APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an inmate’s challenge to the denial of his application for parole by the Tennessee Board of Paroles. After serving approximately ten years ofa 35-year sentence for aggravated rape, the inmate filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Tennessee Board of Paroles was illegally and arbitrarily declining to honor his plea bargain agreement. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and because it was not timely filed. The inmate has appealed pro se. We concur that the petition was not timely filed and affirm its dismissal in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b).1

The Defendant, Michael Brent Cook, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation by the Sumner County Criminal Court. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his proba tion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Martin R. Craddock, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. He is presently in the custody of the Department of Correction serving a Range I sentence of ten years for his conviction of aggravated sexual battery in 1995. He contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment for aggravated sexual battery fails to allege the mens rea for the offense. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Sheryl L. Pendergrass, appeals a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(I), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the Sumner County Criminal Court, the defendant pleaded guilty to three drug offenses, subject to reservation of the certified question. In her certified question, the defendant contends that law enforcement officers infringed on her rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code3 Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The employer, Modine Manufacturing Company, Inc., has appealed from the action of the trial court in awarding the employee, Jamia B. Gardner, 80% permanent partial disability to each arm.  The trial court dismissed the case against the Second Injury Fund. On appeal the employer contends (1) there was no evidence of a permanent injury to the employee’s left arm, (2) the award of 80% to each arm was excessive and (3) the trial court was in error in dismissing the case against the Second Injury Fund.  The Second Injury Fund also contends the awards of disability are not supported by the evidence but insists the court was correct in holding it was not liable for payment of benefits.

This case involves an exclusion in an automobile liability policy for a person operating the automobile without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so. The Circuit Court of Davidson County dismissed the insurance company’s action for a declaratory judgment. We reverse, and declare that the exclusion precluded coverage by the company.

This appeal involves an interstate contract dispute over ten pairs of emu chicks. Two Tennessee residents declined to honor their contract to purchase the chicks after the Arkansas breeders attempted to substitute chicks different from those advertised for sale. The breeders filed a breach of contract suit in Arkansas against the purchasers seeking to recover the unpaid purchase price, and the purchasers filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County seeking to recover their down payment as well as treble damages and attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After the breeders obtained a judgment in Arkansas against the purchasers, they moved to dismiss the purchasers’ Tennessee lawsuit on the ground that the Arkansas judgment was res judicata to the purchasers’ Tennessee claims. The trial court agreed and dismissed the purchasers’ claims. On this appeal, the purchasers assert that the Arkansas judgment should not have precluded them from pursuing their Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims in Tennessee. We agree because the Arkansas court did not have the power to award the full measure of relief the purchasers are seeking in the Tennessee proceedings.