APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Tennessee prison inmate filed a Petition for a Declaratory Judgment, insisting that he was entitled to be immediately released because of the earlier expiration of a concurrent Florida sentence. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

The appellant, Randall Allen Cantrell, appeals the order of the Sumner County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues which collectively challenge the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition as being time-barred.

The appellant, Betty W . Norman, was convicted by a Moore County jury of two (2) counts of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and one (1) count of harassment, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to consecutive terms of one (1) year and three (3) months and one (1) year and two (2) months for the reckless endangerment convictions. The appellant received a concurrent sentence of six (6) months for her conviction for harassment. The trial court ordered tha t the appellant serve her sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues for our
review:

(1) whether the trial court erred in limiting the appellant’s crossexamination of a state w itness reg arding the trajectory of a bullet and by subsequently instructing the jury to disregard the witness’ testimon y regardin g the trajec tory of the bullet;
(2) whether the trial court erred in failing to allow the appellant to question the victims, Robert and Loretta Norman, regarding anydomestic problems between them;
(3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the a ppellant’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt;
(4) whether the trial court imposed excessive sentences;
(5) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences; and
(6) whether the trial court erred in denying probation.

After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we conclude that theappellant was erroneously convicted of two (2) co unts of reckless endangerment arising out of the same course of conduct. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for reckless endangerment in Count One is merged with her conviction for reckless endangerment in Count Two. In all other respects, however, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Randall Allen Cantrell, appeals the order of the Sumner County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues which collectively challenge the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition as being time-barred.

We granted this appeal to clarify the statutory standard by which the validity of antenuptial agreements should be judged. The trial court in this case held the antenuptial agreement invalid, finding the wife did not “knowledgeably” sign the agreement, as required by statute1. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed, finding the totality of the circumstances established that the wife possessed sufficient knowledge of the husband’s business affairs and financial status at the time she signed the agreement to meet the statutory requirement of "knowledgeably" executing the agreement and that the agreement was therefore enforceable. We interpret the statutory requirement that an antenuptial agreement is enforceable only if entered into "knowledgeably" to mean that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent and value
of his or her holdings was provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or that disclosure was unnecessary because the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement had independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the proponent spouse’s holdings.

Alfred Lee Mauldin appeals from the order of the chancery court dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

We granted this appeal by Jeffrey D. Hunter, the appellant, in order to address issues pertinent to a trial court’s authority during probation revocation proceedings. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that when a trial court has determined that a probation violation has occurred, it possesses the authority to: (1) order incarceration; (2) order the original probationary period to commence anew; or (3) extend the remaining period of probation for as much as an additional two years. We further conclude that a defendant is not entitled to credit on his or her sentence of incarceration for any time served on probation prior to probation revocation and reinstatement of the original sentence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

We granted review to address the standard for an employer's liability in supervisor sexual harassment cases under the Tennessee Human Rights Act following the recent United States Supreme Court's decisions in Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998). Upon review, we adopt a standard consistent with Ellerth and Faragher and hold that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. An employer, however, may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages when no tangible employment action has been taken. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified.

In this appeal, the defendant, Pat Bondurant, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and arson. Upon finding that the State had proven two statutory. The jury found the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person;” and (2) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved to rture or de pravity of m ind.” Ten n. Code Ann. § 39 -2-203( i)(2) and (5 ) (1982). These statutory aggravating circumstances were redefined in 1989 and are currently codified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (5) (1998 Sup p.). 2Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997 R epl.).
aggravating circumstances1 beyond a reasonable doubt and that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution on the conviction for first degree murder. On the arson conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years consecutive to the death penalty. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court2 and set for oral argument with respect to eight of the issues raised by the defendant. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 12.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party receiving periodic alimony may obtain a modification or extension of alimony when: 1) a termination date was agreed to by the parties in their property settlement agreement; and 2) the petition to modify was filed after the termination date but prior to the expiration of thirty days. We hold that the alimony was not modifiable after one of the contingencies listed in the property settlement agreement occurred. We affirm the Court of Appeals, but we base our decision upon other grounds

This appeal involves jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Defendant/appellant, John W. Scherer, Jr. (Scherer), appeals the order of the trial court awarding plaintiff/appellee, United Agricultural Services, Inc. (Ag Services), damages for breach of contract.

In this action alleging breach of contract, the Trial Judge granted the plaintiff summary judgment for damages for breach of contract in the amount of $12,180.24. Defendant has appealed.

This is an action to enforce an arbitration award. Plaintiff/appellant, D & E Construction Company (D&E), appeals the order of the Chancery Court vacating an arbitration award rendered against defendant/appellee, Robert J. Denley Company (Denley).

Plaintiffs Kevin and Patricia Sanders appeal the trial court’s judgment which dismissed their complaint against Defendants/Appellees Lincoln County and Steve Graham, Chairman of the Lincoln County Commission, based upon the court’s rulings that the complaint failed to state an equal protection claim against the Defendants and, alternatively, that the Sanders’ equal protection claim was barred by principles of res judicata.1 We conclude that both of these rulings were in error and, thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petition in this case seeks judicial review of real property valuations established by a final order of the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission (“AAC”), a body created by the State Board of Equalization to hear “appeals regarding the assessment, classification and value of property for purposes of taxation.” T.C.A.§ 67-5-1502(a). The AAC’s order in the instant case fixed, for ad valorem tax purposes, the separate values of 15 parcels of Wayne County woodland owned by the petitioner, Willamette Industries, Inc. (“Willamette”). Upon review of the AAC’s order, the trial court held, among other things, that the appraisal methodology utilized by the AAC was not per se contrary to Tennessee law, and that the record contained substantial and material evidence to support the AAC’s valuations based upon that methodology. Accordingly, it affirmed the AAC’s order. Willamette appeals, raising the following issues for our consideration:

The Wilson County Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”) denied the petition of Wilson County Youth Emergency Shelter, Inc. (“the Shelter”) for a use on review to construct a group home on 5.46 acres of property in Wilson County. The Shelter proposes to move its existing facility in the county to the new location. On petition for certiorari, the trial court affirmed the action of the BZA. The Shelter appeals, arguing that the BZA’s decision was illegal, arbitrary, and beyond its jurisdiction. By way of a separate issue, the Shelter argues that there is no material evidence to support the BZA’s denial of its petition.