APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Timothy Whitby, guilty of:
vandalism under $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class C
misdemeanor; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the
Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days on each count,
suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting his assault conviction, and the trial court’s sentence of eleven
months and twenty-nine days for his disorderly conduct conviction. After review, we
conclude that the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and
twenty-nine days for his Class C misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction. Thus, we
remand for entry of a sentence within the appropriate sentencing range. We affirm the
judgments in all other respects.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Phennix Givens, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective forty-six-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Terry L. Gragg, appeals his conviction of aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of four years’ probation.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Albert Bohannon, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  After review, we affirm the dismissal because the Petitioner is no longer imprisoned or restrained of his liberty and the petition fails to comply with the statutory requirements.

Petitioner, Larry J. Bradley, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for evading arrest, attempted carjacking, aggravated burglary, and assault.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel argued that Petitioner was guilty of attempted carjacking without consulting with Petitioner and (2) trial counsel failed to properly determine the felony classification for Petitioner’s Indiana convictions for purposes of sentencing.  He also argues the “Circuit Court erred in denying [Petitioner’s] petition to set aside the sentence on the attempted carjacking conviction due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.”  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Bruce Dorsett, II, Petitioner, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief after the entry of a guilty plea to several offenses.  Petitioner requested equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  The post-conviction court determined Petitioner was entitled to neither statutory nor equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and, consequently, denied relief and dismissed the petition.  Petitioner then filed an untimely notice of appeal.  On appeal, Petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without allowing Petitioner to amend it.  We waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal but affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner, Lavino Horne, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court correctly determined that the statute of limitations should be tolled for his untimely petition because he diligently pursued his petition after being abandoned by trial counsel. He further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The State responds that the post-conviction court erred by finding that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner from timely filing his petition and denying the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The State further argues that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we conclude that Petitioner failed to show that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. Accordingly, Petitioner’s postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred by the statute of limitations and we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.

An Obion County jury convicted the Appellant of second degree murder of Decora Alexander, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ confinement. At the time of the offense, the Appellant was serving a four-year probation sentence for an offense involving the same victim, which was subsequently violated and ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-nine years’ confinement. The Appellant argues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in not charging the jury with self-defense; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the Appellant’s probation officer at trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting photographs from the crime scene and a life-in-being photograph into evidence; (6) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence without consideration of the Appellant’s mitigation proof; and (7) the trial court’s cumulative errors necessitate a new trial.  Upon our review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua W. Gabehart, of the unlawful sale of fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he knew he was selling fentanyl instead of heroin. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony Eugene Barnett, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court conviction of theft of services, arguing that his judgment of conviction contains a clerical error by listing the incorrect statute for his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying his oral motion to continue his case, made the day of his trial.  Upon review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the defendant’s conviction for theft of services.  Because the record includes neither a transcript of the defendant’s oral motion to continue his case, the trial court’s ruling thereupon, nor a transcript of the trial, we conclude that the issue is waived and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Andre Anthony, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct a clerical mistake pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The Defendant contends that his two consecutive sentences at issue were originally ordered to run in a specific order but that the challenged corrected judgment forms indicate that each sentence runs consecutively to the other, in no particular order, and should once again be corrected. The State responds that the trial court correctly denied the Rule 36 motion because the order of the consecutive sentences is immaterial and because the corrected judgments accurately reflect the Defendant’s sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jamieum Alvin Reid, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for
possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of 0.5 grams or
more of cocaine with intent to deliver, and possession of methamphetamine. Defendant
pled guilty as charged and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence, with the manner of
service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve
his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying alternative sentencing because he was already approved by a
community based program, and the State failed to present evidence that an alternative
sentence was inappropriate. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Tipton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for especially aggravated kidnapping,
especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault by strangulation. Prior to trial,
counts one and two of the indictment were amended to aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated burglary. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated assault by strangulation, and aggravated criminal trespass. The
trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective eight-year sentence. Defendant appeals,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated
kidnapping and aggravated assault by strangulation. Following our review of the entire
record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

The Defendant, Antonio D. Gause, was convicted by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury of two counts of first degree felony murder under alternate theories; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and accessory after the fact, a Class E felony. After merging the felony murder convictions, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first degree felony murder conviction, twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and two years for the accessory after the fact conviction, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Cecil Cemontaie Burnice, Defendant, claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation based on new criminal charges of aggravated robbery and criminal trespass because Defendant was subsequently found not guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and the State dismissed the criminal trespass count  We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Defendant’s probation based on the evidence presented at the revocation hearing.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Gibson County jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Demetrius Adkisson a/k/a Antonio Demetrius Turner, Jr., of two counts of second-degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the juvenile court erred in transferring the defendant to circuit court and (2) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the defendant’s statement. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Police officers in this case obtained a confession from a juvenile by threatening him with the death penalty, repeatedly denying his requests for his mother who was present at the station, and interrogating him for over six hours in the middle of the night. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, I would have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the Defendant’s Miranda waiver was invalid and his confession was involuntary. I also would have concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding probable cause that the Defendant committed the offenses. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

The Defendant, Kesean Dewayne Hall, appeals his jury convictions for second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and criminal trespass. For these convictions, he received an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the denial of his motion to sever the separate shooting episodes; (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence; (3) the admission of video footage showing the Defendant trespassing on the housing development’s property; and (4) the admission of “video evidence related to Crime Scene 3.” He also raises a claim of cumulative error and a challenge to his sentence. Following our review, we conclude that due to inadequacies in the Defendant’s appellate brief, all of his issues are waived save sufficiency of the evidence. First, relative to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s criminal trespass conviction, and that conviction must be reversed and dismissed. Next, the evidence’s being sufficient to support the Defendant’s remaining convictions for second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, those convictions are affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Rutherford County jury found Defendant, Lavondas C. Nelson, guilty of two counts of sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school (Counts 1 and 2), and sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine (Count 3). The trial court sentenced him to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that he sold cocaine within a school zone, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on entrapment, and his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of revised judgments in Counts 1 and 2 that reflect the proper release eligibility for those offenses.

Petitioner, Carl Franklin Pendergrast, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of sale of methamphetamine less than .5 grams, two counts of sale of hydrocodone, one count of sale of cocaine less than .5 grams, and one count of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine less than .5 grams, for which he received a total effective sentence of twenty-six years’ incarceration. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty pleas were the product of coercion and, therefore, not voluntarily entered. Following a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Patrick Marshall, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Nicholas D. Brooks, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Antonio Turley, of attempted first degree murder, attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury, and reckless endangerment with a dangerous weapon. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the admission of certain evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence. He also alleges prosecutorial misconduct. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

For events in 2001, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Nakomis Jones, of murder, kidnapping, and gun related charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life in prison plus thirty-eight years. The Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his convictions, as well as filed for post-conviction relief, Federal habeas corpus relief, and motions to reopen the denial of relief in each instance. As relevant here, in 2022, the Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021. He sought fingerprint analysis of the palm print and a handgun collected during the investigation. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Adrian Moore, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and received an effective sentence of forty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.