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| Eddie Limbaugh, Executor vs. Coffee Med. Center
M1999-01181-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:John W. Rollins |
Coffee County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Arthur Ray White v. Maytag Cleveland Cooking
E2000-01451-WC-R3-CV
The Second Injury Fund has appealed an award of total disability where the employer was ordered to pay 2 percent of the award and the Second Injury Fund was to pay the remaining 8 percent. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor |
White County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/13/01 | |
| Nancy Byrd v. Freshi Air Systems, Inc. (Formerly
E2000-00481-WC-R3-CV
The trial court found the plaintiff sustained a permanent psychological or mental impairment as a result of a confrontation between her and a supervisor of the defendant. The trial judge found the plaintiff sustained a fifty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the confrontation. The defendant says the evidence preponderates against the finding. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:O. Duane Sloan, Circuit Judge |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/13/01 | |
| Annette L. Hanna, et al. v. Federated Insurance Company
M2000-01967-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff's husband was killed in the course and scope of his employment and ordered the amount to which his dependants were entitled should be paid in a lump sum. The court further ordered the money to be paid into the court and that the Clerk and Master invest the funds and pay the interest earned thereon to the widow for the benefit fo the deceased's minor children. The defendant says the death benefits cannot be paid in a lump sum and further says, even if lump sum payments is permissible, the plaintiff has failed to show she can manage the money. Further, the defendant says the trial court erroneously failed to commute the award to its present value. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J. and JOSEPH C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., joined. D. Brett Burrow and Delicia R. Bryant, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys for the appellant, Federated Insurance Company. Mark A. Rassas and Julia P. North, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Annette L. Hanna, widow of the decedent, Darren D. Hanna, and as Guardian for the minor children, Brett Hanna and Marian Hanna, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Darren D. Hanna. OPINION On September 2, 1999, Darren H. Hanna died as a result of a vehicle accident. There was no dispute that the accident occurred within the scope and course of the decedent's occupation with the defendant. Mr. Hanna was survived by his widow, Annette L. Hanna, who was born November 25, 1972, and two minor children, Marian Ruth Hanna, born September 17, 1994, and Brett Darren Hanna, born March 3, 1997. On November 5, 1999, the widow filed this case against the defendant. On June 15, 2, the widow was appointed guardian of the estate of the two minor children to receive any workers' compensation benefits, and also in that order the Clerk of the Chancery Court was authorized to receive the proceeds of any compensation benefits, invest them and pay the interest to Annette K, Hanna for the care and maintenance of the two minor children. On June 27, 2, the widow filed a sworn statement renouncing any benefits from the proceeds of any workers' compensation award conditional on the money being paid into the court and invested and distributed as subsequently ordered by the trial court. On June 3, 2, the trial judge ordered the defendant to pay a lump sum of $174,416. into the court less any credits for sums previously paid, and that the Clerk and Master have control of the funds for the purpose of investment and for payments of the interest earned thereon to the widow for the benefit of the minor children. Discussion Did the trial court have authority to order a lump sum payment_yes. In Jones v. General Accident Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1993), the court held "(i)n any event, we hold today that death benefits awarded under Tennessee Code Annotated. _ 5-6-21 can be commuted to a lump sum." In Clayton v. Cookeville Energy Inc., 824 S.W.2d 167 (Tenn. 1992), the court approved a lump sum settlement to the widow, and in Ponder v. Manchester Housing Authority, 87 S.W.2d 282 (Tenn. 1994) the court approved a lump sum payment to the widow and an arrangement for the minor children's share to be paid to the clerk, invested and the interest therefrom paid to the children. The arrangement in this case is similar to the arrangement in Ponder except in this case the widow will not receive a share of the proceeds.1 Perhaps a more substantial argument is made by the defendant on the premise that the evidence does not support a lump sum award because the widow has demonstrated an inability to wisely manage a lump sum award. 1 The defendant's argument that the widow might remarry is not important because the defendant would still be liable for two-thirds of the benefit because of the two remaining children. -2-
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:James E. Walton, Judge |
Robertson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/13/01 | |
| City of Chattanooga v. Kevin Davis
E2000-00664-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Originating Judge:Douglas A. Meyer |
Hamilton County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| State vs. Michael D. Simmons
M1999-00099-SC-R11-CD
