APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff-Appellant, Lamar Fletcher (“Fletcher”), appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant-Appellee, John W. Campbell (“Campbell”).

The appellant, Allen Ray Ricker, was convicted of theft under $10,000, a Class D felony, by a jury of his peers. The trial court found that the appellant was a standard offender and imposed a Range I sentence of confinement for three (3) years in the Department of Correction. The appellant contends that the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by: (a) denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the state’s case in chief because the state failed to prove the venue of the offense and failed to prove that the person named in the indictment was the owner of the wrecker in question, and (b) permitting the state to reopen its case in chief to prove the venue of the offense. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law that governs the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

This case concerns liability in connection with the default on a promissory note for the purchase of stock in a closely held corporation. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and also awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiff. Two principal issues are before the Court. The first is whether the plaintiff gave the necessary parties proper notice of default under the terms of the promissory notes executed by the parties. The second is whether the guarantor of the promissory notes is liable under the personal guaranty if proper notice was, in fact, given. We find that the trial court was correct in its holding that proper notice was given and that the personal guarantor was liable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Pamela Ford (“wife”) filed a petition to modify child support and alimony. Although the trial court declined to increase alimony, the court increased the amount of child support that Michael Ford (“husband”) was obligated to pay based upon his increased income. Wife has appealed and argues that the trial court erred in several respects. First, she asserts that the trial court erred in holding that the husband’s receipt of principal from an irrevocable trust is not “gross income” as that term is defined within the child support guidelines. Next, she contends that the trial court improperly failed to consider the value of the trust in increasing child support. Furthermore, wife argues that the trial court should have imputed income to husband based upon his voluntary unemployment. Finally, wife argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for an increase in alimony. For the reasons stated below, the judgment below is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

The pivotal issue on this appeal is, if an attorney in fact issues a check to a bank, drawn on the checking account of her principal, for which the bank issues a time certificate of deposit for the amount of the check in the name of the principal "or" the attorney in fact, and there is no specific provision in the power of attorney for such transaction and no signature card or contract 2 relating to the certificate of deposit signed by either the principal or the attorney in fact, upon the death of the principal, which is entitled to the funds, the principal's estate or the attorney in fact? We hold the estate is entitled to the funds, and affirm.

Stephen Ray Stamps appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing his “Petition
for Visitation Rights” for lack of jurisdiction. The parties were divorced in the court below and
Linda Diane Stamps was awarded custody of the parties minor daughter. Mr. Stamps was
incarcerated at that time.

Defendant-Appellant, Mickey Dwayne Burleson (“Father”), appeals the trial court’s judgment denying his petition to modify the child custody provisions of the parties’ final divorce decree.

The mother and father lived together in Michigan for approximately fifteen (15) years but were never married. They had a daughter, Cnanah, now seven (7) years of age.

The City of Knoxville appeals judgments rendered in favor of Elmer Richardson, surviving spouse of Goldie H. Richardson, for personal injuries received by him and the wrongful death of his wife in the amount of $30,000, and $130,000, respectively.

We are called upon in this appeal to determine whether relying on the advice of an attorney in filing an unfounded will contest constitutes probable cause sufficient to avoid the enforcement of a forfeiture clause in the will. For the reasons set forth below, we find that such reliance does constitute probable cause, and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

These consolidated cases arise from the efforts of appellants, Lewis Laska and John Jay Hooker, to have their names placed on the ballot for the August 1, 1996, statewide election to the office of Supreme Court  Justice. The deadline for filing nominating petitions for this election was 12:00 noon on May 16, 1996, in accordance with T.C.A. § 2-5-101.

In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant, Teri Michelle Parker (Wife), appeals the trial court’s decision to award custody of the parties' child, Dylan Ken Parker, to Defendant-Appellee, Richard Ken Parker (Husband), alleging that the custody determination was based on the effects of racial prejudice. We affirm the trial court’s award of custody to Husband.

In this appeal we are asked to re-visit the question of whether a man who fathers a child by a married woman may legitimate the child. The Davidson County Juvenile Court held that the legitimation statute allowing a putative father to legitimate a child “not born in lawful wedlock” applied only to children born to unmarried women. If that interpretation holds, the appellant attacks the constitutionality of the statute on due process and equal protection grounds. We affirm the lower court’s interpretation of the statute and reject the appellant’s contention that the statute is constitutionally defective.

The single issue in this case is whether a remote purchaser of a home may maintain a negligence action against the builder of the home despite a lack of contractual privity. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and this appeal resulted. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

In this action asking damages for alleged retaliatory discharge, the Trial Court granted employer summary judgment, and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm.

I fully concur in Judge Cantrell's opinion. I have read with much interest Judge Koch's dissenting opinion. The matters set forth in the dissenting opinion might make good public policy, but the setting of public policy is not a matter for this court or any court in Tennessee.

The Tennessee Public Service Commission ordered the completion of a previously authorized investigation of the future earnings of BellSouth Telecommunications, despite legislative developments that stripped the Commission of its authority to use such an investigation to set telephone rates. BellSouth filed a petition with this court for review of the PSC’s order, arguing that completion of the investigation was inconsistent with the legislative purpose. We reverse the Commission’s order and remand the case for further consideration by the Tennessee Regulatory Commission.

Michael Scott Evans is seeking nothing more than to acknowledge his parental responsibilities to Jacob Ryan Steelman. The majority, however, has decided that he is not entitled to prove in court that he is the boy’s biological father simply because the child’s mother was married to another man when he was born. This decision rests squarely on an erroneous judicial interpretation of Tennessee’s legitimation statutes. Rather than perpetuating injustice, our responsibility as common law judges is to remedy, not ignore, plain judicial mistakes.

Walter Everett died in 1993; his children Marion Everett Barton and Gerald Joseph Everett were substituted as plaintiffs in place of their father. In this contest of the will of the deceased, Joseph Everett, a jury returned special verdicts that the deceased did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will, and Joseph Robert Everett, Deceased, was unduly influenced by Ralph Everett on March 11 to the extent that such influence amounted to coercion, destroying the free will of the deceased and substituting his will for the deceased and compelling the deceased to make a disposition he otherwise would not have made.

The Defendant, John Namdi Anene appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Hamilton County granting Victoria Ngozi Anene's petition for divorce and awarding her custody of their three minor children. Mr. Anene raises five issues on appeal, two of which are jurisdictional. (See appendix.) As to the jurisdictional issues, we find that the Circuit Court of Hamilton was correct in assuming jurisdiction to hear both the divorce and custody issues. We find the remainint issues to be without merit.

This is a child custody case. Appellant Marla Perry sought to move out of state with the minor children of her previous marriage. In response, Appellee Ronnie Perry filed a petition seeking a change in custody. The trial court held that custody would be changed in the event that the mother moved out state. We reverse, based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996).

In this action for damages for personal injuries to the deceased, the complaint alleged the deceased was placed in a room while in defendant hospital, and on April 18, 1991, she ws found lying on the floor with injuries about her head and face. It was further alleged that it was not learned until wll after her death, in conversation with the physicians of the plaintiff decedent, that the decedent more likely would have survived for many years had she not fallen...

The defendant, Brian K. Collins, was convicted of violating a habitual traffic offender order, violation of registration, and evading arrest. He was sentenced as a range one offender to two years for violating the order, thirty days for violation of registration, and eleven months and twenty nine days for evading arrest, all to be served concurrently. This is his appeal of right.

This appeal arises from the judgment of the trial court which, among other things, awarded a divorce to the defendant, provided for custody of the parties' minor children and made a division of the marital estate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.