APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder in 1975 and sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the conviction, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by executive action. Hamilton v. State, 555 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

In this capital case, the defendant, Christa Gail Pike, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing on the conviction for first degree murder, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;” and (2) “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) and (6) (1997 Repl.). Finding that the two aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution. With respect to the defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the trial judge imposed a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence.

In this legal malpractice action, the plaintiffs, John Kohl & Company P.C., John B. Kohl, III and Helen H. Kohl, Individually, and John B. Kohl, III, Trustee, as Trustee of the John Kohl & Company, P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, (collectively referred to as the “plaintiffs”), appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the trial court’s finding that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs’ recovery for negligently provided legal advice pertaining to certain business matters. The plaintiffs have also appealed from the denial of legal fees associated with prosecuting this action against the defendant, Dearborn and Ewing, and one of its associates, Dan Huffstutter. The issues before us are: (1) whether certain of the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104, and (2) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover legal fees associated with prosecuting this action. For the reasons explained hereafter, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

In this legal malpractice action, the defendant, John P. Roberts, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment entered by the trial court in his favor based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. The issue for our determination is whether the present action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104.1 After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we conclude that the instant suit is time-barred. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the decision of the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant is reversed.

The Court has considered the Petition for Rehearing filed by the defendant/appellee, and it is the decision of a majority of this Court that the petition is without merit. The Petition for Rehearing is denied.

A. L. Moneymaker, Jr., and his wife Roberta Moneymaker appeal a judgment rendered by the Trial Court against them in the amount of $36,000 as a result of personal injuries sustained by Karen Lynn Pilcher and loss of consortium of her husband, Keith A. Pilcher. The suit arose as a result of a collision occurring on September 3, 1994, about 10:00 a.m., between a female dog named Spec, alleged to be owned by Mr. and Mrs. Moneymaker, and a bicycle being ridden by Mrs. Pilcher on Dutch Valley Road in Anderson County.

The Sevier County Grand Jury indicted sixteen-year old Cecil Eugene McGuire for aggravated rape, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated burglary. After a trial, the jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary but found him guilty of aggravated sexual battery and aggravated criminal trespass, a lesser grade offense of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to serve eleven years in the custody of the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender for the Class B felony, concurrently with eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant presents the following issues:

1. Whether the indictments are fatally defective and thereby deprive the trial court of jurisdiction in this case.
2. Whether the evidence as a matter of law was insufficient to support the convictions.
3. Whether the trial court improperly credited and weighed the enhancement factors and imposed an excessive sentence.

After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we find no error warranting reversal of the defendant’s convictions. We affirm the convictions, but for reasons explained below, we modify the felony sentence from eleven years to ten years.

In this adoption case, Danny Alan Kratochvil (respondent) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights regarding his son, Damon Alan Kratochvil. The biological mother's parental rights were terminated by default judgment, and she is not a party to this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, Jeremy P. Crye, seeks to impose liability on Mary B. Morton for the act of her son, Lloyd C. Norton, in shooting him. The trial judge granted her motion for summary judgment without enlargement. The plaintiff appeals, and presents for review the issue of whether the proof relevant to the motion established a genuine dispute of a material fact, thus requiring a merit trial.

Larry G. Relford, an employee of William DeRochie, sued Mr. DeRochie and Steve LaFon, seeking damages for injuries received by him when he fell from a scaffold while framing a personal residence being erected for Mr. LaFon under a contract with Mr. DeRochie, the general contractor. As best we understand the complaint, it is grounded upon two theories-- first, that Mr. LaFon failed to provide a safe place for Mr. Relford to work and, second, that Mr. LaFon was, as contemplated by T.C.A. 50-6-111, a statutory employer and subject to the provisions of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Statute.