APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted this appeal by Ronnie William (Billy) Taylor, the appellant, in  order to address issues pertinent to the sentences he received in the trial  court. In our review, however, we notice as plain error an invalid conviction  that was imposed upon appellant for an offense that was not charged in the indictment.1 Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, we vacate the invalid burglary conviction and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case tests the power of the trial court to order an adult, slightly handicapped child to visit his father. The Chancery Court of Rutherford County held that it was the duty of the court to require the visitation. We hold that under the circumstances of this case the court exceeded its jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a chancery decree awardingspecific performance to the purchasers of a tract of real estate and denying a counterclaim for rent. The lower court rendered the decree after a full evidentiary hearing on the merits. The appellant has not furnished this court with a transcript of the evidence heard at the trial.

The defendant was charged with vandalism, three counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of assault. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to vandalism and two counts of aggravated assault, receiving a sentence of one year on the vandalism count and four years on each aggravated assault count, to be served concurrently. Following a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service, the trial court denied probation. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying probation because it perceived inconsistencies in the defendant’s statements and did not allow the defendant to clarify the evidence through his statutory right of allocution prior to sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a reduction in ordered child support.

The Defendant, Otis J. Wickfall, ap peals as of right his conviction for first degree murder in the Shelby County Crimina l Court. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, Defendant raises the following issues:  I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal based on the evidence presented by the State;  II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of the victim’s blood-staine d shirt to show the trajectory and angle of the bullet;  III. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of a photograph of a recording label depicting the slang term for murder;  IV. Whether the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of California Penal Code section 187 defining murder; and V. Whether the trial court erred in its jury ins tructions.  After a careful review of the reco rd, we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.

This is a personal injury slip and fall case. The plaintiff was injured when she fell in the defendant’s restaurant due to a tray negligently left on the floor. The defendant restaurant admits liability but asserts that the evidence does not support the amount of the trial court’s award and seeks a remittitur. We affirm the trial court’s decision as modified.

The controversy giving rise to this appeal had its genesis in a service contract for washers and dryers entered into between Plaintiff Bill Jennings and Defendant Lawler-Wood, Inc., which manageg Maple Oak apartments for the owners. 

In its eminent domain proceeding, the City of Lafayette (City) took a small strip of Mark and Ruby Hammock’s land along the City’s right-of-way for an existing street.

This case involves eligibility for environmental cleanup funds. The plaintiff landowner appeals the decision of the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Tank Board finding the plaintiff ineligible to receive reimbursement from the petroleum underground storage tank fund established in Tennessee Code Annotated § 68-215-110. Upon initial review in chancery court, the Board’s decision was reversed. The trial court subsequently reconsidered its decision and, based on recent Tennessee appellate decisions, affirmed the Board’s decision to deny assistance. We affirm.

The defendant, James Clay Romines, appeals as of right from a ruling of the Blount County Criminal Court revoking his probation. The defendant presents one issue for appellate review: whether the trial court erred by ordering the defendant to serve eleven days in jail as punishment for a second violation of probation. After a review of the record, briefs of the parties, and appropriate law, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

The court has correctly affirmed the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Darnall’s Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 1998) claim. Even though I concur with the court’s decision, I have prepared this separate opinion to state my understanding of the elements of a Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 claim. I find this restatement necessary because of the Western Section’s reliance on Johnson v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) in Merryman v. Central Parking Sys., Inc., No. 01A01-9203-CH-00076, 1992 WL 330404 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1992) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from summary judgment granted to the Defendants in a complaint asserting retaliatory discharge with the action based solely upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether an amendment to T.C. A.50 -1-304, (commonly knownn as the Whistle Blower Statute), which brough employees of the State of Tennessee within its purview, should be given retrospective effect.

The appellant states the issue before this Court thus:

A single, narrow issue is presented for consideration in this appeal: Does material evidence within the meaning of Rule 13d, appear in the record which suports the jury’s verdict of $140 ,000.00 in compensatory damages, and, if so, did the trial court erroneously grant a new trial?

The case history demonstrates that this issue is not properly before the Court for consideration.

The appellant, Charles R. Brown, appeals as of right from his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) by a Blount County jury. The defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. He was ordered to serve forty-eight hours in the county jail before being placed on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-seven days. The defendant was also fined $350. In this direct appeal, the defendant presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury.

We granted this appeal to decide whether: (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated burglary and felony murder committed during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to criminal trespass. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant and that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on criminal trespass.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the defendant’s convictions is affirmed.

The defendant, Paul Carr Moss, Jr., was indicted for the first degree murder of his wife, Peggy Ann Moss. He was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of twenty-five years. The defendant was fined $50,000.00.

We granted this appeal to decide whether a defendant’s credibility may be impeached by reference to a prior conviction for a “felony involving dishonesty.” We hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the State could impeach the defendant by asking him whether he had been convicted of any “felonies involving dishonesty.” We hold, however, that the error was harmless.¹

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in their determinations of the amount of child support to be paid by the child’s father. Although both the trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that the total monthly payment should be increased from four hundred dollars ($400.00) to six hundred fifty dollars ($650.00), each court reached its conclusion upon different reasons. We conclude that both courts erred and that the base amount of child support should have been $1,241.00 per month. In addition, Mr. Brooks shall pay the child's private education expenses per the parties agreement.
 

The Defendant, Barry Waddell, appeals as of right from his conviction in the Davidson County Crimina l Court. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two (2) counts of rape of a child (Counts 1 and 2) and two (2) counts of aggravated sexual battery (Counts 3 and 4). Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five (25) years for each count of rape of a child and ten (10) years for each count of aggravated sexual battery, with all sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of seventy (70) years. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him to the maximum period of incarceration for his rape of a child convictions and erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. We affirm in pa rt, and reverse and modify in part.