Appellant, Michael Dewayne Simmons, pled guilty to felony theft of property and aggravated robbery but reserved for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i) the following certified question of law: whether the defendant was denied his federal and state constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Simmons had not been deprived of his speedy trial right. We granted Simmons' application for permission to appeal to determine whether a speedy trial violation occurred in this case where the only prejudice allegedly resulting from the delay is the defendant's lost possibility of concurrent sentencing with a sentence imposed for a prior unrelated offense. Because the delay of twenty-three months was not egregious, the reason for the delay was negligence or administrative oversight, and the only prejudice alleged is the lost possibility of serving a concurrent sentence, we conclude that the defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Seth W. Norman |
Davidson County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Johnie N. Gibson vs. Douglas Trant, et al
M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Wheeler A. Rosenbalm |
Knox County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| Johnie N. Gibson vs. Douglas Trant, et al
M1999-00390-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:Wheeler A. Rosenbalm |
Knox County | Supreme Court | 06/13/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Earl Jefferson
W2000-00608-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the admission of three alleged hearsay statements and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/12/01 | |
| Shawn Tolliver v. State of Tennessee
W2000-00834-CCA-R3-CD
The petitioner appeals his denial of post-conviction relief and asserts that the post-conviction court incorrectly found that he received effective assistance of counsel and, thus, knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:Judge Chris B. Craft |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/12/01 | |
| George Robert Rector v. Bridgestone (U.S.A.), Inc.
M1999-02284-WC-R3-CV
The defendant, Bridgestone, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Rutherford County where the trial court awarded Mr. Rector a 5% vocational disability for a psychological injury incurred as a result of his employment and found Bridgestone responsible for the cost of future psychiatric treatment as well as the cost of psychiatric treatment previously provided by Dr. Ravi Singh. For the reasons stated in this opinion We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: James Weatherford, Sr. J.
Originating Judge:Robert E. Corlew III, Chancellor |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/11/01 | |
| Harold Liford v. Afg Industries, Inc.,
E2000-01474-WC-R3-CV
The employer and insurance company have appealed from an award of permanent total disability insisting the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding the employee's leg condition was causally related to his work injury. The employee contends the award of disability should have been determined to be of a permanent partial nature so that he would qualify for benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-242. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Ben K. Wexler, Circuit Judge |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/11/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Sharon Leming
M1999-01424-CCA-R3-CD
This is Defendant, Sharon Leming's, second appeal as of right to this Court. See State v. Leming, 3 S.W.3d 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). In both Defendant's first and second trial, a Humphreys County jury convicted her of premeditated first degree murder. After the Defendant's initial appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial due to the erroneous admission of testimony regarding statements made by the victim as to his fear of the Defendant. Following a second trial, the Defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this second appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review:1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Defendant was mentally competent to stand trial; 2) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant of first degree murder; 3) whether the trial court erroneously admitted statements by the Defendant that she would kill her husband before she would allow him to leave her; 4) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony that the Defendant had stated that she needed a gun to protect herself from friends of the deceased; and 5) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's request for a mistrial, when the trial court declined to instruct the jury that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole would require that the Defendant serve a minimum of fifty-one years. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Originating Judge:Judge Robert E. Burch |
Humphreys County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/11/01 | |
| Sheree Sapp v. Covenant Transport, Inc.,
M2000-00681-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to theSpecial Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer and its insurer contend: (1) the trial court erred in finding the employee's carpal tunnel syndrome to be work-related; (2) the trial judge's comments concerning a potential expert and matters not in evidence demonstrated bias and lack of impartiality; (3) the trial court erred in not finding the employee's unilateral initiation and selection of medical treatment and refusal to report for light duty barred any claim for temporary total, permanent partial and/or medical benefits; (4) the trial court erred in finding that adequate and proper notice of a workers' compensation claim was provided; (5) the trial court erred in assessing bad faith penalties on outstanding medical expenses, temporary total disability benefits and accrued permanent partial disability benefits; (6) the trial court erred in finding that it was appropriate that the employee's attorney put in the record counsel's attendance at the employer's medical examination, and thus attempting to bolster the testimony