APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an interlocutory appeal from the Trial Judge’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement
entered by the parties. Defendant has appealed. We reverse and remand with instructions to enforce the arbitration agreement. Tenn. R. App. P.3 Interlocutory Appeal by Permission from the Trial Court; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
 

Plaintiff, an inmate in Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary, appeals the Trial Court’s dismissal of his civil suit for damages allegedly incurred as a result of the “capricious, arbitrary and unjust” operation of the Inmate Grievance Procedure, for “malfeasance”, and for “civil rights intimidation.” The Trial Court found that (1) the doctrine of res judicata prevents Plaintiff’s suit on one of his alleged claims because judgment has been entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee on that claim; (2) all of Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory except for that one claim already resolved, and, therefore, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (3) with respect to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in the Tennessee Department of Correction grievance policy, and, therefore, that allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s Statement of Issues in this appeal alleges abuse of discretion by the Trial Court “by dismissing his civil rights claims” and cites Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-701, 4-21-702 and 4-21-801. Construing Plaintiff’s pro se appeal liberally, we deem it as challenging all three bases upon which the Trial Court dismissed his Complaint. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

An inmate presently in custody in the Whiteville Correctional Facility sued the warden and the CEO and Chairman of Corrections Corporation of America in a pleading styled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. He seeks release from that facility contending that the State of Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) released him when it surrendered him to a facility outside the borders of the State of Wisconsin for incarceration. The trial court dismissed the cause of action and we affirm.
 

This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Claude Willis and Defendant Lola Mae (Wright) Willis regarding the terms of their divorce. The trial court granted an absolute divorce to Ms. Wright,¹ divided the parties’ marital property, allocated the parties’ marital debt, and awarded Ms. Wright alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, Mr. Willis argues that the trial court’s division of marital property and allocation of marital debt are inequitable, and that, assuming an award of alimony is appropriate in the case at bar, the court should have awarded Ms. Wright rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro. Additionally, Ms. Wright requests on appeal that her award of attorney’s fees be designated as alimony. We affirm the ruling of the trial court; however, we modify the court’s ruling to reflect that attorney’s fees are awarded to Ms. Wright as alimony.

This appeal involves the question of whether the Appellants, Walter and Gordon Farris, complied with the statute of limitations when filing their complaint for legal malpractice and conversion. The Appellees, William S. Todd and Thomas S. Dossett, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Appellants moved to amend their complaint to include declaratory judgment relief for determination of the ownership rights of the parties in a particular art work. The Circuit Court for Sullivan County granted the motion to dismiss the complaint and denied the motion to amend. We affirm in part and vacate in part the Circuit Court’s judgment.
 

This appeal involves a dispute regarding a final decree of divorce entered in the Shelby County
Circuit Court. The Husband appeals the trial court’s order claiming error in several aspects of the
decision, including the determination as to his alimony obligation.