APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative’s statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply.

A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative’s statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply.

This appeal concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Eric O. Carter (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against Howard Gentry (“Gentry”), Davidson County Criminal Court Clerk, 1 and Frank Strada (“Strada”), Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), asking that the criminal judgment entered against him be expunged because it was not properly endorsed under the applicable rules and statutes. The Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner appeals, arguing that he only wants a ministerial act performed and is not challenging his sentence. We find that Petitioner is in fact challenging his sentence, and the Trial Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear that challenge. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court.

The Appellant, Izaiha Gleaves, was convicted of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, two counts of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-nine years’ confinement. On appeal, the Appellant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to excuse a juror who had a conflict of interest; (3) the trial court erred when it admitted a redacted recording of a witness interview; (4) the trial court’s cumulative errors warrant reversal; and (5) the trial court erred when it imposed an effective sentence of forty-nine years.¹ After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Travis Scott Gilliam, in three cases involving violations of the Sex Offender Registry, community supervision for life, and related offenses. In a fourth case, the Defendant pled guilty to the offense of aggravated assault and agreed to a six-year sentence running consecutively to the other cases. After a hearing, the trial court imposed partially consecutive sentences for a total effective sentence of fourteen years plus eleven months and twenty-nine days. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences and that the judgments conflict with the trial court’s oral announcement. Upon our review, we dismiss the appeal in Case No. 22-CR-36 because this sentence was entered pursuant to a valid plea agreement and was the subject of a valid waiver of appeal. Regarding the other cases, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments. We also remand these cases for entry of corrected judgments reflecting the alignment of the sentence as announced at the sentencing hearing.

The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss on the ground of judicial immunity. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a partition in kind action. The three owners of 68 acres entered into a joint stipulation appointing three commissioners to partition the property into three separate parcels. Thereafter, the commissioners filed a written report with a survey that allocated 32.4 acres to the plaintiff Jerry Green, 17.8 acres to the defendant Robert Hale, and 18.1 acres to the defendant Cynthia Panter. After the defendants filed exceptions to the commissioners’ report, the parties agreed to have one of the commissioners testify to state the commissioners’ factual findings and reasoning. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Commissioner Bill Haisten testified in open court, explaining, in part, that more acreage was partitioned to the plaintiff because much of the parcel allocated to him is hilly and rocky and another large portion of the plaintiff’s parcel is encumbered by a TVA power line easement. Commissioner Haisten also testified that while the three partitioned parcels are not equal in area, they are equal in fair market value. Based upon these additional facts, the trial court concluded that the partitioning of the property by the commissioners should be confirmed. The defendants appeal, contending, inter alia, that without sufficient proof of either the value of the property partitioned or of the evaluations from which the commissioners derived their partition division, the trial court erred in confirming the commissioners’ report. We affirm.

Tyrel J. Sidwell, Defendant, was charged in a presentment with nine counts related to the
physical assault of his wife, the victim, Bithiah Lufcy, and his actions after his initial arrest.
The charges included aggravated assault, domestic assault, coercion of a witness, and six
counts of violation of a no contact order. Prior to trial, the coercion of witness charge was
severed and the State dismissed two of the counts of violating a no contact order. A jury
acquitted Defendant of aggravated assault but found Defendant guilty of domestic assault
and four counts of violation of a no contact order. Defendant was ultimately sentenced to
11 months and 29 days on each conviction with the sentences to run consecutively. The
trial court denied probation on the sentences for Counts 2 and 4 and suspended the
remainder of the sentences to probation. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence is
insufficient to support the convictions for violation of a no contact order because he was in
custody at the time of his alleged contact with the victim. Defendant also argues that the
trial court erred in denying probation and ordering Defendant to serve consecutive
sentences. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and the trial
court did not err in denying probation and ordering consecutive sentences, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

This is a wrongful death action that was filed pro se by two sons of the decedent, in their capacity as co-administrators of the estate of the decedent, on behalf of the decedent’s six children. The trial court found that the action was filed by persons not authorized to practice law on behalf of the estate and/or others, and therefore, it was void ab initio and a nullity. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The two pro se sons appeal. We conclude that the complaint was void to the extent that the pro se sons asserted claims on behalf of other heirs of the decedent, as they were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. However, the complaint was partially proper to the extent that the two pro se sons were also asserting their own right of action under the wrongful death statute. Consequently, the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint in its entirety. However, on remand, the additional heirs will be given an opportunity to file a motion to intervene. In the event they do not, the trial court is directed to consider Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 19.01 and 19.02 in order to determine whether the other heirs are indispensable parties and to consider issues related to such a determination. Thus, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In a divorce action, the wife moved for recusal of the trial judge. The motion was denied and the wife appealed pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. Because the wife waited too long to file her motion, we affirm the denial of the motion to recuse.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Juanyai Walls, of two counts of first degree
premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated
robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of life plus
fifteen years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his convictions. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) allowing the
introduction of written notes from the Defendant to his co-defendants while in custody;
and (2) imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shenessa L. Sokolosky, appeals from the Smith County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of her two consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences for her guilty-pleaded misdemeanor convictions for drug possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation. We dismiss the Defendant’s appeal pursuant to the mootness doctrine.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that eight statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed.1 Having determined that the petitioner did not prove the statutory ground of abandonment through failure to visit the child prior to the mother’s incarceration by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to that ground. Additionally, because the trial court made insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning a separate statutory ground it termed, “abandonment by an incarcerated parent/wanton disregard,” we reverse the trial court’s determination as to that ground as well. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child.

