APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves the dissolution of a seventeen-year long marriage. The parties have raised on appeal issues involving spousal support, child support, their partial marital dissolution agreement and attorney fees. Upon a review of the record and the relevant law, we find that the decision of the trial court should be reversed in part and affirmed in part.

This appeal arises from a dispute between brothers-in-law over the sale of a partnership interest in a family dairy business. After reaching an oral  agreement regarding the price of the interest to be sold, the buyer tendered $50,000 of the purchase price to the seller and later  presented a promissory note evidencing an obligation for the $61,000 balance of the sale. The seller’s home subsequently burned and the note was destroyed.  A dispute arose between the parties as to the validity of the note and the existence of an agreement. The seller  contends that the note handed to him by the buyer does not contain the true terms of the contract. He argues that his agreement was with the buyers and not with the buyer's corporation. The buyer contends that his corporation is liable on the note and not him personally. A jury found that the note was not accepted by the seller and rendered judgment against the buyer and his wife, rather than against the corporation. In reviewing the trial court’s denial of the buyer’s motion for a directed verdict, the Court of Appeals reversed the jury’s findings and held that the seller accepted the promissory note and was estopped from denying his acceptance. Accordingly, the intermediate court reversed the judgment against the buyer and his wife, finding them not to be personally liable on the promissory note. After a close review of the record, we have concluded that while the Court of Appeals correctly  reversed the judgment against the buyer’s wife, it erred by reversing the jury’s verdict with respect to the buyer personally. We therefore reinstate the jury’s verdict and judgment against the buyer.

The appellant bail bond company appeals the en banc order of the Criminal Courts of Davidson County which refused to reinstate its authority to write bail bonds. We conclude the appellant was not given proper notice of grounds relied upon for the refusal to reinstate its authority to write bonds, and the Criminal Courts of Davidson County erroneously refused to reinstate appellant's authority to write bail bonds based upon its alleged failure to notify a defendant of an arraignment date. Accordingly, the judgment refusing to reinstate appellant's ability to write bail bonds is reversed.<?xml:namespace prefix = o /?>

The defendant was convicted by a Sumner County jury of aggravated assault and attempted first degree murder. The defendant alleges on appeal that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt of aggravated assault; 2) the trial court erred in allowing victim Kevin Wynn to testify that he had previously seen the defendant with a gun; and 3) the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after testimony that the drug task force kicked in the defendant’s door on a prior occasion, and after testimony that the defendant had previously been arrested. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty in Hardin County Circuit Court to a three count indictment for theft of property, possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of a controlled substance. The defendant received an effective sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Corrections.  After seven months in Wayne County Boot Camp, he was placed on probation. A probation violation warrant was issued charging that the defendant had failed to make payments; failed to appear in court; left the state without permission; and been arrested on a new charge. Following a hearing, the probation was revoked, and the defendant timely appealed. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant Jimmie C. Spratt was convicted of aggravated rape by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a term of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant challenges his conviction and his sentence, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred when it ruled that he improperly struck potential jurors based on the jurors’ race; (2) whether the trial court should have dismissed the charges against him because there was an unnecessarily long delay between his arrest and his appearance before a magistrate; (3) whether the trial court erred when it refused to suppress a pretrial statement that he gave to police; (4) whether the trial court erred when it refused to suppress evidence that he had been identified by the victim during a physical lineup; (5) whether the trial court erred when it admitted an out of court statement by the victim into evidence; (6) whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence about the results of a DNA probability test; (7) whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State to call a rebuttal witness; (8) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (9) whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the potential range of punishment; and (10) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After a review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and we remand this matter for a new trial.

The defendant, Charles Chesteen, served as the Clerk and Master of the Cocke County  Chancery Court from 1984 to 1996. In 1997, he was charged with theft relating to his service in the capacity as conservator of funds of two elderly ladies and with unlawful conversion related to funds misappropriated by him in his official capacity. He pleaded guilty, with the sentencing determination to be made by the trial court. The court imposed an effective six-year incarcerative sentence along with restitution of $101,821.73. Upon review, we hold that the trial court erred in some of its sentencing determinations. We affirm in part, modify in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further determination regarding aspects of the sentencing issues.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the minor victims were particularly vulnerable because of their age as contemplated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(4). In my opinion, the fact that the defendant, as clerk and master, had control over the minors’ funds because they were minors rendered them no more vulnerable than any other litigant or party whose funds had been paid into court or otherwise put within the control of the clerk and master. I would not apply enhancement factor (4) to the offense of embezzlement in an official capacity.

Petitioner appeals as of right from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal Petitioner challenges only the post-conviction court’s determination that his trial counsel was effective when Petitioner entered into a guilty plea. After a de novo review, we conclude that petitioner has not established either prong of the Strickland test, and we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

This appeal involves a dispute over the existence of an easement over Defendants Fuchs’ land. Plaintiffs Page and Hanafee brought suit seeking an easement by necessity or a prescriptive easement, as well as damages for Defendants’ alleged inducement of breach of contract. The court below found that Plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement across Defendants’ property, but did not find Defendants liable for damages. Defendants appeal.
 

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s defamation case for failure to state a cause of action. The Trial Judge overruled the motion and on interlocutory appeal, we affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff filed two identical actions only days apart in Shelby County and Carroll County against the same defendants. The plaintiff non-suited and then re-filed the Carroll County action. Amended complaints were filed in both actions seeking to add a defendant. The plaintiff then asked the Shelby County trial court to transfer the action pending in Shelby County to Carroll County for consolidation. The defendant who was added argued that the Shelby County trial court should dismiss the case for improper venue and that the Carroll County trial court should grant his motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The Shelby County trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to transfer to Carroll County and the Carroll County trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The added defendant appealed. We reverse the Carroll County trial court’s denial of summary judgment and its acceptance of the Shelby County case for consolidation and remand to the Carroll County trial court to determine whether the Shelby County amended complaint was intended to supplement the original complaint or to completely replace it, and whether a named Shelby County defendant was still a defendant in the Shelby County suit when the amended complaint was filed, in order to ascertain if venue was proper as to the added defendant.