of the employee; and (7) the trial court's award of permanent partial disability benefits was excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the trial court erred in assessing a 25 percent penalty on accrued permanent partial disability benefits and in assessing a penalty on unpaid medical benefits, but that the judgment should otherwise be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Modified in part. LOSER, SP. J, in which BIRCH, J. and PEOPLES, SP. J., joined. Robert J. Uhorchuk, Spicer, Flynn & Rudstrom, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellants, Covenant Transport, Inc. and Travelers Insurance Companies. William Joseph Butler, Debbie C. Holliman, Farrar & Holliman, Lafayette, Tennessee, for the appellee, Sheree Sapp. MEMORANDUM OPINION At the time of the trial on February 1, 2, the employee or claimant, Sheree Sapp, was 43 years old and a high school graduate with experience as a convenience store worker and truck driver. After previously working for Covenant, she returned to work there in late May 1977. At the time, she was having general aches and pains in her hands, but had never experienced any tingling and numbness. She passed a physical examination before returning. Her duties required her to drive a truck and to help load, unload and drop trailers and refuel the tractor. By January of 1998, she was having pain, tingling and numbness in both hands. She reported the problems to her dispatcher at Covenant. She was eventually referred to Dr. Paul Abbey, whom she visited on June 12, 1998. On the same day, she notified her employer that she believed the condition was work related. The employer filed a First Report of Work Injury with the workers' compensation division of Tennessee on the same day. The employer told the claimant that she would be required to go to Chattanooga to be evaluated by a workers' compensation insurance company physician, stay in a motel and work in Covenant's offices in Chattanooga to have any chance of collectingworkers' compensation benefits. The claimant lives in Smith County, a drive of more than 15 miles from Chattanooga. She refused to drive to Chattanooga for an examination and evaluation. She received a letter from John Orum, a claims representative representing Covenant, denying workers' compensation benefits because, he said, ". . . After a careful review of your claim for Workers' Compensation benefits, we have determined that your carpal tunnel syndrome did not arise out of your employment with Covenant Transport, Inc." The letter was dated July 13, 1998. It is undisputed in the record that the claimant told Sheila Simpson-Murray, workers' compensation manager for Covenant, on June 12, 1998, that she had a work-related injury. At trial, Mr. Orum admitted that he actually made no investigation of the claim and that normally he would call the employee, the employer and the physician. He did not call Ms. Sapp or Dr. Abbey before denying this claim. The record contains conflicting evidence as to whether Ms. Murray offered the claimant a panel of three physicians from which to choose a treating one. The claimant says she did not; Ms. Murray says she did, but concedes all three were in Chattanooga, and admits she never offered the name of a treating physician as close to Smith County as Nashville, all on the advice of Orum. Additionally, the only light duty offered to the claimant was in Chattanooga. The claimant did not wish to drive all the way to Chattanooga for light duty work or medical care. Dr. Abbey continued to treat the claimant and eventually performed carpal tunnel surgery on both arms. She continued to have problems after surgery. The doctor's testimony regarding causation, though equivocal, was that the claimant's condition could have been work-related. Our independent examination of the record reveals no evidence that the injury resulted from an occurrence that was not work-related. Dr. Cornelius J. Mance, a neurologist, examined the claimant and found no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome, but said he regularly saw truck drivers with the condition and would defer -2-
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J
Originating Judge:J. O. Bond, Judge |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/11/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel T. Williams
M1999-00790-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon for shooting a man to death in an automobile shop. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder. Specifically, the defendant contends that the State failed to offer sufficient proof of the victim's cause of death. In support of his claim, he argues that the autopsy report, which states the cause of death as multiple gunshot wounds, was improperly admitted into evidence, that the medical examiner never directly testified that the victim died of gunshot wounds, and that no other evidence was presented to prove cause of death. After a thorough review, we conclude that the defendant waived any objection to the admission of the autopsy report by his failure to object at trial, and further, that sufficient evidence, other than the autopsy report, was presented to show that the victim died as the result of gunshot wounds. Consequently, the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Judge Seth W. Norman |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/11/01 | |
| Mary Louise Goodman Case, v. Billy Ray Case
M2000-00547-COA-R3-CV
This is a divorce case. The parties were married for twenty-five years and had no children. The wife was employed full-time and had a pension, and the husband was unemployed and disabled. The trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct by the husband, classified and divided the marital property without determining the value of the wife's pension, and made no provision for spousal support for the husband. The husband appeals. We affirm the grant of the divorce to the wife and affirm the decision not to award alimony to the husband. We reverse in part and remand for the trial court to classify the wife's pension plan as marital property, determine its value, and equitably divide it between the parties.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Originating Judge:Judge Clara W. Byrd |