A Cumberland County jury found Defendant, Warren J. Nostrom, guilty of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court imposed concurrent life sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court erred by (2) finding Defendant competent to stand trial and precluding an attorney from testifying as an expert at the competency hearing, (3) admitting Defendant’s pretrial statement to police, and (4) denying Defendant’s motion for a continuance. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Dangelo Penny, was convicted of driving under the influence of
an intoxicant. The trial court placed him on probation for eleven months and twenty-nine
days after service of forty-eight hours. The court also suspended his driver’s license.
Thereafter, the Defendant was arrested for evading arrest, reckless driving, leaving the
scene of an accident, and driving on a suspended license. After a hearing, the trial court
fully revoked the Defendant’s probationary sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that
a complete revocation of his sentence was an abuse of discretion. Upon our review, we
respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

On January 10, 2017, Daryl Ray Baker, Petitioner, pleaded guilty to four counts of aggravated sexual battery, five counts of attempted rape of a child, and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of nineteen years in confinement, and Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence. In April 2023, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, requesting the post-conviction court to consider his delayed post-conviction petition. Therein, Petitioner argued that newly discovered evidence entitled him to relief and due process required tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and Petitioner now timely appeals. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the
trial judge. After carefully reviewing the record provided by the appellant, we reverse the
decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal and remand for reassignment.

The Petitioner, Avery LaVerne Davenport, appeals from the Cumberland County Criminal
Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis. The coram
nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the
court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed jointly by David Carroll (“Plaintiff”) and Todd Foster (“Defendant”) (“Petitioners,” collectively), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioners, and finding no reversible error, we affirm.

In 2020, the Defendant, Justin McDowell, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell
or deliver less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a Drug Free Zone, a park. The
trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years of incarceration. The Defendant
filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to an amendment to the Drug Free Zone Act. See
T.C.A. § 39-17-432. The trial court held a hearing and denied relief. On appeal, the
Petitioner contends that his motion for resentencing should have been granted. After
review, we dismiss the appeal.

This is a modification of child support case. Mother appeals the trial court’s: (1) discovery rulings regarding Father’s inheritance, banking, and trading accounts; (2) findings with respect to Father’s income; (3) denial of an upward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines; and (4) assignment of the Guardian ad Litem costs to Mother. We reverse the trial court’s order denying Mother’s discovery requests and the assignment of the Guardian ad Litem costs to Mother. We vacate the order establishing Father’s child support obligation and denying Mother’s request for an upward deviation. All other issues are pretermitted, and we remand the case for further proceedings.

Foster parents appeal the dismissal of their petition to terminate a father’s parental rights and to adopt. The petitioners sought to terminate the father’s rights on two grounds: failure to file a timely petition to establish paternity and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility for the child. The trial court found insufficient evidence to support either ground for termination. Upon review, we find clear and convincing evidence to support one of the alleged grounds. So we vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Laura Adams (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court for Robertson County (“the Trial Court”) against Timothy Adams, Sr. (“Husband”). In its final judgment of divorce, the Trial Court determined that real estate in Lawrence County (“Lawrence County property”), purchased by Husband prior to the marriage, was marital property because it had become “inextricably commingled.” The Trial Court awarded Wife “40% of the total proceeds” from the Lawrence County property. The Trial Court further awarded Wife the marital residence and any and all equitable interests in the marital residence. Husband has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

This is the second appeal in this healthcare liability case. In the first appeal, which was taken under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Appellees’/healthcare providers’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion. The trial court held that, although Appellant/patient failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E), Appellant showed extraordinary cause to excuse the noncompliance. The only question certified in the Rule 9 appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding extraordinary cause. We determined that it did and reversed the extraordinary cause finding but left undisturbed the trial court’s finding on substantial compliance. On remand, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss without hearing. Now, in this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 appeal, we review the trial court’s initial finding that Appellant did not substantially comply with the statutory requirements. Because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in so finding, we vacate the order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss and remand for reconsideration of the question of substantial compliance under the correct legal standard.

The Petitioner, Shaun Alexander Hodge, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for
writ of error coram nobis based on alleged newly discovered evidence of a trial witness’s
criminal history. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.