APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief alleging (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea to aggravated assault; and (2) that his plea was not voluntary as constitutionally required. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Antonio Durrell Hubbard a/k/a Antonio Bradford, was indicted by the Fayette County Grand Jury in March of 2010 for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver, driving with a suspended license, and speeding. Prior to trial, Appellant sought to suppress the results of an inventory search. The motion to suppress was denied. After a trial, Appellant was convicted of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver and driving on a suspended license. The speeding charge was dismissed. As a result of the convictions, Appellant received an effective sentence of one year. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has appealed. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. After a review, we determine the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress and the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Derrick Rice (“the Defendant”) appeals jury convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the trial court erred in denying extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of a witness and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The defendant, Robert Lee Adams, fled justice while the jury was deliberating numerous charges against him stemming from his participation in a drug-related shooting in 2007. The jury found the defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, a Class D felony. The defendant was sentenced in absentia to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty years. The defendant’s trial counsel filed a timely motion for new trial. In response, the State moved to dismiss the defendant’s motion on the grounds that the defendant had abandoned his right to proceed by absconding from the court’s jurisdiction. After a hearing held while the defendant was still in absentia, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for a new trialpursuantto the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and allowed the defendant’s trialcounsel to withdraw soon thereafter. Weeks later, the defendant was returned to custody, filed a pro se notice of appeal, and was appointed new counsel. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by dismissing his motion for a new trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred by denying his trial counsel’s motion for a continuance; and (4) the trial court applied improper enhancement factors when it sentenced him for his conspiracy and aggravated robbery convictions. The State argues that we must dismiss the defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds that he was a fugitive from justice but that, nonetheless, we have jurisdiction to review his appeal now that he has been returned to custody. The absence of a motion for new trial, however, limits our appellate review to considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and his sentencing. After thorough review, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the defendant’s convictions and thatthe trial court committed no error in sentencing the defendant for conspiracy to commit kidnapping. While we conclude that the trial court may have erroneously applied one of the several enhancement factors it used when it sentenced the defendant for aggravated robbery, in light of the applicable sentencing principles, remaining enhancement factors, and the particular facts of this case, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was appropriate. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Kenneth Edward Watts, of vandalism resulting in $10,000 to $60,000 in damages, a Class C felony, and theft of property under $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years for the Class C felony and as a career offender to twelve years for the Class D felony. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify as to the estimated cost of repair; that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and that the trial court improperly calculated his sentencing range. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James David Moats, stands convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”), fourth or greater offense, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and motion for judgment of acquittal. Following our review, we conclude that under the facts of this case the police officer seized the defendant when she pulled up behind the defendant’s parked vehicle and activated her blue emergency lights. We further conclude that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure. As such, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dib Driver, was found guilty by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; six counts of attempted solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony; two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony; two counts of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure,a Class D felony; attempted sexual battery,a Class A misdemeanor; and two counts of attempted assault, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2010) (attempt), 39-13-101 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010) (assault), 39-13-505 (2010) (sexual battery), 39-13-527 (2010) (sexual battery by an authority figure), 39-13-529 (2010) (solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to serve ten years for solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, five years for two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, four years for six counts of attempted solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, three years for two counts of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, eleven months and twenty-nine days for attempted sexual battery, and thirty days for two counts of attempted assault. The trial court imposed partially consecutive sentences yielding an effective fifteen-year sentence for these offenses. After the convictions, the Defendant pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, pertaining to a count of the indictment that was severed from the counts charging sexual offenses. See id., § 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping). The court imposed a twelve-year sentence consecutively to the effective fifteen-year sentence for the other convictions, for a final effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his two motions for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court

In this interlocutory appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, Susan A. Webb, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s order denying her request for relief from the prosecutor’s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. On appeal, Webb argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify at the hearing challenging the prosecutor’s denial of pretrial diversion; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to “fill in the gaps” in proof after determining that the prosecutor initially abused her discretion in denying pretrial diversion; (3) the trial court erred in suggesting and allowing her to file a second application for pretrial diversion; (4) the unfavorable factors regarding the circumstances of the case and the need for deterrence did not outweigh the favorable factors as stated in her application for pretrial diversion; (5) the prosecutor considered irrelevant factors and drew “conclusions based on conjecture and speculation” in evaluating her petition for pretrial diversion; (6) the prosecutor abused her discretion in using “conclusionary, flawed logic” in denying her application for pretrial diversion, which resulted in an “arbitrary and capricious” decision; and (7) appellate review of the denial of her two applications for pretrial diversion is improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Charles Edward Cliff, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The defendant, Martarious Hoskins, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, John Wesley Wright, was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued at ten thousand dollars or more but less than sixty thousand dollars, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II,multiple offender to seven years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Davidson