Wilson County | Court of Appeals | 06/08/01 | |
| Roderick D. Cobb v. State of Tennessee
W1999-00655-CCA-R3-CD
The issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court properly denied the Appellant/Petitioner's post-conviction petition? After a review of the record in this cause, the briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Authoring Judge: Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Originating Judge:Judge Chris B. Craft |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/08/01 | |
| Bruce Hardin v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois
W2000-01966 WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant, Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois (Travelers) appeals that part of the trial court's judgment which ordered Travelers to pay to the plaintiff, Bruce Hardin (Hardin) and his attorney, $28,652.23 the total of Hardin's medical expenses and required Hardin's attorney to satisfy Blue Cross and Blue Shield's subrogation lien. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court requiring the payment of the total medical expenses and remand for a determination of the amount of medical expenses paid by Hardin. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded W. MICHAEL MALOAN, SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J. and JOE C. LOSER, JR. SP. J., joined. Mary Peterson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois. Ricky Boren, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Bruce Hardin. MEMORANDUM OPINION The relevant facts are not in dispute. Hardin filed a claim for workers' compensationbenefits for an April 1998 fall at his place of employment, Young Radiator. The employer's insurance carrier, Travelers, provided benefits including medical treatment for some period of time but, after an investigation, denied liability and ceased any benefits. Hardin continued to receive medical treatment which was paid in part by him and by his group health insurance carrier, Blue Cross and Blue Shield. At trial, the parties stipulated Hardin's total medical expenses of $28,652.23 were reasonable and necessary. The trial court found Hardin's claim to be compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits of forty-three (43) percent to the body as a whole. Further, the trial court ordered Travelers to pay to Hardin and his attorney the total of his medical expenses of $28,652.23 and for them to satisfyBlue Cross and Blue Shield'ssubrogation interest. Travelers appeals this part of the trial court's order. The scope of review of questions of law is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Cunningham v Shelton Sec. Services, Inc., 958 S.W.2d 338, 34 (Tenn. 1997). The sole issue of this appeal is the authority of the trial court to order Travelers to paythe total medical expenses to Hardin and his attorney. This issue was considered in the recent case of State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v Hurley, 31 S.W.3d 562, 565 (Tenn. Sp. Workers' Comp. 2). The Special Workers' Compensation Panel of the Supreme Court held as follows: We find this issue is controlled by the language of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-24(a)(1) and by the Tennessee Supreme Court decision of Staggs v National Health Corp., 924 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tenn. 1996). Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-24(a)(1) provides in part: The employer or employer's agent shall furnish free of charge to the employee such medical and surgical treatment, medicine, medical and surgical supplies, . . . made reasonably necessary by accident, . . . as may be reasonably required;. . . . In Staggs, 924 S.W.2d at 81, the Supreme Court held as follows: An employee is not entitled to personally receive payment for medical expenses unless he or she personally paid the medical expenses and is due reimbursement. Instead, employers must pay the providers of medical care directly for incurred medical expense. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 31 S.W.3d at 565. Hardin attempts to distinguish the present case from State Auto by the fact he paid a portion of the premiums to his group health insurance carrier, Blue Cross and Blue Shield. He relies on the following language in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-114(b): (b) However, any employer may set off from temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent partial and permanent total disability benefits any payment made to an employee under an employer funded disability plan for the same injury; provided, that the disability plan permits such an offset.... -2-
Authoring Judge: W. Michael William Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Joe C. Morris, Chancellor |
Hardin County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/08/01 | |
| M.S. Carriers, Inc. v. Robert Wood
