APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The divorced mother of a minor child claimed that her former husband and his employer conspired to fraudulently understate the husband’s income, in order to defeat her attempts to have his child support obligation increased to an appropriate amount. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We reverse.

Christopher Scott Wells (“Father”) and Betty Sue Wells (“Mother”) divorced in October 1997. By the terms of their Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA), the parties had joint custody of the two children with Mother as primary custodian. Shortly after the MDA was accepted by the court, Father changed his mind. He sought custody of the children based on Mother’s relationships with men. The trial court found no change in circumstances and left custody with Mother. Because of evidence of the children’s altered behavior during their visit with Father, we find it necessary to remand the case to the trial court for a determination of the best interests of the children, including the comparative fitness of the parents at the time of the hearing on remand.

'This is an appeal by Gerald W. Smith (“Plaintiff”) under T.R.A.P. Rule 3 alleging error in the Trial Court’s granting Summary Judgment to Defendants/Appellees, Harriman Utility Board (“HUB”), HUB General Manager Richard A. Hall (“Hall”), and the City of Harriman, Tennessee (“Harriman”). Plaintiff was an employee of HUB, and after his employment was terminated filed suit for breach of contract, procurement of breach of contract in violation of T.C.A. 2 § 47-50-109, retaliatory discharge, and promissory estoppel. The Circuit Court for Roane County entered summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a suit by Plaintiffs David LeFemine and David Sanders seeking damages for breach of contract against Defendant Phillips & Jordan, Incorporated, which alleges that Defendant  Phillips & Jordan failed to provide the Plaintiffs an access road as it had by written contract agreed to do. The Trial Court dismissed the Plaintiff's proof resulting in this appeal which insists the evidence preponderates against the action of the Trial Court. We vacate the Trial Court'sjudgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

Leslie A. Lewis filed a detainer warrant in the General Sessions Court of Shelby County against John S. Muchmore and Virginia Muchmore alleging forcible entry and detainer (FED)1 or unlawful detainer. The court entered judgment for possession only and the Muchmores appealed to circuit court where the Muchmores brought a counter-complaint for specific performance of a real estate contract. Following a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, Leslie A. Lewis, restoring her to possession of the subject premises and dismissing the countercomplaint. This appeal resulted.

Lamb, Lee, Lofton, and Bailey (“Plaintiffs” or “Phoenix”) brought suit alleging breach of contract and fraudulent inducement in the Chancery Court of McNairy County, Tennessee. MegaFlight, Rosenberg, and Noel (“MegaFlight”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because a forum selection clause in the contract specified that any action must be brought in the courts of Orange County, Florida. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. Based upon the following, we reverse the lower court’s grant of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Appellant leased equipment to United American Bank (“UAB”) for a seven year term. Three years into the lease, UAB was closed by the Tennessee Commissioner of Banking and FDIC FILED February 9, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk 2 was appointed as receiver. Appellant filed a claim with FDIC seeking recovery of the full amount due on the lease. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to FDIC, thus upholding the constitutionality and applicability of T.C.A. § 45-2-1504(b), which provides that lessors can recover a maximum of two months’ lease payments after a Tennessee bank fails and is closed. In this appeal, lessor contends that T.C.A. § 45-2-1504(b) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions by treating lessors differently from other contract claimants and that the application of the statute results in an unconstitutional taking of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The essence of this appeal is whether a judgment creditor of an estate should be permitted to intervene in a marital/familial matter.

In this divorce action the wife has appealed and raises issues as to the amount of the alimony award and the division of marital property. The husband objects to an aw ard o f alimony in futuro and the Order requiring him to pay $2,047.20for the w ife’s atto rney’s fees.

This case deals with in personam jurisdiction under the Tennessee Long Arm 1 This Court originally denied the application for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appellant’s T.R.A.P. 11 application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this Court for a review on the merits. 2 Also named as a defendant is Jeff L. Walker, but he is not involved in this interlocutory appeal. 2 Statute and comes to this Court as a T.R.A.P. interlocutory appeal.1 Defendants, Jo Bursey (Bursey), Jack L. Moore (Moore), Ocean Inn, Inc. (Ocean Inn), and Dimension III Financial, Inc. (Dimension III)2, appeal the order of the trial court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant Ronald Lockhart appeals as of right from his conviction by a Hamblen County jury of driving under the influence, third offense, and driving with a revoked license. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of driving under the influence. After a careful review of the record, we find no error, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,1 this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee: Whether the omission of the official notary seal in the acknowledgment on
a Tennessee deed of trust as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-22-110, renders the instrument “null and void as to . . . subsequent creditors . . . or bona fide purchasers . . . without notice” as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-26-103. After careful consideration, we conclude that the official seal of the acknowledging notary public must be affixed to a deed of trust if that instrument is to constitute notice to subsequent creditors or bona fide purchasers. Because the deed of trust before us did not bear the official notary seal, it does not constitute notice to subsequent creditors and bona fide purchasers without notice.

We granted this appeal to decide (1) whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over criminal charges that were not addressed in juvenile court during the transfer hearing; and (2) whether the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1- 159(d) (Supp. 1999), generally eliminating the requirement for an acceptance hearing, is unconstitutional. After examining the record and considering the arguments of the parties and applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over the criminal charges transferred from juvenile court as well as over the additional charges found in the grand jury’s indictment. In addition, we conclude that the General Assembly did not act unconstitutionally in eliminating the requirement for an acceptance hearing. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In this appeal, we address several issues related to the consolidation and severance of multiple sexual abuse offenses pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 8, 13, and 14. More specifically, these issues are: (1) whether the appellant properly preserved his right to a severance of offenses under Rule 14(b)(1) by objecting to a pre-trial motion for consolidation; if so, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by improperly consolidating two indictments alleging child rape and aggravated sexual battery in a single trial; and if so, (3) whether that abuse of discretion affirmatively appears to have affected the outcome of the trial. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the appellant properly preserved his right to a severance of offenses and that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating both indictments in a single trial. Because we also hold that the trial court’s abuse of discretion affirmatively appears to have affected the outcome of the trial, we vacate the appellant’s conviction and sentence and remand this case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new trial. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part as modified and reversed in part.

This is a dispute between adjoining property owners over a tract of land which the Chancellor determined was owned by plaintiffs.

This an appeal of a Roane Chancery Court order which enjoined Appellants, Joe Parker, Mary Lynn Parker and Tiger Haven, Inc., from maintaining any Class I, wild or exotic animals, on certain parcels of land in Roane Count, and from expanding theoperation of Tiger Haven, Inc., except upon proper applicatin and approval by the County. While not as exactly stated by the parties, the issues raised on appeal aare whether (1) Appellant's refusal to rezone Appellant' property was arbitrary and capricious, (2) Appellants' use of parcel 22.06 is a pre-existing nonconforming use which may be expanded by Appellants, (3) Appellee's affirmative respresentations to Appellants and its failure to enforce its zoning ordinance for over six years estops it from now enforcing the zoning ordinances, (4) the A-2 zoning regulations are unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad (5) the A-1 zoning regulations and Appellee's actions in not rezoning Parcel 29.01 work an unreasonable discrimination against Appellant's property, and (6) the Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's motion asking that the judgment be altered or amended or a new trial had based on evidence discovered after the trial. For the reasons herein stated, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is a third appeal in this divorce action which was filed more than six years ago between plaintiff (“husband”) and defendant (“wife”).