APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an action in negligence arising out of the June 1993 acts of the appellant, Harold Angus, in demolishing the “Glassman” building, located at 111 North Highland Avenue in Jackson, pursuant to a contract with the city. Angus’ demolition of the building, which had been declared condemned by the city code, is not disputed. Nor is it disputed that, as a result of the building’s demolition, damage was sustained to the building located adjacent thereto, identified as the “Carmen’s” building, and owned by the appellees, Robert J. McCurley and wife, Patricia G. McCurley.1 The two buildings shared a common “party wall.” At issue in this case is whether Angus was negligent in its demolition of the Glassman building so as to be held legally accountable to the McCurleys for the damages they sustained. The case proceeded to a trial by jury where, at the close of all proof, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the appellees on the issue of liability.2 Angus has appealed challenging the correctness of the trial judge’s decision in this regard. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

A Bedford County Circuit Court jury found Appellant Venson Woodard guilty of two counts of aggravated assault. As a Range II multiple offender, he received a sentence of nine years and eight months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served consecutive to a sente nce for which Appellant was on parole at the tim e of the offense. In this appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for review: whether the trial court violated its duty to act as a thirteenth juror by refusing to grant Appellant’s motion for a new trial. Specifically Appellant maintains the weight of the evidence shows he was acting in self-defense.
 

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial co urt.

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Winslow Watson, from a decision of the chancery court dismissing his petition for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-14-101 to -113. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

The appellant sought to enjoin both city and county officials from the sale of general obligation bonds. The Chancery Court of Franklin granted all  defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the  Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, we must determine  whether the trial court erred in not considering the petition for injunction on the merits as against either the city or the county defendants.

Plaintiff Demetra Lyree Parker appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant/Appellee W arren County Utility District. We reverse the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Utility District responded promptly, adequately, and effectively to Parker’s allegations of sexual harassment against the Utility District’s general manager.

This appeal presents an issue of first impression concerning the evidentiary standards applicable to disciplinary proceedings involving licensed physicians. The Tennessee Department of Health perfected an interlocutory appeal to the Chancery Court for Davidson County after an administrative law judge disqualified its expert witness for failing to satisfy the locality rule generally applicable in medical malpractice cases. The trial court reversed the administrative law judge’s decision after concluding that a physician’s conduct should be measured by a statewide standard of minimum competency rather than a particularized local standard of care. While the administrative law judge’s decision was correct with regard to two of thecharges, we affirm the trial court’s decision in part because several of the charges in this proceeding only require proof that a physician has failed to meet statewide, minimal competency standards.

The defendant, Tyrone Watkins, was convicted on July 18, 1994, of two Class A misdemeanors. While allowing pretrial jail credit, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, the remainder of which was to be served on probation. On February 16, 1996, a warrant was issued which resulted in the revocation of probation. The question of law certified for review is whether the probationary term had expired prior to the commencement of the revocation proceeding. Rule 37(b)(2)(i), Tenn. R. Crim. P. We must reverse the judgment of the trial court; the cause is dismissed.

This case involves a suit to partition certain real and personal property owned by three brothers as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Walton and Steven Bunch appeal the order of the trial court granting the sale for partition.

The defendant, Buffy Mae Twadell, has been indicted on two counts of aggravated perjury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-703. The district attorney general denied the defendant's application for pretrial diversion. Thereafter, the trial court denied her petition for a writ of certiorari. In this extraordinary appeal made pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant insists that the district attorney general abused his discretion by the denial of pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an action for damages for breach of contract involving the sale of the assets of a corporation doing business as North River Nursery in Chattanooga. The selling price was $370,000.00, to be paid $305,000.00 cash and $65,000.00 in seven (7) promissory notes, each of which provides “That all or a substantial portion of the debt evidenced hereby shall be paid by work to be performed . . . . . as set out in a letter . . . ”

The appellant, Dennis P. Neilan, appeals from the judgment of the Sevier County Circuit Court which dismissed, without hearing, his petition seeking postconviction relief. We affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Phillip W. Pomeroy, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for  post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

Union Planters National Bank (“Bank”), as executor for the estate of James A. LeRoy (“Testator”), filed an action in the Probate Court of Shelby County for probate of Testator’s will on January 5, 1989. Bank subsequently filed suit for declaratory judgment against the beneficiaries and legatees of Testator’s property (“appellees”) alleging that the residuary estate provided for in Testator’s will to pay all death taxes was insufficient to cover his tax liability and seeking restitution from the appellees for their proportional share. Dedman appellees responded by contending that the post-death appreciation of residuary estate assets and the receipt of income from those assets had sufficiently increased the value of the residuary estate to enable it to sufficiently cover all death taxes requested by Bank. The Special Master appointed by the trial judge confirmed the sufficiency of the residuary estate on the date the taxes were due. The trial court entered judgment for appellees confirming the report of the Special Master finding that there was no shortfall in the residuary estate established by the testator in his will and thus rendering appellees not liable to Bank for reimbursement of death taxes in any amount. We find the decision of the lower court as to the issue of post-death income to the residuary trust to be in error and remand. Due to the complicated facts of this case and our determination that one issue in this case requires a remand to the lower court, we will only present the facts relevant to that issue.

The defendant, Ricky Hill Krantz, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court for felony murder and aggravated assault, a Class C Felony. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in the custody of the Department of Correction for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered the defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively. The defendant contends that:

(1) the evidence is insufficient to support the first degree
murder conviction;
(2) the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment due to
the state’s failure to preserve a blood sample taken from the
defendant on the evening of the offense;
(3) the trial court erred by not dismissing the indictment upon
grounds of fundamental fairness because the defendant
should not have been retried after a mistrial upon a theory that
was not relied upon by the state in the first trial; and
(4) the trial court erred by allowing the state to use a
peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner in violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the
Tennessee Constitution.

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not err as the defendant claims. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, Gerome J. Smith, appeals as of right from a conviction of first degree murder following a jury trial in the Sumner County Criminal Court. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the Defendant committed premeditated firstdegree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial co urt.

Defendant, Tracey E. Stigall, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offense of aggravated burglary. The sole issue in this direct appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to charge lesser offenses. We AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

The issue which this court must resolve is whether the statute of limitations commences in an accessory after the fact prosecution when (a) the crime is committed or (b) the principal offender is convicted. The trial court found the statute of limitations does not commence until the principal offender is convicted. The defendant contends the statute of limitations commences when the crime of accessory after the fact is committed. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law pertaining to the issue presented for review, it is the opinion of this court the statute of limitations commenced to run in this prosecution for accessory after the fact when the offense was committed. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the prosecution is dismissed since the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations.

William T. Rawls (plaintiff) brought this action to recover damages resulting froma collision between a truck in in which he was a passenger and a train owned by Norfold Southern Railway Company. The truck was being driven by the defendant, James Massey. The train engineer was the defendant, N.V. Hodge. Rawls alleged that Norfolk Southern's locomotive was at the timeof the collison being operated in a negligent manner under the circumstances existing at the crossing where the accident took place.  He alleged that Hodge failed to give warning by blowing the train's whistle or horn, and that the crossing was not sufficiently marked by adequate warning devices. Rawls also sued Dycho Company, the owner of the land adjacent to to the rialway, alleging that a fence which Dycho had placed onits land, together with various structures and objects inside the fence, constituted a dangerous obstruction which blocked the view of the oncoming train.