W2000-00841-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. As discussed below, we affirm the trial court's judgment. FACTUAL BACKGROUND At trial, Robert Wood, age forty-nine (49), a resident of Clinton, Arkansas, testified that he had finished the 1th grade, but he has not received a GED. Until his truck accident, the Respondent had been employed by M.S. Carriers, Inc. ("Carriers"), as an over-the-road truck driver for three and one-half (3_) years. He stated that on June 25, 1996, during the early morning hours, he entered an on ramp on an interstate in Perryville, Maryland, when "I had a paper load that shifted, and it took me off -- laid the tractor and trailer over on its side." Carriers assisted him in returning to Memphis, Tennessee, where he was seen by Dr. Bruce Randolph on June 27, 1996. Dr. Randolph set the Respondent up for physical therapy. Next, the Respondent saw a Dr. Thomas Eans, in Little Rock, Arkansas, with the permission of Carriers. After an MRI, Dr. Eans referred the Respondent to Dr. Blankenship. Here, the Respondent testified that he wanted to see a Dr. Peek, from a list of doctors furnished by Carriers, but Carriers refused and wanted him to be seen by Dr. Scott Schlesinger. Dr. Schlesinger ordered no tests but set the Respondent up with a work hardening program and FCE (functional capacity evaluation). After two visits, Dr. Schlesinger released the Respondent in November of 1996. The Respondent testified that he returned to see Dr. Eans in January 1997. In the interim, Carriers had notified the Respondent that he would not be receiving any more medical treatment or be able to see any more doctors, and that they were not authorizing it, although he had requested additional treatment. According to the Respondent, Dr. Eans referred him to Dr. Schock, an orthopedic surgeon and back specialist. After a discogram, Dr. Schock operated on the Respondent for two herniated discs in July of 1997. Since his surgery, the Respondent has attempted to find employment at various places, but has been unsuccessful. The Respondent testified1 that he still has trouble with too much sitting or standing, and is somewhat incapable of really bending or stooping. He estimates that he can lift between ten (1) or fifteen (15) pounds without too much discomfort. During cross-examination, the Respondent conceded that he was upset and thought that it was somewhat unfair for Carriers to terminate him as a result of the accident. Also, after release from Dr. Schlesinger, Respondent did not speak to Pat Aeschliman, a workers' compensation adjuster for Carriers about continuing medical treatment from Dr. Eans, or surgery performed byDr. Schock. Mrs. Halle S. Wood, wife of the Respondent, testified that they have been married twenty- seven (27) years, and prior to his surgery her husband was in an extreme amount of pain, and had problems walking and getting around. She stated that since the surgery, her husband is doing much better. 1Wood's injury occurred on June 25, 1996. The trial of this action was held on March 1, 1999, and the case was taken under advisement. The trial court's order was entered on March 1, 2. We point out that workers' compensation cases are granted priority over all other cases on both the trial and appellate dockets. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(f)(1). -2-
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Karen R. Williams, Judge |
Shelby County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/08/01 | |
| Charles Edward Taylor v. State of Tennessee
W2000-02167-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his jury conviction of aggravated robbery, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Originating Judge:Judge Lee Moore |
Dyer County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/07/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Jerry Maxwell
W2000-01947-CCA-R3-CD
Defendant, the attorney for the Dyer Industrial Development Board, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of theft over $60,000 and theft over $1,000. On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge J. Steven Stafford |
Gibson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/07/01 | |
| Danny Ray Lacy v. State of Tennessee
W2000-01898-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we hold that the record supports the post-conviction court's finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to obtain the 911 tape; was not ineffective in preparing a defense; was not ineffective for failing to introduce fingernail samples taken from the petitioner; and was not ineffective for failing to adequately develop the victim's mother as a suspect.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:Judge Joe C. Morris |
Madison County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 06/07/01 | |
| Everett E. Hollingsworth v. Crouch Lumber Company
W2000-01214-SC-WCM-CV
In this appeal, the employer insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee is permanently and totally disabled and in favor of a minimal award of permanent partial disability benefits. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Originating Judge:C. Creed Mcginley, Judge |
Benton County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/06/01 | |
| James L. Kirchner vs. Jacqueline Kirchner
M2000-02102-COA-R3-CV
The trial court granted the husband a divorce, divided his military pension between the parties, and awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony. The wife argued on appeal that she should have been given a greater share of the husband's pension, and that the alimony award was inadequate. We affirm the property division and the amount of the alimony award, but remand this case to the trial court for a determination of whether a change of circumstances would entitle the wife to an extension in the duration of the award.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Originating Judge:Chancellor Carol A. Catalano |
Montgomery County | Court of Appeals | 06/05/01 | |
| Danny Hudson v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies
W2000-00342-WC-R3-CV
The plaintiff, Danny Hudson, appeals the judgment of the trial court that found that the plaintiff had failed to carry his burden of proof in establishing that his medical condition was caused by the work-related accident of August 21, 1996 and dismissed his claim. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Joe C. Morris, Jr., Chancellor |
Madison County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/05/01 |