APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Andrew Helton, appeals the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the court’s judgment.

assault by the use or display of a deadly weapon. After a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of the charge. Appellant was later sentenced to four years as a Range I, standard offender. He was ordered to serve the sentence on supervised probation and attend domestic violence counseling. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Brooke Lee Whitaker, was indicted for aggravated rape. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, she was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser included offense of rape, with the trial court to determine the length of the sentence after a sentencing hearing. Defendant was sentenced to serve twelve years, and she appeals, arguing that the sentence is excessive.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Shirley LaRhonda Gagne, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense; driving on a suspended license, second offense; possession of drug paraphernalia; violation of the seatbelt law; and violation of the open container law. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 130 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence testimony pertaining to a blood sample taken from her; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for DUI, third offense. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Appellants, Jesse Grant Craven, Tommy Davenport, and Greg Pope, appeal the Warren County Circuit Court’s order denying them relief from the prosecutor’s denial of each of their respective applications for pretrial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the prosecutor’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Carl Lee Bright, was convicted by a Monroe County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ confinement. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss the case due to insufficient evidence, (2) denying his motion to suppress evidence, (3) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment or remand for a preliminary examination because his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, and (4) imposing confinement for the maximum allowable sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Assadot Starling, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug free zone with the intent to sell or deliver. He received a sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Warren County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Lawrence E. Ralph, of violation of the seatbelt law, see T.C.A. § 55-9-603, and operating a vehicle in violation of restrictive condition #01 (driving without corrective lenses), see id. § 55-50-331. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 30 days and 11 months and 29 days, respectively, suspended to intensive probation following the service of 120 days in jail. Additionally, the trial court imposed fines totaling $1,010 and ordered the defendant to perform 40 hours of community service as a condition of his probation. The defendant appeals pro se, making various arguments concerning the propriety of his trial in circuit court and the trial court’s sentencing. Because the defendant filed his notice of appeal prior to his motion for new trial and failed to prepare an adequate record on appeal, we determine that his issues are waived and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Darius Jones, was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, ten years for each of the aggravated robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery convictions, and four years for each of the attempted aggravated robbery and the aggravated burglary convictions, for an effective sentence of life plus eighty-one years. On direct appeal, this court affirmed all of the defendant’s convictions and his life sentence for the felony murder conviction but remanded for resentencing on the remaining convictions in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). This court also ordered that the trial court revisit the issue of consecutive sentencing and place its specific findings on the record. After being resentenced to life plus fifty-four years, the defendant appealed again, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. On direct appeal of the resentencing, this court observed that the trial court failed to place its findings regarding consecutive sentencing in the record, and we remanded the matter a second time. After conducting a sentencing hearing on remand, the trial court again imposed consecutive sentences, which the defendant challenges on appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering consecutive sentencing in this case.

A Cocke County jury convicted the Petitioner, Charles Wade McGaha, of first degree murder and aggravated assault. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which appointed counsel amended to allege the petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant entered pleas of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to five counts of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403(a) (2006); two counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(3); three counts of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than  $1,000, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(2); one count of vandalism of property valued at more than $500 but less than $10,000, see id. § 39-14-408(a); one count of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, see id. § 39-14-408, -105(2); and tampering with evidence, see id. § 39-16-503(a)(1). The trial court imposed a total effective entence of 15 years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cauley Cross, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and three counts of exhibition of obscene materials to a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a child predator to concurrent terms of ten years for both aggravated sexual battery convictions. For the misdemeanor offenses, Cross was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, he claims: (1) his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) his sentences for aggravated sexual battery were excessive; and (3) his convictions for aggravated sexual battery should be merged. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Emanuel Hamilton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony, and ordering the remainder of his effective eleven-year sentence to be served in confinement. He contends that he should have been returned to probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Michael Holmes, pled guilty as a career offender 1 to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, with an agreed sentence of 6 years at 60 percent, leaving the manner of service to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shawn Rafael Bough, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State of Tennessee has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20.

