APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court of Knox County and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is reversible error in the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Elton Donald Bowers, also known as Rashid Qawwi, was convicted of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of the robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-307. The trial court ordered the weapons conviction merged with the aggravated robbery, classified the defendant as a career offender, and imposed a thirty-year sentence.

The appellant, Robert Willis Chance, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences were to be served concurrently. The Hardin County Circuit Court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years for each conviction. In his sole issue, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing twenty-three year sentences because of the misapplication of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (1995 Supp.), regarding the presumptive sentence of a class A felony.

Defendant appeals from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the State of Tennessee never surrendered jurisdiction over defendant and that defendant's sentence did not expire. We accordingly affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The defendant was tried and convicted of second degree murder in the Cumberland County Criminal Court in connection with an aggravated assault of a bar patron who died approximately one month later. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to 25 years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on "diminished capacity" and with the length of the sentence he received. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment below.

Eldred L. Reid (Plaintiff) sued Jason Petty (Defendant) for “pain and suffering with mental stress” alleged to have resulted from the defendant’s failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s request for pain medication. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendant on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that the defendant was immune pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8- 307(h).

This is a domestic relations case. The issues are whether the evidence preponderates against (1) an award of alimony in futuro to the appellee, (2) the finding that an alleged loan to the parties was intended as a gift, (3) an award of attorney’s fees.
 

Plaintiff, Gary Bernard Sanders, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) at the Cold Creek Correctional Facility, appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendant, Jimmie L. Jones, a correctional officer at  the facility.¹

In this divorce action, the Plaintiff, Lawrence Woodward Hamilton, filed his petition 2 for divorce on July 20, 1993. The Defendant, Brenda Kay Smith Hamilton, filed a countercomplaint seeking a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted the Defendant’s request for a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded the parties’ marital residence as well as household furnishings to the Defendant. The Plaintiff was ordered to pay all outstanding marital debts other than the first and second mortgage on the marital residence, all expenses incurred by the Defendant as a result of this action including the Defendant’s attorney fees and $2,200.00 per month in permanent alimony. The trial court awarded the Defendant onehalf of the Plaintiff’s retirement proceeds and ordered the Plaintiff to maintain the Defendant on his health insurance policy for three years. The trial court further ordered the Plaintiff to maintain a $50,000.00 life insurance policy naming the Defendant as the irrevocable beneficiary. The Plaintiff has appealed the judgment of the trial court arguing that the trial court erred in awarding the Defendant permanent alimony and attorney fees. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a domestic relations case. The issues are whether the evidence preponderates against (1) an award of alimony in futuro to the appellee, (2) the finding that an alleged loan to the parties was intended as a gift, (3) an award of attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff, Mike G. Pauley, an inmate at the Madison County Penal Farm (Penal Farm), appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his pro se complaint against the defendants, 1 Plaintiff filed suit against Madison County, Madison County Penal Farm, David Woolfork, the Madison County Sheriff and Penal Farm Superintendent, Captain Jackson, the Penal Farm’s Head Controller and Acting Warden, Sergeant Jered, the first shift sergeant, Sergeant Evans, the third shift sergeant, Officer Steven Horner, and Officer Cleo King in their official and individual capacities. 2 4which include Madison County, the Penal Farm, and several of the Penal Farm’s personnel.1

This appeal from the Washington County Chancery Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of an expert witness in accordance with a local rule. The Appellant, Jami Allyson Ross Carter, appeals the decision of the Chancery Court. We vacate the decision of the Trial Court.

