APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff, Deborah H. Steele (“Steele”), brought this action against her former employer, Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc. (“Superior”), and her former supervisor, David Twombley (“Twombley”)1, alleging that she was the victim of, among other things, sexual  harassment, outrageous conduct, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. After various other claims were dismissed by the trial court², the case proceeded to trial before a jury on Steele’s claim of sexual harassment against both Superior and Twombley under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. § 4-21-101, et seq. (“THRA”), and her claim of outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against Twombley alone. The jury found in favor of Steele on all of the remaining theories of recovery and awarded her $1.2 million in compensatory  damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. The trial court also awarded Steele attorney’s fees and costs against both defendants. After Steele  accepted a remittitur that eliminated the punitive damages award and reduced the compensatory damages award to $850,000, both Superior and Twombley appealed, raising in substance the following issues for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err in allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony from witnesses who did not have first-hand knowledge of the events in question?

2. Did Steele’s counsel make improper and prejudicial statements during closing argument, thus warranting a new trial?

3. Is there material evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict?

4. Did the trial court err in submitting to the jury Steele’s cause of action against Twombley under the THRA?5. Did the trial court err in giving the jury an inaccurate charge, thereby prejudicing its verdict against Twombley?

6. Did the trial court err in not suggesting a further remittitur of the jury’s verdict?

7. Did the trial court err in awarding attorney’s fees against Twombley under the THRA?

I concur with the results of this opinion. However, I am filing this separate opinion to clarify my understanding of the significance of the portion of the decision dealing with the need of the parties’ daughter for continuing support past her eighteenth birthday.

In this divorce case, the defendant husband has appealed from a decree awarding the plaintiff a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences and dividing the marital estate. The husband has presented the issues in the following form:
1. The Trial Court rushed the trial, making it difficult for the defendant/appellant to fully present his case.
2. The Trial Court erred by awarding the plaintiff/appellee an interest in the defendant/appellant’s
separate property.
3. The Trial Court erred in refusing to make any division in marital property that was held solely in the plaintiff/appellee’s name.
4. The Trial Court erred in awarding the divorce to the plaintiff/appellee despite overwhelming grounds in favor of the defendant/appellant.

In this divorce case, Mary C. Williams, hereafter “wife” has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court awarding her a divorce from Si J. Williams, hereafter “husband,” custody, child support, alimony, insurance, fees and division of property.

I concur with the results of this opinion. However, I am filing this separate
opinion to clarify my understanding of the significance of the portion of the decision
dealing with the need of the parties’ daughter for continuing support past her
eighteenth birthday.

This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Lori Vanhooser Robertson (“Wife”) a divorce on the ground set forth at T.C.A. § 36-4-101(3)1; awarded the parties joint custody of their 16-year-old son; ordered Gary Wayne Robertson (“Husband”) to pay Wife child support of $387 per month plus 21% of part of Husband’s future increases in net income; awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony of $250 per month for 12 months, beginning with the month of October, 1997; divided the parties’ property and debts; denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees; and made other decrees not relevant to a resolution of the issues now before us. Wife appealed, raising issues that present the following questions for our review.

We granted the Rule 9, T.R.A.P., application of the appellant, Brent D. Laing, M.D. (“Laing”), in order to review the propriety of the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend his answer filed in litigation instituted against him and others by the appellee, Brenda J. Crowder, M.D. (“Crowder”). In the same order, we consolidated that interlocutory appeal with the appeal of Laing’s separate suit against Crowder, which latter appeal is before us as of right. See Rule 3(a), T.R.A.P. The claims asserted by Laing in the second suit are identical to those in the counterclaim which Laing attempted to pursue, albeit unsuccessfully, in the earlier litigation. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend in the first suit. We dismiss, as moot, the appeal of Laing’s subsequent suit against Crowder.

The defendant, Kevin Burns, was convicted of two counts of felony murder and two counts of attempted felony murder. The jury imposed the death penalty for one of the felony murder convictions after finding that evidence of an aggravating factor -- that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons other than the victim murdered -- outweighed the evidence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury imposed a life sentence for the other felony murder conviction.

While this case has ultimately been decided on a waiver issue, we granted this appeal to take the opportunity to address two very important issues of statutory construction in misdemeanor sentencing. The general issues may be framed as whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-209 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210 apply to misdemeanor sentencing. Specifically, the issues have been stated as: (1) whether a trial judge must state on the record, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(f), what enhancement or mitigating factors were employed in setting the sentence length in a DUI case; (2) whether a trial court must make specific findings on the record, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann § 40-35-209(c), when fixing the percentage of a sentence to be served in incarceration under the misdemeanor sentencing statute; and (3) whether the appellate court erred in remanding this case for re-sentencing. We hold that §§ 40-35-209, - 210(f) are inapplicable to DUI sentencing and that the defendant's sentences should be affirmed.

The plaintiff sued for injury suffered when she stepped into a hole in the asphalt surface of a parking lot provided for customers of Kroger Company. Kroger was dismissed by nonsuit, and the remaining defendants were dismissed by summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and presented the following issue:

I. Whether a genuine issue of material fact has been raised by the plaintiff/appellant, so as to warrant this cause to be tried on its merits.