D. Roberts, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of illegal voting, a Class D felony, for having intentionally voted in a November 2008 election knowing that he was ineligible to vote due to his felony convictions for infamous crimes. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to four years in the Department of Correction, with the sentence suspended to fifteen days in the county jail with the remainder of the time on supervised probation. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to disregard a lay witness’s testimony regarding similarities in signatures; and (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing. Given that the Defendant does not raise any issue regarding the trial court’s failure to determine the implied consent law violation, that no prejudice has been demonstrated, and that the trial court acted as the thirteenth juror, I would address the issues raised on appeal.

The defendant, Michael Martin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. The aggravated assault conviction merged into the attempted second degree murder conviction, and the defendant was sentenced to eighteen years as a Range II offender on the attempted second degree murder conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days on the violation of an order of protection conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing photographs of the victim’s wounds into evidence; (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence regarding injuries the victim’s grandparents sustained during the commission of the offense; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder; (4) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial was sufficient to justify a new trial; and (5) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range II offender. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Napoleon Stephan Meredith, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow the appellant to be viewed from a close distance by the jury and that the error forced him to relinquish his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court found the Defendants, Elisha Tomlinson and Tommy Gregory, in contempt of court for their part in the depleting of $250,000 in certificates of deposit held as collateral for the bond writing ability of Aaron Bonding Company. On appeal, both Defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain this finding. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry Wayne Lankford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted by a McMinn County jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony. State v. Lankford, 298 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). The petitioner was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for aggravated burglary and ten years for theft of property, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Id. On appeal, the petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Rodney M. Butler, appeals pro se after the Madison County Circuit Court summarily dismissed his post-conviction petition seeking relief from his guilty plea to driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony, for which he received a three-year sentence with a 35 percent release eligibility. We conclude that Petitioner should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing, and for the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Small, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. On appeal, Small argues that the trial court erred in imposing a twenty-year sentence consecutive to his effective sentence of forty years for three previous convictions for aggravated robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Stacy Lee Fleming, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Fleming claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by restricting the cross-examination of a State’s witness; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing Fleming as a career offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Michael Ware, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the order of the habeas corpus court dismissing the petition.

The pro se petitioner, George Franklin, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State acknowledges on appeal that the petition was timely filed because the petitioner delivered it to the appropriate prison official for mailing within the one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for consideration of the petition.

The petitioner, Kendrick D. Rivers, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, resisting arrest, evading arrest, and criminal trespass. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to serve an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with the petitioner a sufficient number of times and to properly investigate the case. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Camille Kristine Chesney, of facilitation to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and driving on a suspended license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of four years for the facilitation to sell cocaine conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction, to be served as ninety days in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. She also was fined three thousand five hundred dollars. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal stop and arrest and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s conviction for facilitation to sell cocaine but reverse the conviction for driving on a suspended license.