Appellant, Darrell Anthony Jones, was charged in two separate indictments by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one count of criminal impersonation, and one count of driving on a suspended, revoked, or canceled driver’s license. Appellant pled guilty to one count of felony possession of cocaine and one count of felony possession of marijuana, for a total effective sentence of four years. The remaining counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences were suspended, and Appellant was placed on four years of supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was filed. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated the terms of his probation and imposed a sentence of one year to serve, after which Appellant was to be reinstated to probation for three years. Appellant contends on appeal that the evidence did not support the finding that he violated the terms of his probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly revoked Appellant’s probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Grainger County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, John E. Lane, of the premeditated first degree murder of Joe Brooks and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the appellant’s conviction for first degree murder but reverse his conviction for conspiracy.

A jury convicted the defendant, James Alton Walton, of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jarvis Nichols, appeals the judgment of the Blount County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering service of the balance of the sentence in confinement when less severe sanctions were available. Upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which challenged his 1987 convictions of felony murder and aggravated rape and resulting death sentence. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the coram nobis court erred by ruling that due process considerations did not toll the oneyear statute of limitations applicable to coram nobis petitions, see T.C.A. § 27-7-103 (2000), and that the newly discovered evidence “would not have” resulted in a different verdict had it been presented to the convicting jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Petitioner, Timmy Reagan, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. See State v. Timmy Reagan, No. M2002-01472-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1114588 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Nashville, May 19, 2004). The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. See Timmy Reagan v. State, No. M2007-01396-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 230355 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 2, 2009). On appeal, this Court questioned the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief and remanded the case to the post-conviction court “for a determination of whether the petition was filed within one year of this court’s opinion affirming the petitioner’s conviction or whether due process requires the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations in this case.” Id. at *1. On remand, the post-conviction court first determined that Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was untimely. Then, the post-conviction court held that trial counsel failed to withdraw pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and that his failure to withdraw or pursue an appeal was a misrepresentation to Petitioner of his intent to seek permission to appeal. Id. Based on this finding, the post-conviction court determined that trial counsel’s actions denied Petitioner the opportunity to seek post-conviction relief in a timely manner. The post-conviction court held that the statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s petition should have been tolled. Then the post-conviction court reviewed the post-conviction petition and the transcript from the previous post-conviction hearing as well as the trial record, and agreed with the prior determination of the post-conviction court that Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, we determine: that the post-conviction court properly determined that Petitioner’s petition was untimely but improperly determined that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations for Petitioner’s post-conviction petition. Therefore, the post-conviction court improperly addressed the merits of the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.

The petitioner, Brian Eric McGowen, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of life plus forty years to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Christopher Jake Reynolds, was indicted by the Giles County Grand Jury in October of 2003 for two counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a jury trial in June of 2005, Appellant was found not guilty of Count One and guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell in Count Two. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years as a Career Offender. A motion for new trial was denied. Nearly one and a half years later, Appellant sought a delayed appeal and postconviction relief on the basis he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel had been disbarred. The trial court found that it was without jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s claims. Appellant seeks relief in this Court. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that he has failed to establish a reasonable explanation for the delay that would justify the tolling of the statute of limitations for purposes of a delayed appeal or post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Douglas Wayne Young, was convicted by a Sullivan County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; four counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010), 39-13-502 (2010), 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010), 39-14-403 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years’ confinement for especially aggravated kidnapping, twenty-five years’ confinement for each aggravated rape conviction, six years’ confinement for aggravated assault, and six years’ confinement for aggravated burglary. The kidnapping conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts and by enhancing his sentence based upon enhancement factors not found by the jury or admitted by the Defendant. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eugene Taylor, entered a plea of guilty to possession of cocaine for resale and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent terms of four years as a Range I, standard offender for these convictions. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. We remand for the entry of a corrected judgment.