APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The majority concludes that the jury’s finding of an incomplete aggravating circumstance permits Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a), harmless error review, holding the error statutory rather than constitutional. I agree that the error is statutory and that harmless error analysis applies. Accordingly, I join with the majority in affirming the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. I write separately, however, because I find that, in conducting harmless error review, the majority fails to perform a sufficient analysis to support its finding that the invalid aggravating circumstance did not “affirmatively appear to have affected the result of the trial on the merits.” See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

Petitioner, Harold David Jones, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court of Robertson County. Previously, he entered a nolo contendere plea to second degree murder and received a Range II sentence of 35 years. The following issues are presented for our review:

1. whether the petition was filed within the applicable statute oflimitations; and

2. whether the nolo contendere plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.

We find no reversible error and AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment by the trial court domesticating a Connecticut judgment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-6-101 et seq. against both defendants. I. The Connecticut Action In September 1990, Connecticut Savings Bank brought suit in the Superior Court of the Judicial District of New Haven, Connecticut against Ronald S. Obenauf and Ardeth H. Obenauf on a promissory note in the amount of $34,000, executed by Ronald S. Obenauf and dated March 27, 1990. Plaintiff alleged that it was the current holder of the promissory note and that Ronald S. Obenauf had failed to make monthly payments in accordance therewith. The bank demanded judgment of the amount of the promissory note together with  nterest and costs. The bank further sought fees and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, asserting that plaintiff had been harmed by the failure of the defendant to make payment on the promissory note.

Paula Chaffin, Manny Formigo, Brenda Thurman, Brent Mezzacasa, Maria 3 Rodriguez, Robert Kirk, Lloyd Ramer, Jerry Knott, and Mike Freeman (“Plaintiffs”), who were appointed by the trial court as class representatives in this conditionally certified class action, appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against four separate cruise line businesses, which included: (1) Norwegian Cruise Line Limited f/k/a Kloster Cruise Limited (“Norwegian”); (2) Carnival Corporation and/or Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (“Carnival”); (3) Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (“Royal Caribbean”); and (4) Princess Cruise Lines, Inc. (“Princess”). Plaintiffs’ claims were based upon alleged Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) violations and upon alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims based upon forum selection clauses contained in written cruise contracts. Based upon the following, we find that the subject forum selection clauses are neither invalid based upon fraud nor unenforceable based upon unreasonableness. Moreover, we find that the subject forum selection clauses do not contravene a strong Tennessee public policy. Accordingly, we find that the forum selection clauses are enforceable and that the trial court’s dismissal was proper. We therefore affirm.

This is an appeal of two ten-day sentences for criminal contempt. We find that the procedural requirements for a sentence for criminal contempt have not been satisfied. We, therefore, reverse the lower court’s order.

This appeal involves the requirement of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11.01 that pleadings be signed by an attorney or by a party if that party is not represented by an attorney. Finding that the plaintiff did not comply with Rule 11 within the statutory period of limitations, the Putnam County Chancery Court granted summary judgment to the defendant. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves a suit for personal injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs-appellants, Myranda Brown (Brown), Candy Brown (Candy) and Sherri Mills (Mills) appeal the judgment on the jury verdict that awarded plaintiff Mills $922.00 in damages and awarded no damages for plaintiffs Myranda and Candy against defendants, Jessica Chessor (Jessica) and Lisha D. Oaks (Oaks).

This appeal involves a petition to modify an award of alimony. Appellant, Johnny Wayne Thomas (Husband), appeals the order of the trial court denying Husband’s petition to modify by deletion an award of alimony in futuro awarded to Appellee, Brenda Kaye Thomas (Wife).

Plaintiff Ray Darris Thompson appeals the trial court’s final order entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees Betty Hammond, Vernon Brown, June Wesson, Bruce MacDonald, and Christine Bradley.  We reverse the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that the trial court erred in granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment  without considering Thompson’s motion to compel discovery.

This appeal involves a petition to modify child custody. Respondent-Appellant, Erin Blanding Bingham (Mother), appeals from the order of the trial court granting the petition to modify custody filed by Petitioner-Appellee, Thomas Gregory Townshend (Father).

Defendant Woodworks, Inc., appeals the circuit court’s final judgment in the amount
of $8288 which was entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Billy and Diane Wesson. We reverse
the circuit court’s judgment based upon our conclusion that the court erred in directing a verdict in
favor of Defendant/Appellee Larry Cupples, d/b/a Cupples Construction Company, and we remand
for a new trial.

Respondent Anita W. Goode LeCornu (Respondent) appeals the trial court’s judgment admitting to probate the will of J. B. Warren, Jr. (Testator). We vacate the trial court’s judgment based upon our conclusion that the court erred in ruling that the Testator did not effectively revoke one of the will’s provisions.

The pro se petitioner, William Lewis Howell, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App.

In this wrongful death action, the trial court granted a motion to quash process and dismiss complaint filed by Defendants Percy and Mary Ward. Additionally, the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Bill and Ardia Cunningham. Plaintiff Veronica Toney appeals the ruling of the trial court regarding the motion to quash process and dismiss complaint as well as the motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree that the conviction should be affirmed. Assault is not a lesser included or lesser grade offense of statutory rape. I disagree, however, with footnote 3 which suggests that a special request by the defendant for an instruction on a lesser offense would serve to amend the indictment. See State v. Leland Ray Reeves, No. 01C01-9711-CR-00515 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 23, 1999).