APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Kiara Tashawn King, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property with a value of $500 or more, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective five-year sentence, to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court failed to follow the correct sentencing procedure, imposed an excessive sentence, and erred by denying judicial diversion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an effective sentence of five years of probation and that its decision to deny judicial diversion did not wholly depart from the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court accordingly.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Deeric McAfee, of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s criminal history, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce on cross-examination a letter written by the appellant, the trial court erred by giving an instruction regarding flight, and the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Jeremy Bailey, pled nolo contendere in the Hickman County Circuit Court to two counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant agreed to be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender and received consecutive four-year sentences with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve the sentences as eleven months, twenty-nine days in jail "day for day" prior to his being released on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his requests for judicial diversion and full probation and by ordering that he serve his sentence of confinement day for day. The State concedes that the trial court erred by imposing day-for-day confinement. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and full probation but remand for correction of the judgments to reflect that the appellant is entitled to earn good conduct credits while serving eleven months and twenty-nine days of his felony sentences in jail.

On appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the Defendant’s indictment due to pre-indictment delay. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment because it misapplied the law in reaching its determination that the delay caused the Defendant actual prejudice. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

A Montgomery County jury convicted appellant, Frank Huber Sumner, of robbery. The trial court sentenced him to nine and one-half years of confinement as a multiple offender. Appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that the length of his sentence is excessive and that he should have received an alternative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Anthony Barnes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The plea agreement provided for an effective eight year sentence and, further, that the petitioner could apply for a suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in incarceration. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the State complied with an agreement to recommend probation to the trial court. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

The petitioner, Jameel Childress, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In January, 1999, the petitioner pled guilty, in seven separate cases, to two counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and one count of theft of property over $1000. Because all sentences imposed in the case were ordered to be served concurrently, the petitioner received an effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition because the sentences imposed are illegal, as they were statutorily required to be served consecutively because the petitioner was on bond when the offenses were committed. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for relief.

The defendant, Thomas Ray Ward, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, Class E felonies, and was given consecutive two-year sentences for each offense. However, the defendant was placed on probation for a period of eight years. A violation warrant was subsequently issued, and, at the hearing, the defendant acknowledged that he had committed the technical violations of his agreement. The trial court found the defendant to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that the balance of the reinstated six-year sentence be served in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision to revoke was error because it was based upon the fact that the defendant had prior violations of his probation rather than on the technical violations which were established at the hearing. Following review of the record, we affirm the revocation of probation.

The Defendant-Appellant, Baleke Kromah, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for five counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. He was subsequently convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of count three and was acquitted of the remaining counts. Kromah was sentenced to ninety days of imprisonment followed by four years of probation. On appeal, Kromah argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to order the State to make an election of offenses at the close of the State’s proof. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jamey Ray Christy, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and aggravated assault, all class C felonies; and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon involved, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the voluntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide convictions and imposed concurrent terms of eight years’ confinement for the vehicular homicide and aggravated assault and three years’ confinement for the reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a consecutive term of ten years’ confinement for the aggravated child neglect conviction, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of aggravated child neglect. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael L. Snodgrass, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his judicial diversion for a charge of theft of property valued at less than $500 and imposing a split confinement sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ten days to be served in jail. On appeal, he contends that the court erred in sentencing him to split confinement and imposing a requirement that he serve 75% of his sentence before eligibility for work release, furlough, trusty status and related rehabilitative programs. We affirm the denial of full probation but reverse the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment that deletes the special condition that the Defendant to serve ten days “flat” and specifies the percentage of his sentence he must serve before eligibility for rehabilitation programs.

The petitioner, Edward Pavwoski, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2009 Maury County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of two counts of rape and six counts of incest. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief, we affirm.

