APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Michael T. Keen, the Defendant, appeals as of right following his sentencing hearing in the Sum ner County Criminal Court. Defendant was indicted for vehicular homicide and DUI, second offense. In an agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, and agreed to an eight (8) year sentence, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sente nce. Following his sentencing hearing, the trial court orde red Defendant to serve eight (8) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an alterna tive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, Robert E. Mayers, acting pro se in this medical malpractice action, appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of Davidson County denying his application for relief under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 60.02 from a final summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants.

The defendant, Sheryl L. Pendergrass, appeals a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(I), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the Sumner County Criminal Court, the defendant pleaded guilty to three drug offenses, subject to reservation of the certified question. In her certified question, the defendant contends that law enforcement officers infringed on her rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an exclusion in an automobile liability policy for a person operating the automobile without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so. The Circuit Court of Davidson County dismissed the insurance company’s action for a declaratory judgment. We reverse, and declare that the exclusion precluded coverage by the company.

This appeal involves an interstate contract dispute over ten pairs of emu chicks. Two Tennessee residents declined to honor their contract to purchase the chicks after the Arkansas breeders attempted to substitute chicks different from those advertised for sale. The breeders filed a breach of contract suit in Arkansas against the purchasers seeking to recover the unpaid purchase price, and the purchasers filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County seeking to recover their down payment as well as treble damages and attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After the breeders obtained a judgment in Arkansas against the purchasers, they moved to dismiss the purchasers’ Tennessee lawsuit on the ground that the Arkansas judgment was res judicata to the purchasers’ Tennessee claims. The trial court agreed and dismissed the purchasers’ claims. On this appeal, the purchasers assert that the Arkansas judgment should not have precluded them from pursuing their Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims in Tennessee. We agree because the Arkansas court did not have the power to award the full measure of relief the purchasers are seeking in the Tennessee proceedings.
 

Plaintiff Chase Cavett Services, Inc. (Chase) appeals an order of the chancery court granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendant Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. (Brandon). Because we find that the chancery court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Brandon, we reverse the ruling of the chancellor.

We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA").

We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA").

The appellant, Jimmy Jones, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his pro se motion to reopen post-conviction petition or in the alternative a petition for habeas corpus relief by the Sumner County Criminal Court. In December, 1987, the appellant was convicted by a Sumner County jury on two counts of armed robbery and one count of burglary. The appellant received concurrent Range II sentences of forty-five years for the armed robbery convictions and fourteen years for the burglary conviction to run consecutively. On direct appeal, the appellant alleged trial errors as to (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdicts, (2) whether the trial court erred in limiting production of police reports, and (3) whether his effective sentence of fifty-nine years was excessive. In January, 1989, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in State v. Jimmy Jones, Jr., Sumner County No. 88-58-III (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, January 11, 1989) per. app. denied (Tenn. 1989).

We granted this appeal to determine whether an employer is entitled to an offset of long-term disability payments against a workers’ compensation award for permanent total disability. A 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 permits offsets against workers’ compensation benefits for payments made to an employee under an employer-funded disability plan. The plaintiff’s injury pre-dated the effective date of the statute. We hold that the amendment is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset in this case.
 

On December 6, 1996, a W illiamson County jury convicted Appellant, Darrell Wentzel, of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing on January 31, 1997, Appellant was sentenced to twelve years for each count of aggravated robbery, twelve years for aggravated kidnapping, and six years for aggravated burglary, with all sentenc es to be served concurrently. On February 18, 1997, Appellant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial, claiming that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction, that the aggravating kidnapping conviction should be dismissed because it was incidental to the robbery, that several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were erroneous, and that the trial court had misapplied enhancement factors to arrive at maximum sentences on all four convictions.  The trial court denied the motion. Appellant challenges both his convictions and his sentence, raising the following issues:

1) whether the trial court comm itted plain error by adm itting the in-court identification of the Appellant by Mary Ethel Veach;

2) whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony of Edward Mitchem;

3) whether Appellant’s convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery constituted dou ble jeopardy;

4) whether the trial court correctly rejected Appellant’s argument that he could not be convicted of aggravated kidnapping because it was only incidental to the robbery;

5) whether the trial court correctly sentenced the Appellant.

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this post-conviction appeal to determine whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel where, at the express instruction of a competent and fully informed defendant, defense counsel does not investigate or present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that there is not.

This appeal involves a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Appellant, Lorenzo Carlos Pfeifer, appeals from the order of the Circuit Court in Obion County which found him a delinquent child because he was guilty of the offense of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000.00. Appellant was committed to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services for an indeterminate term. The only issue presented for review is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pfeifer committed the offense of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000.00.

This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel, and the briefs and argument of counsel; and upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 of the Workers’ Compensation Act is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset against the worker’s compensation award in this case.

This dispute concerns an award of alimony and attorney’s fees. Appellant, Dennis T. Crouse (Husband), appeals from the trial court’s order granting alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees to Appellee, Charlane Allen Crouse (Wife).

Gehl Corporation filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County to contest an assessment by the Commissioner of Revenue of the "Amusement Tax" imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-212(a)(2).

This is a domestic relations case. The appellant complains of the award of the residence to the appellee, and the award of the attorney’s fees. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d); Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996). Where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material fact, the question on appeal is one of law, and the scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying a chancellor's conclusions of law. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1993).

Steve Makris appeals the trial court’s denial of his claim for accrued and unpaid salaries in this partnership accounting and dissolution case. For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
 

This controversy may, perhaps, be described as a boundary dispute. The development of Riverview Estates Subdivision began in 1971 with the recordation of a plat which provided for a cul-de-sac fifty feet in width centered on the West boundary of Lot 23.