APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this contract action, the Trial Judge entered judgment for plaintiff against defendant in the amount of $50,431.29, and dismissed defendant’s counterclaim which had sought damages for plaintiff’s alleged breach of the distributorship agreement.

In this case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant made an intentional misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a tract of unimproved real property. Following a bench trial, the court found that the defendant, Dean Russell Carrico (“Carrico”), had fraudulently misrepresented a material fact, resulting in a judgment of $21,911.97 for the plaintiff, Dr. Robert W. Bagby (“Bagby”). The trial court also found that Carrico’s conduct violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, T.C.A. § 47-18-101, et seq. (“the Act”). Carrico appealed, raising three issues that present the following questions for our review:

In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on defendants’ premises, the Trial Judge granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R.C.P. 12.02(6), and plaintiff has appealed.

The petitioner, Napoleon Momon, appeals pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted in 1991 of second degree murder in the shooting death of his wife, Jacqueline Daniel Momon, and received a twenty-five-year sentence.1 His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to this Court. State v. Napoleon Momon, No. 03C01-9205-CR-00174 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Nov. 20, 1992).

This is a post-divorce case. Paul William McGaffic filed a petition seeking to modify his child support and periodic alimony in futuro obligations. As pertinent to the issues on
this appeal, the trial court refused to modify its existing child support and alimony in futuro decrees. Mr. McGaffic appealed, raising issues that essentially present the following questions: 1. Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to modify its alimony in futuro award by either terminating it, or reducing it and/or converting it to an award of rehabilitative alimony? 2. Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to modify its child support award?

This is a suit for declaratory judgment. The petitioner, TRW Koyo Steering Systems Company (“TRW Koyo”), seeks a declaration that a document filed by the defendant, John D. Snavely (“Snavely”), in the Monroe County Register of Deeds’ office is a cloud on its title to real property in Monroe County. The trial court granted TRW Koyo summary judgment, decreeing that the purported lien filed by Snavely “is...of no legal effect and, thus, is lifted and removed from [TRW Koyo’s] title.” Snavely appealed pro se.

In this divorce action brought by Gloria E. Hill-Evans (Mother) against Bredell Michael Evans, Sr. (Father), the trial court awarded custody of the parties’ two minor sons to Mother with Father to have reasonable visitation. However, the trial court’s decree further provided that visitation be suspended “until both of the parties and the children have completed a counseling program which is satisfactory to the court, and the court has been furnished a report that the counseling course has been successfully completed. When the counseling process has been successfully completed, the court will consider the defendant’s visitation rights.”

The appellant, Brenda Starks (defendant), appeals as of right from the judgment of the trial court affirming the sentence, as amended, imposed by the General Sessions Court of Wilson County. After the defendant entered a plea of guilty to passing a worthless check, a Class A misdemeanor, she was sentenced to serve 364 days at 100% in the Wilson County Jail. Her entire sentence was suspended and she was placed on unsupervised probation. The General Sessions Court subsequently revoked the probation, and she appealed to the Criminal Court for Wilson County. The trial court affirmed the judgment of the General Session Court, but amended the judgment. The amended judgment provided for confinement in the Wilson County Jail for 364 days at 75%. In this court, the defendant contends: [T]he sentence she was given by the Criminal Court for Wilson
County, Tennessee, an eleven (11) month, twenty-nine (29) day sentence at seventy-five percent (75%), for the misdemeanor offense of passing a worthless check, T.C.A. 39-14-121, was excessive, in that the Court did not sentence Defendant pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, T.C.A. 40-35-101, et. seq. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the laws applicable to this case, it is the opinion of this court the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and this cause dismissed because the defendant has served the entire sentence prior to the institution of the revocation proceedings in the General Sessions Court.

The plaintiff, Wade Spurling, D.C., appeals from the order of the trial court granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) T.R.C.P. Spurling filed a complaint titled “Complaint For Deceit in Inducement to Contract, Promissory Fraud, Fraud, Intentional Interference With Performance ofContractual Obligations and Breach of Contract.” The complaint alleges that Plaintiff owned and operated Spurling Chiropractic Clinic (SCC). He entered into negotiations with Defendant Michael K. Plambeck (Plambeck) for Plambeck to purchase SCC.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant and his wife, Diane, alleging that defendant “entered into agreement with plaintiff for plaintiff to grade and excavate . . . in order to make said land usable”. Plaintiff further averred that he expended over $29,000.00 for heavy equipment and operators on excavation, and “purchased and installed piping at the cost of $3,604.00, for a total due in the amount of $33,530.09".

VANDALISM CONVICTION AFFIRMED; FALSE REPORT CONVICTION REVERSED

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The defendant has filed a petition for rehearing of this appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39. We have considered all of the arguments raised in the petition and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is denied.
 

In this capital case, the defendant, Glenn Bernard Mann, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, aggravated rape and aggravated burglary.¹ In the sentencing hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;” and (2) “[t]he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing burglary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) and (7) (1991). Finding that the two aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution. 

This dispute arose out of the sale of a residence in Signal Mountain, Tennessee. The trial court found that the sellers, Thomas F. Cofer and wife, Cynthia H. Cofer, had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“the Act”) in connection with the sale of their five-bedroom, two and a halfbath residence to the plaintiffs, Theoren J. Murvin and wife, Melody S. Murvin. The Cofers appealed, arguing that the Act does not apply to this transaction, and that the evidence does not show that the Cofers “knowingly withheld information from the [Murvins] to constitute fraud.”

This appeal involves a trial court’s discretion not to employ the mechanisms in Title IV-D for the payment and collection of child support. In a post-divorce proceeding seeking changes in visitation and child support arrangements, the Circuit Court for Davidson County declined to order the obligor parent to execute a wage assignment or to pay child support through the trial court clerk. On this appeal, the Attorney General and Reporter, on behalf of the Title IV-D contractor who represented the custodial parent, asserts that the trial court was statutorily required to direct the non-custodial parent to pay child support through the trial court clerk. We agree. Even though requiring the child support to be paid through the trial court clerk will, in this case, extract an unnecessary five percent penalty from the noncustodial spouse, paying child support through the trial court clerk is statutorily required in Title IV-D proceedings.