APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Ricky Anderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for two counts of first
degree premeditated murder, for which he received concurrent life sentences. Defendant
contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of one of the deceased
victims. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a wrongful death action. On April 28, 1998, Cynthia Low Armes ("Sister"), the sister of the late Terry Allen Lowe ("decedent"), instituted this action against Granville Simpson ("Granville") and his wife, Judy Simpson ("Judy"), (collectively, "the Simpsons"), alleging that the Simpsons were negligent in allowing three men, including Granville, to go armed on the Simpson's premises on December 10, 1995, and that their negligence directly contributed to the shooting death of the decedent. The trial court granted the Simpsons summary judgment on the ground that the complain was not filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Sister appeals, raising the following issue for our consideration: Did the trial court err in holding that Sister was aware of the injury and the cause of action on December 10, 1995, and therefore her action was barred by the statute of limitations?

The State of Tennessee has filed a petition to rehear asking this Court to reconsider certain
portions of the opinion. Contrary to the assertions of the petition the opinion does not require the giving of a special “proximate cause” instruction in every homicide case. The opinion requires the giving of a general causation instruction whenever the homicide offense does not itself explicitly or implicitly include a causation instruction. As the State recognizes, some of the homicide offenses include elements that implicitly instruct the jury that a causation finding is necessary. Also without merit is the State’s assertion that the suggested pattern jury instruction set out in footnote 16 conflicts with existing law and relieves the State of its burden of proof. The State’s petition confuses criminal negligence and causation. Both elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish criminally negligent homicide. Moreover, we emphasize that the language in footnote 16 is merely a suggestion which may be accepted, revised, or rejected by the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee. Accordingly, the State’s petition to rehear is DENIED. Costs of this petition are taxed to the State of Tennessee, for which execution may issue if necessary.
 

This appeal involves a personal injury action that was dismissed because the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County refused to accept and file a summons that had not been prepared on an original form provided by the clerk. By the time the plaintiff provided another summons acceptable to the clerk, the time for filing the complaint and the summons had elapsed. Accordingly, on motion of one of the defendants, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the personal injury claim because it was time-barred. We have determined that the clerk’s office exceeded its authority when it declined to accept and file the summons and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the personal injury claims and remand the case for further proceedings.

This is an action pursued by the appellant, Lesa Johnson (Johnson), for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment with South Central Human Resource Agency (SCHRA). The Chancery Court for Bedford County dismissed the complaint upon motion of the appellees, SCHRA, and its executive and deputy directors, Roy Tipps and John Ed Underwood, Jr., respectively.

I agree with the majority’s resolution of every issue in this case but one: the effect of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. The majority concludes that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the offense of second-degree murder is not error because the evidence in the record does not support that offense. Because I find the evidence can indeed support a conviction of seconddegree murder, I respectfully dissent.

Petitioner, James Edward Gant, appeals the judgment of the chancery court denying his application for a beer permit.

It is apparent that this Court has based its finding that Mr. Brooks is willfully and voluntarily underemployed simply on the fact that he, at one time, was more lucratively employed. Simply because a parent is not as lucratively employed as during the marriage, or for a time thereafter, no automatic inference that he or she is willfully and voluntarily underemployed should be drawn. We must remain cognizant of a parent’s right as a citizen to the pursuit of happiness and to the freedom to make reasonable employment decisions, while at the same time heeding the duty to support.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to her two oldest
children. As grounds for termination the trial court found abandonment for failure to
provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume
custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of both children.
We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to the
grounds for termination and the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Jaselyn Grant, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief,
which petition challenged her convictions of second degree murder, reckless
endangerment, and aggravated assault, alleging that she was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel at trial. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that she is
entitled to post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her Shelby
County convictions for two counts of conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of
methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone and two counts of
possession of 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver in a
drug-free zone. Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel
based upon counsel’s failure to: (1) object to irrelevant and prejudicial text messages
introduced at trial; (2) file a Bruton motion; (3) contest that Petitioner tracked the package
containing the methamphetamine; (4) adequately prepare for trial; (5) object when the State
argued that Petitioner’s silence implied guilt; (6) object when the prosecutor “testified
during closing argument in order to bolster his own credibility”; and (7) object when the
prosecutor intentionally misrepresented evidence during closing argument. Petitioner
further asserts that she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. Following a thorough
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding the prisoner's request for access to the Department's rules governing prisoner sentence credits. The Department responded by informing the prisoner that its policies governing prisoner sentence reduction credits could be found in the prison law library. Thereafter, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County complaining that he had been wrongfully denied access to public records. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint. Alternatively, the Commissioner sought a summary judgment and supported his motion with affidavits asserting that the prisoner had already received all the information he sought. Based on these affidavits, the trial court granted the Commissioner's summary judgment motion and dismissed the prisoner's complaint. We have determined that the Commissioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, reverse the summary dismissal of the prisoner's complaint.

The petitioner, an attorney identified as John Doe, filed a petition for contempt alleging violations by the respondent, an attorney identified as Jane Doe, of the confidentiality requirement of Rule 9, section 25 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Court directed the parties to address as a threshold matter the constitutionality of Rule 9, section 25. After considering the arguments of the parties, the Attorney General and amicus curiae, and analyzing the applicable law, we hold that section 25 of Rule 9 violates free speech protections of Article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. We further conclude that sanctions for criminal contempt are not appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the petition for contempt is denied.

This is a parental rights termination case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile
Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Trent W. (“Father”) to his minor children
Klowii W. and Mariah W. (collectively, “the Children”). After a hearing, the Juvenile
Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. The Juvenile
Court found by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven the grounds of
abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the
permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness
to assume custody. The Juvenile Court also found by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals,
arguing that DCS failed to prove either grounds or best interest. We find that all four
grounds found by the Juvenile Court were proven by the requisite clear and convincing
evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.