The Defendant was convicted by a Bradley County jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; (4) that the jury considered extraneous facts during deliberation and that the trial court erred in the manner in which it conducted a post-trial voir dire of the jury concerning this matter; and (5) that he was improperly sentenced. Having reviewed the record, we conclude (1) that sufficient evidence was presented to support the Defendant's conviction for second degree murder; (2) that the trial court did not err by allowing the Defendant's statement into evidence; (3) that the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; (4) that the record does not support the Defendant's allegation that jurors in his case were influenced by extraneous information and that the manner in which the trial court conducted a post-trial voir dire of the jurors concerning this matter was not improper; and (5) that the Defendant was properly sentenced. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of CriminalAppeals erred by denying the petitioner’s motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. In hismotion, the petitioner asserted that new evidence establishes that he is mentally retarded and,therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203, which prohibits theexecutionof the mentally retarded. The petitioner also argued on appeal that the Eighth Amendmentto the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals.

In this action, Plaintiff Eddie Heath (“Heath”) filed a pro se complaint for declaratory judgment to determine whether he provides a taxable service under the Business Tax Act. Heath brought suit against A.C. Gilless (“Gilless”), the Shelby County Sheriff, Jayne S. Creson (“Creson”), the Shelby County Clerk, as well as two employees of the Shelby County Clerk’s Office, Waylon Wininger (“Wininger”) and Pat Hutchinson (“Hutchinson”). The trial court dismissed Heath’s complaint, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.

The plaintiff’s employer had a generous profit-sharing plan to which the plaintiff was not required to contribute. The trial judge declined to treat this fund as marital property because the “plaintiff didn’t earn it, and the defendant didn’t contribute to it.”

I concur with the results of the Court’s opinion. Based on my independent review of the evidence both in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, I have determined that the six plaintiffs have not produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the reasons given by the University of Tennessee Space Institute for the adverse employment actions taken against each of the plaintiffs were pretextual or that the employment actions were taken for prohibited reasons.

Defendant Ashland Healthcare Center, Inc. (Ashland), appeals the judgment entered against it in this breach of contract action. The contract at issue was between Plaintiff/Appellee Southern Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. (Southern Rehab), andOakmont Healthcare Center (Oakmont). In imposing liability against Ashland, the trial court ruled that Pete Prins, the administrator of Oakmont and an employee of third-party defendant Monarch Nursing Homes, Inc. (Monarch), had the authority to bind Ashland to the contract between Southern Rehab and Oakmont. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse the judgment against Ashland and remand for further proceedings.

This is a divorce case involving an Illinois decree. An Illinois court granted a divorce to the husband and awarded the marital residence in Tennessee to the husband. The Tennessee trial court enforced the Illinois court’s award of property, and the wife appeals. Because the Illinois court did not have personal jurisdiction over the wife, we reverse and remand.

This case involves an action to recover on a loan guarantee. The trial court entered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff bank against the individual guarantor. We affirm.

In this unlawful detainer action, Defendant Michael D. Figlio appeals the trial court’s final judgment which held that Plaintiff/Appellee Prism Partners, L.P., had free and clear 2 title to the subject property, ordered Figlio to vacate the subject property, and dismissed Figlio’s counterclaim for conspiracy. The trial court’s judgment also dismissed Figlio’s thirdparty complaint for fraud and conspiracy against Third-Party Defendant/Appellee Larry Cherry. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment, and we remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the adequacy of a conservator’s accounting of a disabled person’s estate. After the conservator filed her final accounting in the Probate Court of Davidson County, the personal representative of the disabled person’s estate objected to the accuracy and completeness of the accounting. The probate court conducted a bench trial and approved the conservator’s amended final accounting. On this appeal, the personal representative asserts that the final accounting was irregular and that the conservator has failed to account for all of the disabled person’s funds. We have determined that the conservator’s final accounting cannot be reconciled and, therefore, that the order approving the final accounting must be vacated.

I concur with the court’s conclusion that The Application Group, Inc. is entitled to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) relief under the facts of this case. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to state that I do not concur with the court’s sweeping conclusion that “Rule 60.02(1) relief should be granted when the lawyer realizes his [or her] oversight and takes steps to correct it.” I know of no precedent for the notion that efforts to correct an error, by themselves, are always enough to entitle a lawyer to post-judgment relief. They are only one of the many factors to consider when engaging in the fact-intensive analysis required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1).