APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s order denying the State’s
motion to admit the preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims who had
subsequently, and unrelatedly, been killed, and granting the Defendant’s motion to exclude
said testimony. The Defendant argued that the trial court should exclude the victim’s
former testimony because the State withheld exculpatory information prior to the
preliminary hearing in violation of the Defendant’s rights to confrontation, due process,
and a fair trial. The trial court agreed with the Defendant, and the State appeals. Following
our review, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.

Defendant, Christopher Alan Peters, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of
aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to ten years
to serve in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction because the State presented no evidence that he entered the residence
with the intent to commit a theft. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of
the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Tyrone T. Roach, entered a nolo contendere plea to one count of sexual battery. The trial court imposed a diverted one-year sentence. As part of the plea, Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the four-year delay between the grand jury presentment on the sexual battery charge and his arrest on the presentment violated his rights to a speedy trial and due process. The State contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a diverted sentence. In the alternative, the State argues that Defendant did not reserve the certified question properly, and even if the certified question were reserved, the trial court did not violate his right to a speedy trial. Defendant has not responded to the State’s contention regarding jurisdiction. We conclude we lack jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Eugene W. Jones, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary
sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon with a previous
conviction for a violent felony and simple possession of marijuana. Following our review
of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Cornell Poe, for driving on a
revoked license, unlawful use of a license plate, improper registration, and violation of the
financial responsibility law. The defendant filed a suppression motion, arguing the lack of
signage on the one-way street deprived him of due process. The trial court granted the
defendant’s motion, and the State appealed, asserting the defendant’s seizure was
supported by probable cause. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and
pertinent authorities, we agree with the State, reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for further proceedings.

In 2021, the Defendant, Timothy Eugene Wells, pleaded guilty to sexual assault by an
authority figure, as a Range II offender, in exchange for a sentence of six to ten years with
the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the
trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years of incarceration. On appeal, the
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve his
sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Eric Martell Small, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of evading
arrest in a motor vehicle endangering others, a Class D felony; driving while license
revoked, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C
misdemeanor; and violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor. On appeal,
the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony and that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Fred Auston Wortman, III, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition
seeking post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted first
degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court incorrectly concluded that the
Petition was time-barred. After our review of the record, we reverse and remand the case
to the post-conviction court. On remand, the post-conviction court should appoint counsel,
if necessary; provide an opportunity for counsel to amend the Petition; and conduct a
hearing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to due process tolling of
the statute of limitations.

The defendant, Mario Deshon Murray, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving violence, and the trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing, in misapplying mitigating factors, and in imposing consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tyrell Webb, pleaded guilty to rape, and the trial court imposed a sentence
of eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the
defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for probation and in restricting
cross-examination of the victim. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of
judgments reflecting the dismissal of counts two and three.

I must respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in holding
the Appellant properly preserved the issue of whether the trial court violated his right to
confrontation by allowing a witness to testify via Zoom rather than in person. I believe the
Appellant has waived the confrontation clause issue for failure to specify at trial whether
he was objecting based on the federal constitution,1 the state constitution,2 or both. Given
the lack of a properly developed record, I would have concluded that the issue was not
entitled to plenary review and declined review for plain error. Accordingly, I dissent.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, William Michael Bowers, of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the trial court violated his right to confrontation by allowing a witness to testify via video rather than in person; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cedric Konard Mitchell, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his ten-year
sentence for two counts of domestic assault and one count of aggravated assault in case
numbers 14908 and 15052. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking
his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in
confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Tracey Lynn Carter, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of attempted aggravated assault, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and public intoxication. He received an effective sentence of eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant alleges that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated assault; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; and (3) the trial court erred in denying a sentence of split confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Timothy Michael Crabtree, was convicted in the Henry County Circuit
Court of aggravated assault and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years
in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction because the evidence fails to show the victim suffered serious bodily injury and
that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Defendant, Charles D. Perry, of two counts of rape
of a child, and the trial court entered an agreed effective sentence of fifteen years of
incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the prosecution was time-barred
because it was commenced outside the statute of limitations; (2) his verdict was not
unanimous; (3) the trial court deprived his right to present a defense by limiting expert
testimony; (4) the trial court erred when it admitted character evidence in violation of
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions; and (6) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitles him to a new
trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Mr. Raghu Singh, guilty of two counts of
driving under the influence and one count of reckless driving. The trial court sentenced
the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, after service of
ten days in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally
insufficient to sustain his convictions for driving under the influence. He also asserts that
the trial court erred (1) in finding that the State had established a proper chain of custody
for his blood sample; and (2) by denying a motion to suppress statements he made at the
scene. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jason White, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues: (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itself; (2) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner a full and fair post-conviction procedure; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in numerous areas; and (4) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court, but remand the case to the post-conviction court for the entry of amended judgments that properly reflect the offenses for which Petitioner was indicted and convicted.

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to “Set
Aside, Amend and/or Correct Improper and Unlawful Judgments.” The Defendant argues
(1) that her judgments are void due to noncompliance with the statutes and rules governing
the entry of judgment forms and (2) that she is entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Criminal Procedure 36. Following our review, we have determined that we lack
jurisdiction to hear the Defendant’s voidness arguments and that the Defendant has waived
review of her Rule 36 claim. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, William Patrick Robinson, appeals pro se from the Circuit Court of
Carroll County’s dismissal of his third request for post-conviction relief. Following
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Eleanor Grace Hoffman, filed a motion to suppress challenging the search of her purse during a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant was convicted as charged by a Warren County jury of simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Appellant’s application for judicial diversion was granted, and she was sentenced to two concurrent terms of eleven months and twentynine days suspended to supervised probation after service of ten days’ imprisonment. A probation violation order was entered, and the Appellant conceded to violating the terms of probation before the trial court. The trial court revoked her probationary judicial diversion sentence, entered judgments of conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and ordered the Appellant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment, with the possibility of furlough to an inpatient drug treatment facility after service of ninety days’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Alternatively, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking her diversionary probation and ordering service of her original sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and revocation of the Appellant’s probation but remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Appellant, Jason Lee Schutt, of alternative counts of possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-408(b)(1)(F), -417(a), -417(c)(2)(A). The trial court properly merged the above counts, and following a sentencing hearing, the Appellant was ordered to serve nine years and six months in confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the alleged controlled substance was not verified by chemical analysis as hydrocodone, and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Marquis Jeffries, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, and one count each of domestic assault, interference with emergency communications, trafficking for a commercial sex act, promotion of prostitution, and evading arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately explore racial bias during voir dire and (2) failing to seek additional time for the Petitioner to consider the State’s plea agreement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Nicholas Kentrell Dickerson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s
orders revoking his probation and imposing his original sentences for various drug
convictions and a felony evading arrest. The Appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking his probation because (1) the alleged violations were based on new
charges that were subsequently dismissed, and (2) the remaining violations were technical
in nature and not a valid basis for full revocation under Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-311(e)(1)(A) (2022). Upon our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Stacy M. Miller, was convicted by a Meigs County Criminal Court jury of
three counts of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at less than $1000.
See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony
murder), 39-13-212 (2018) (criminally negligent homicide), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially
aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft).
The trial court merged the three first degree felony murder convictions and imposed an
effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support her first degree felony murder convictions and (2) the trial court
erred in failing to merge the criminally negligent homicide conviction with the first degree
felony murder conviction and to merge the theft conviction with the aggravated robbery
conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected
judgments reflecting the requested mergers of convictions and for correction of the
judgment form in Count 6 to reflect the correct conviction offense, aggravated robbery.