County Criminal Court denied the petitioner, Gdongalay P. Berry, post-conviction relief from his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping but granted relief from his sentence of death in the form of a new capital sentencing hearing. The petitioner appeals the partial denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the State violated the tenets of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); that neither the State nor the trial court honored his constitutional right to a speedy trial; that the State’s pursuit of inconsistent theories violated his constitutional right to due process; that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel; and that the cumulative effect of the constitutional deprivations rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The State appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of a new sentencing hearing, asserting that the error attending the petitioner’s original sentencing hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Shanta Jones, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of facilitation of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; facilitation of aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403 (2010), 39-13-402 (2010), 39-14-403 (2010), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010), 39-16-510 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years for facilitation of aggravated robbery, to four years each for the burglary and assault convictions, and to two years for retaliation for past action, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Marlon McKay, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of life plus six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and contends that the trial court committed plain error by granting the State’s request to omit a portion of the pattern jury instruction on criminal responsibility. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert White, appeals his conviction of second offense driving under the influence, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401(a)(1); -403(a)(1)(A)(iv), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in light of his acquittal on an alternative count also charging driving under the influence, see id. § 55-10-401(a)(2). Because the seemingly inconsistent verdicts in this case do not render the evidence of the defendant’s intoxication infirm or insufficient, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Mark Edward Coffey, pled guilty to facilitation of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to eight years, suspended and placed on probation. Defendant was charged with a violation of probation, and after a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Paul Whetstone, was convicted of direct criminal contempt by the Jefferson County General Sessions Court, Judge Alfred Benjamin Strand, Jr., presiding. The Defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the Jefferson County Circuit Court, which was granted. Following its review, the Jefferson County Circuit Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Timothy J. Turner, was convicted of four counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen months for each count of sexual battery and four years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court ordered two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure to run consecutively to each other and the remaining counts to run concurrently for an effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) that the original judge failed to perform his role as thirteenth juror; (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to hear his motion for new trial; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Defendant’s dual convictions for sexual battery and sexual battery by an authority figure in counts five, six, and seven of the indictment violate double jeopardy principles. We accordingly merge his convictions for sexual battery into his convictions for sexual battery by an authority figure in counts five, six, and seven and remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial courts, including the effective sentence of eight years imposed by the trial court

The petitioner, Timothy Casterlow, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. In this appeal, he contends that principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Winford McLean, of one count of facilitation of possession with intent to deliver 300, grams or more of cocaine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 and §39-11-403(2006). He was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to fifteen years in prison. The defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court denied following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by admitting evidence of his prior convictions for use as impeachment at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant, Wayne Robert Wait, of second degree murder and, thereafter, the trial court imposed a sentence of 18 years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a police officer to testify about blood spatter evidence he observed at the scene when the officer was not tendered as an expert in blood spatter analysis; (2) whether the trial court erred in limiting the admission of prior violent acts allegedly committed by the victim offered to corroborate the Defendant’s contention that the victim was the first aggressor and to support his self-defense claim; and (3) whether his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to apply mitigating factors and gave too much weight to the sole enhancing factor. We conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Montell Williams, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for abuse of a corpse, especially aggravated kidnapping, felony murder, and premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted 1 of one count of premeditated first degree murder and one count of abuse of a corpse. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -17-312. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the abuse of a corpse charge from the premeditated first degree murder charge; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a toxicologist to testify regarding his opinion on the likelihood that prescription drugs found in the victim’s blood caused her death; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Rhynuia L. Barnes, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In the petition he contends that in a letter purportedly written by his now deceased father, his father confessed to the murder for which Petitioner was convicted. Petitioner asserts that the letter constitutes newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The grand jury of Smith County indicted Defendant, Jose Amates Martinez, for the Class A felony offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver 150 grams or more of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged, and after a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to serve twenty years. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment and/or suppress all evidence seized because the agents who stopped Defendant and searched the vehicle he was driving were working outside their territorial jurisdiction and beyond their lawful scope of authority; (3) the trial court erred by denying his additional motion to suppress evidence based upon Defendant’s assertions that Defendant was unlawfully stopped, Defendant’s consent to search was not knowingly and voluntarily given, and the search by the agents exceeded the scope of consent, if the consent was valid; (4) the trial court erred by overruling Defendant’s objection to the testimony of the forensic scientist regarding test results of the heroin seized; and (5) the trial court erred by overruling Defendant’s objection to a law enforcement officer’s testimony of the street value of the heroin seized. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Devin Jefferson, of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of attempted robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress his statement to police because (1) the police continued to interrogate him after he invoked his right to remain silent, (2) the police continued to interrogate him after he invoked his right to counsel, and (3) his statement was coerced. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.