Tirrone Akillia Simpkins ("the Petitioner") pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the plea submission hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, William Ray Boatwright, was convicted by a Knox County jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the aggravated assault counts into the especially aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-five years at 100 percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twelve years at thirty percent for the aggravated robbery conviction, and twelve years at thirty percent for the aggravated burglary conviction. The court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of  forty-nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his identity as a perpetrator and argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony and by enhancing his sentences within his range and ordering consecutive sentencing. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity, that the defendant has waived the issue regarding the jury instruction, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentences within his range and ordering that they be served consecutively. However, we note under plain error review that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-404 d) prohibits the defendant’s dual convictions for both especially aggravated burglary and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we modify the defendant’s Class B especially aggravated burglary conviction to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and his sentence to ten years as a Range II, multiple offender for this offense. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jackie D. Seymore, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court convictions of rape of a child, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant pled guilty to eleven counts of observation without consent, Class A misdemeanors, two counts of stalking, Class A misdemeanors, one count of phone harassment, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of theft of property worth less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and ten counts of criminal trespass, Class C misdemeanors. The defendant was sentenced to the maximum sentence on all counts—eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the Class A misdemeanors and thirty days on each of the Class C misdemeanors. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve all sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of almost sixteen years. In addition, the trial court placed a special condition on each judgment that "further ordered that the defendant shall not receive good time credit or work release" on any of his sentences. On appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences and ordering that he not receive "good time" credit. After careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve all of his sentences consecutively. However, the trial court was without authority to order the denial of the defendant’s statutory "good time" credit. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgments with respect to the special condition directing that the defendant be denied "good time" credit and remand the case for entry of judgments deleting this special condition. We otherwise affirm the judgments.

The Petitioner, Christopher Turner, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2008 conviction for attempted aggravated robbery and his effective nine-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and interview witnesses adequately and by failing to request that his case be severed from his codefendant’s case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Carl Bond (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to seventeen years, to be served in confinement at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in its ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Post-conviction petitioner, Demario Johnson, challenges his 2008 conviction of first degree murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he alleges the following claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) failure to investigate and present evidence of his mental health history; and (2) failure to challenge the medical examiner’s opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Wesley Jones, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a witness to be recalled to testify, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Dickson County grand jury indicted appellant, Howard B. Lewis, III, for especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and domestic assault. He entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. The parties agreed to submit the length of the sentence and any alternative sentencing decision to the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant now challenges the trial court’s findings, alleging that the trial court impermissibly enhanced his sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Shundell Lynn Dickerson, appealed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, and this court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. Shundell Lynn Dickerson v. State of Tennessee, No. M2011-00644-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 2564376 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed July 3, 2012). In that opinion, Petitioner raised the issue of whether his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on direct appeal. We acknowledged that pursuant to our supreme court’s decision in State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883 (Tenn. 2011), appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence must be undertaken with respect to the offense for which a defendant was convicted rather than the greater offense with which he or she was charged. We were precluded, however, from fully considering the issue because the summary of the facts contained in our opinion in the direct appeal was not adequate to allow for review of the issue, and, through no fault of Petitioner, the appellate record in the direct appeal was destroyed in the historic Nashville flood in May, 2010. Therefore, this court could not determine from the record whether Petitioner suffered prejudice by appellate counsel’s deficient performance in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. Since the filing of that opinion, this court has granted Petitioner’s petition to rehear the issue of the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, and Petitioner has supplemented the record with copies of the trial transcript. Both parties have filed supplemental briefs. After a review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Melissa Barnett, appeals the Polk County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding her convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying her relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Wade P. Tucker, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court erred in failing to consider his motion for appointment of counsel and that the indictment was defective so as to deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Appellant, Eric Pernell Taylor, was on probation after entering guilty plea in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on January 7, 2011. On July 13, 2011, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Appellant had failed to report his arrest, failed to report to his probation officer, failed to pay litigation taxes, and tested positive for cocaine. He also admitted to the cocaine usage in writing. After holding a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in incarceration. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the probation or ordering the service of the sentence in incarceration. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.