APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner's first post-conviction petition was dismissed in 1996, the petitioner, apparently, having been released from custody before the hearing and not appearing at the hearing to testify. Back in custody, at some point, he filed in 2000 a motion to reopen his petition, which was denied. He then filed an untimely appeal from that dismissal and proceeded, on appeal, as if the motion had been granted and the issues were those raised in his 1996 petition. Based upon our review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed because it was untimely.

The defendant, Derrick Bryant, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.  In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by (1)  failing to suppress his confession; (2) denying his last requested continuance; (3) accepting transfer of the case from the juvenile court; and (4) excluding evidence of the victim's reputation for violence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was indicted for robbery and convicted of misdemeanor theft, for which she was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, and payment of restitution, with the defendant to serve thirty percent of the sentence. She timely appealed, arguing that the entire sentence should have been probated. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Linda G. Robison, appeals from the revocation of her probation. She contends that her probation expired before the revocation warrant issued, thereby divesting the trial court of the power to revoke her probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Earl Johnson, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In this appeal, Defendant argues insufficiency of the evidence, improper investigative procedures by the police, errors by the trial court regarding admissibility of evidence and jury instructions, improper comments by the prosecutor during closing argument, sentencing errors, and ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On July 18, 1997, the Defendant, Randall Lloyd Hill, was convicted of one count of incest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of five years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that (1) his incest conviction subjected him to double jeopardy, (2) he was convicted solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, (3) the trial court erred in allowing inappropriate opinion testimony from a child abuse investigator, and (4) the Defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutor's improper comments regarding the Defendant's decision not to testify. Because we conclude that the prosecutor improperly commented on the Defendant's election not to testify, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

Plaintiffs action against First Tennessee Bank National Association (“Bank”) was held to be time-barred by the Trial Judge pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §47-3-118. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court.

The defendant, Carl F. Neer, pleaded guilty in the Anderson County Criminal Court to a fourth-offense possession of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance, and attempted to appeal a certified question of law. Because we are constrained to conclude that he has not properly presented his certified question, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, John Blacksmith, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of second-offense driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). He claims (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's conclusion that, while intoxicated, he was in physical control of an operable motor vehicle and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when a state's witness introduced inadmissible evidence that besmirched the defendant's character. We discern no reversible error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

This case arises from a home construction contract entered into by Appellants and Appellee. Appellants filed a complaint against Appellee in the Chancery Court for Coffee County for breach of contract. Appellee filed an answer and counter-complaint. The trial court found that the contract was a cost-plus contract with no cap or ceiling on the price, and rendered judgment in favor of Appellee for $26,945.10. Appellants appeal. We affirm the trial court.

Alonzo Chatman appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's revocation of his probationary sentence. Because the lower court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation and ordering the original sentence into execution, we affirm.

This lawsuit arises out of a real estate contract. The plaintiff, Chuck Robertson, a residential home builder, contracted to purchase sixteen (16) lots from the defendant, Melvin George. After the parties entered into the contract, the plaintiff discovered that the official flood plain designation had been adjusted to include nine (9) of the lots the plaintiff contracted to purchase and filed suit on the theories of intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, mutual mistake, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The defendants filed a counter-complaint for breach of contract. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action holding that the mistake was a mistake of law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This is a post-judgment domestic relations case. The principal alleged issue is whether a non-custodial parent may be judicially coerced to exercise visitation privileges. The appealed Order is not imperative and the asserted issue is not a genuine one. Because the judgment is marginally ambiguous we modify it to incorporate a measure of fairness.

The mother of a seven-year-old daughter asserts that the court awarded custody of the child to the father because the mother is homosexual. We find, however, that the court did not base its award on sexual orientation and that the evidence in the record supports the award of custody to the father. Therefore, we affirm.

A divorce judgment rendered June 5, 1992 required the appellant to pay, inter alia, the sum of $185,000 to his wife "as a fair and equitable division of the marital property." The appellant elected recalcitrance rather than compliance, and failed to pay. He was found in civil contempt in September 2000 and ordered to be confined until he purged himself of contempt. We affirm.

The mother ("Mother") and stepfather ("Stepfather") of a minor child ("Child") filed a Petition to Terminate the parental rights of the Child's biological father ("Father"). The Petition to Terminate alleged one ground for termination of Father's parental rights, abandonment. After three hearings, the Juvenile Court held that the Petition to Terminate should be dismissed because Mother and Stepfather failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child and because termination of Father's parental rights would not be in the Child's best interests. Mother and Stepfather appeal. We affirm.

We granted review in these consolidated cases to determine (1) whether William Andrew Dixon’s sentence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2603 (1975) is void and thus subject to habeas corpus relief; and (2) whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(c) (1997) applies to Dixon’s sentence. We hold that Dixon’s sentence is void and grant habeas corpus relief. We further hold that Dixon is entitled to any sentence reduction credits earned from 1988 until 1998. Our grant of habeas corpus relief pretermits the remaining issues raised by Dixon.1 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the criminal court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2Both convictions stem from the abduction of Jodie Gaines in 1978. Dixon originally pled guilty to both counts in exchange for consecutive sentences of thirty-five ye ars for the kidnapping for ransom and five years for the commission of a felony by use of a firearm. Dixon’s guilty pleas were vacated during post-conviction relief proceedings, and he was then tried by a jury. 3Dixon received a sentence of five years for the commission of a felony by use of a firearm. This sentence, however, is not at issue in the present appeal. 4The Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) originally calculated Dixon’s sentence without parole. When the TDOC later computerized inmate records, Dixon’s sentence was inadvertently classified as life with possibility of parole. Section 41-21-236(c)(3) of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that “[a]ny person who committed a felony . . . prior to December 11, 1985, may become eligible for the sentence reduction credits . . . by signing a written waiver waiving the right to serve the sentence under the law in effect at the time the crime was committed.” (1985). Because of the computer error, Dixon was perm itted to receive sentence reduction credits. -2- Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed; Case Remanded.
 

The defendant pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court ordered a split confinement with thirty days in jail, and the balance to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her full probation. After careful review, we affirm the defendant's sentence but remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment.

This case arises from an automobile accident resulting in personal injuries to plaintiffs. The defendants, Mr. & Mrs. Ruiz, filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that their cousin, Mr. Corpus, was driving their vehicle without their permission or knowledge at the time of the accident. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiffs appeal. Plaintiffs assert that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-311, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based solely on their own self-serving affidavits and depositions. We affirm the summary judgment

The Petitioner was convicted by a Sevier County jury of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and to twenty-five years incarceration for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The Petitioner appealed, and the convictions were affirmed by our Court. The Petitioner then filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court. The Petitioner now appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Concluding that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Four physicians formed a PLLC. Eventually personal and professional conflicts arose. Various claims were asserted that Drs. Brown and Barton had violated the Operating Agreement of the PLLC; Dr. Brunsting sought declaratory relief, and monetary damages for breaches of contract and fiduciary duty; Dr. Rankin alleged that Drs. Brown and Barton had effectively withdrawn from the PLLC. The Chancellor found the Drs. Brown and Barton by their actions constructively withdrew from the PLLC which he declined to dissolve. The fees awarded to the plaintiff's attorneys are the principal issue on appeal, together with issues involving the continuing viability of the PLLC.

I do not believe that the prima facie evidence created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311 can be overcome as a matter of law solely by the affidavits and testimony of owners of a vehicle who have a vital interest in the outcome of the case.