APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the workers’ compensation carrier for Mr. Hunley’s employer is subrogated, without further inquiry, to the proceeds of Mrs. Hunley’s settlement of her loss of consortium claim that arose out of the work-related injuries sustained by her husband.

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the workers’ compensation carrier for Mr. Hunley’s employer is subrogated, without further inquiry, to the proceeds of Mrs. Hunley’s settlement of her loss of consortium claim that arose out of the work-related injuries sustained by her husband.

The dispositive issues in this appeal are as follows: (1) whether the indictment in this case charging the defendant with aggravated rape is sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape, a “lesser grade” offense under this Court’s 1The defendant rais ed tw o oth er iss ues in this a ppeal: (1) whe ther th e trial c ourt e rred in refus ing to gran t the d efendant’s mo tion fo r recusal; and (2) w heth er the trial co urt er red in admitting into evidence a tape-recorded interview between the victim and the field supervisor of the Department of Human Services. Because we have reversed and remanded on other grounds, we need not address these issues in detail. However, we note that the proof in this record indicates that the trial judge was residing in a home owned by the assistant district attorney who prosecuted this case and was paying only the utilities and cable bills and not monthly rental. Under such circum stance s, recus al is appro priate. See Sup. C t. R. 10, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2(A) 4(D)(5 ), and 3(E ). We also agree w ith the defen dant that th e trial court er red in allow ing the Sta te to offer into evidence the entire tape-recorded interview of the victim by the Department of Human Services field supervisor. While the State has the right to “convey the true picture of the prior statement alleged to be inconsistent,” State v. Boyd, 797 S.W .2d 5 89, 5 93-9 4 (Te nn. 1990), this rule does not form a basis for reference to portions of the statement which were not made an issue on cross-exam ination and which are not necessa ry to convey an acc urate picture of the matters discussed on cross-examination. The trial judge could have either allowed the State to question the witness concerning her prior statement to place her testimony on cross examination into context or permitted the State to use the transcript of the DHS tape to refresh the victim’s recollection. Neither the tape nor the transcript, how ever, should have been introduced as substantive evidence in this case. decision in State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1996); and (2) if so, should this Court reconsider it decision in Trusty. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that, under Trusty, the indictment in this case would be sufficient to support a conviction for the “lesser grade” offense of spousal rape. However, upon careful reconsideration, we overrule Trusty to the extent that it recognizes “lesser grade” offenses as distinct from lesser-included offenses and permits convictions of “lesser grade” offenses that are not lesser-included offenses embraced by the indictment. In light of our overruling of Trusty, the indictment in this case is not sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape. Therefore, we vacate the defendant’s convictions, dismiss the indictments, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Defendant/appellee Brenda Burns was tried and convicted of criminal responsibility for the commission of first-degree murder in the death of her ex-husband, Paul Burns.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interview two potential defense witnesses and present the testimony of those witnesses before the jury. The State filed an Application for Permission to Appeal contesting the intermediate court’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction on that basis. The defendant filed a Cross-Application for Permission to Appeal raising, among other issues, whether the trial court had committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (i.e., first-degree murder), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-403 (1991), and solicitation to commit a criminal offense (i.e., first-degree murder), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-102 (1991). We granted both Applications in order to address these important issues.

In this inverse condemnation action, Defendant Smith County appeals the trial court’s final judgment that suggested a $15,000 additur to the $7700 verdict rendered by the jury in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Charles W. McKinney. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for a new trial on the issue of damages.

This appeal involves a pregnancy discrimination claim asserted by an employee of a Nashville pizza restaurant. After refusing to accept a temporary reassignment requested by her employer, the employee quit her job and filed suit, alleging that her employer had discriminated against her in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted the employer ’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the employee’s proof after concluding that she had not made out a prima facie case for disparate treatment because of her pregnancy. The employee asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by directing a verdict for the employer and by amending its final order on its own motion. We have concluded that the trial court correctly directed a verdict for the employer in this case and, therefore, affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Eric Larez, appeals his convictions in the Sullivan County Criminal Court on two counts of the sale of marijuana over one-half ounce and one count of the sale of over one-half gram of cocaine. He was sentenced as a Range I offender to two years confinement for each of the counts involving marijuana and nine years in that involving cocaine, all sentences to be served concurrently. He has filed a timely appeal of these convictions, alleging as error:

1. The trial court should have instructed the jury as to a“casual exchange.”
2. His rights to a speedy trial were violated by the delay of three and one-half years between his being charged with the offenses and being arrested following those charges.
3. The evidence was insufficient for a conviction as to the sale of a controlled substance.
4. He should have received a lesser or an alternative sentence.

Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal by Ms. Bogan (Appellant) from an Order of the Chancery Court for Sullivan County which reduced Mr. Bogan’s (Appellee) alimony payments to her from $2,300 monthly to $945 monthly after Appellee’s retirement

I dissent from the judgment of the majority opinion “reinstat[ing] the prior award of $2,300 monthly alimony as provided in the parties’ original divorce decree.” In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reduced Mr. Bogan’s monthly alimony obligation from $2,300 to $945. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Charles Edward Evans, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation. In 1996, the appellant was convicted of one (1) count of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine and sentenced to eight (8) years as a Range II offender. The appellant was placed on probation by the Tennessee Department of Correction in February 1998. Subsequently, the state filed a petition to revoke the appellant’s probation, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in revoking probation. After a review of the record before this Court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

In this case we consider the proper standard of appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to sever offenses under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a denial of a severance will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. We also hold that the trial 1 The first count alleged that the appellant robbed a convenience store on November 29, 1995, at 8:00 p.m. The second count alleged that ten days later on December 9, 1995, the appellant robbed a video rental store at 7:10 p.m. Counts three and four of the indictment alleged robberies of two conve nience s tores on December 10, 199 5, occu rring at 4:00 p.m. an d 4:30 p.m . respec tively. 2 court in this case abused its discretion in denying a severance because the methods used to commit the offenses were not so materially distinct or unique as to rise to an inference of identity. Because we find that this abuse of discretion was not harmless, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for new trials.

We granted this appeal to determine whether stock in a closely-held corporation is a “security,” as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (1992 Repl. & Supp. 1998)1, so that Chapter 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs its sale or transfer. In Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tenn. 1983), we concluded that closely-held stock was not a security within the meaning of Chapter 8 of the UCC. Because we have determined that the Official Comments of the 1977 version of the UCC, adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly in 1986, as well as the 1995 and 1997 amendments to the Code, overrule the reasoning in Blasingame, we now hold that closely-held stock is a security within the meaning of the UCC’s Chapter 8, and that the closely-held stock at issue in this case is governed by Chapter 8. Because the plaintiff cannot produce a signed writing that comports with the statute of frauds found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-319 (1992 Repl. & 1996 Repl.), nor can he satisfy one of the statutory exemptions, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and find in favor of the defendant.
 

We granted the appeal in this case to address the proper application of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1), which is used to sever criminal offenses. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to sever one count of child rape based upon a finding that the offense was part of a common scheme or plan. However, we also hold that the error is harmless because the appellant was acquitted on two of the three counts of child rape, and the evidence is entirely sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction on the remaining count. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.