APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Annette Clay (“Wife” or “Appellant”) appeals the judgment of the trial court which granted a divorce to Annette Clay and Kerry Clay (“Husband” or “Appellee”), awarded to Husband $17,270.00 of Wife’s total retirement benefit, awarded to Wife $212.00 of Husband’s $28,460.80 workers’ compensation settlement, and failed to award any amount of Husband’s workers’ compensation settlement as child support for the parties’ children.

James Richardson (“Richardson”) and James Taylor (“Taylor”), officers and agents 1It is not nec essary tha t the perso n who is c harged with conte mpt b e a party to the underlying proceeding. Tennessee Code Annotated §29-9-102(3) states that a court can inflict punishments for contempts of court for “the willful disobedience or resistance of an y officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person to any lawful writ, pro cess, o rder, rule, de cree, or command of sa id courts .” (em phasis added). It is also not necessary that the proceedings out of which the contempt arose be complete. A judgment of contempt fixing punishment is a final judgment from w hich app eal will lie. Hall v . Hall, 772 S.W.2d 432, (Tenn.App. 1989 ); Rules App.Proc., Rule 3(a). 2 of Personnel Plus, Inc. (“Personnel”) appeal the ruling of the trial court holding them in contempt for failure to pay Sixty Seven Thousand Dollars ($67,000.00) owed by Personnel to Quality First Staffing Services (“Quality”) into the Registry of the Chancery Clerk.

I concur with the majority opinion. I note, though, that the case upon which the opinion relies to conclude that the statute of limitations may not be raised for the first time on appeal was decided under the former post-conviction procedure act. I am hesitant to say that such a total bar exists under the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act, given the affirmative duty of the trial court to assess the timeliness of the petition regardless of whether it is raised by the state as a defense and the apparent jurisdictional effect of the running of the statute.

The Defendant, Jimmy Sills, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his pro se brief to this C ourt, Defendant argues that his convictions for first degree murder and for use of a firearm during commission of a felony violate double jeopardy because the use of a firearm is an essential element of first degree murder. For the same reasons this issue was previously determined to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial cou rt.

This appeal involves the division of property and the award of alimony as between parties who were married for many years. On appeal, the appellant is challenging the trial court's characterization of certain property as marital property, the trial court's division of the marital estate, and the trial court's failure to award both periodic alimony as well as attorney fees and costs to the wife. The decision of the trial court is affirmed with regard to certain matters and reversed with regard to others.

In this appeal, a state prisoner appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his action in which he contends that he is entitled to the benefit of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act’s allegedly lesser sentences for armed robbery, aggravated rape and aggravated kidnaping rather than the sentences imposed upon him at the time of his convictions in 1983. He also contends he is entitled, as a matter of law, to certain sentence reduction credits. Finally, he contends that, taken together, the downward adjustments of his sentence on the basis of these two contentions would entitle him to immediate release from custody. We affirm the dismissal of the prisoner's petition because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

This case involves a mother's post-divorce petition to modify custody. The trial court dismissed the petition and awarded attorney fees to the father's attorney. The mother asserts that circumstances have changed such that it is now in the children's best interests to live with her. We do not find that the mother has made the requisite showing of changed circumstances, and, accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Willie Perry ("Perry" or "Appellant") appeals the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment to Appellees Robert Conley, et al. ("Appellees").

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In this child custody case involving Bianca Arneshe Askew, now age eight years and nine months, we consider the competing claims between the child’s natural mother, Julie Donoho, and Dorothy Lewis, who presently has physical custody of the child. The lower courts found that a prior court order had granted custody to Ms. Lewis and that Ms. Donoho had failed to satisfy her burden of proving that custody should be restored to her. Because we find that Ms. Donoho’s constitutional right as a parent has been abridged, due to the absence of a showing of unfitness or of substantial harm, we reverse the decisions of the lower courts.

This is a post-divorce action. The mother filed a petition to enforce the provisions of the marital dissolution agreement. The agreement provided for payment of attorney’s fees and costs for legal action to enforce the marital dissolution agreement. The trial court denied the mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. We reverse and remand.