APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, James Thomas Page, appeals as of right from the Chester County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and received the agreed, forty-year sentence as a 100% violent offender. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not understand what was happening at the guilty plea hearing. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Corey L. Milliken, pled guilty to two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of aggravated robbery. His agreed sentence was two concurrent life sentences for the murders and a consecutive twelve year term for the aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of life plus twelve years. The Defendant timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. After a hearing the trial court denied relief and the Defendant appealed as of right. Finding no error in the trial court's ruling on the Defendant's petition, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Timothy L. Robertson, was indicted on two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell; one count of felony possession of a weapon; and one count of driving on a revoked or suspended license. Following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, he pled guilty to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to resell, a Class B felony, and one count of felony possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. In accordance with the terms of his plea bargain agreement, the remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant reserved the right to appeal as a dispositive question of law the issue of whether his custodial arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-7-118(b)(1)(c). We conclude that the officers were required to make a custodial arrest of the defendant to prevent his continued violation of the driver's license law, and that the subsequent search of his vehicle was valid as incident to that arrest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Chauncey E. Gray, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Chester County Circuit Court of forgery, a Class E felony, and theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to a four-year sentence for the forgery to be served in the Department of Correction, imposed a $1,500 fine, and ordered $400 in restitution. It imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent for the theft to be served concurrently and a $1,250 fine. The defendant contends that his effective four-year sentence is excessive and that he should have received a sentencing alternative to confinement. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

This appeal involves the custody of a four-year-old girl. After slightly more than two years of marriage, the mother filed a divorce petition in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County requesting custody of the parties’ only child. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and awarded custody to the mother. The husband asserts on this appeal that he is comparatively more fit than the mother to have custody. We agree and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s award of custody to the mother.

This is an action by the appellant, Cultra Landscaping Supply Company (Cultra), seeking to recover the balance allegedly due on an open account. Cultra’s complaint, as amended, was filed against the Director of Highways, Department of Transportation, W. L. Sharpe Contracting Company, Inc. (Sharpe) and Charles Hill, individually and d/b/a C. H. Hill Landscape and 2The Director of Highways was named as a defendant pursuant to T.C.A. § 54-5-124 (civil actions against contractors by claimants). Cultra’s complaint states that it “seeks no remedies” against Sharpe, but acts to put the latter “on notice” of said claim having been filed with the Department of Transportation. Prior to trial, a summary judgment was entered in favor of Sharpe. The order granting summary judgment provided that the State of Tennessee and the Department of Transportation were to retain certain funds to satisfy Cultra’s claim in the event it proved meritorious at trial, in accordance with T.C.A. § 54-5-123. After trial, an agreed order was entered with this Court dismissing the Department of Transportation, Director of Highways as a party. 2 Excavating (Hill). For purposes of this appeal, however, the only other party before us is Hill, the appellee.2 A bench trial resulted in a judgment for Hill. Cultra appeals on the sole basis that the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court’s findings. For reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm.

This is an unemployment compensation case. Petitioner, Loretta Trull, appeals from the order of the chancery court dismissing her petition for certiorari and affirming the decision of the Board of Review that disallowed her claim for unemployment compensation benefits.

The Defendant appeals a judgment entered by the Blount County Circuit Court awarding the Plaintiffs discretionary costs including attorney fees. This appeal arises from an earlier action (second lawsuit) seeking specific performance of a settlement agreement resolving the original lawsuit filed by the Defendant.

This is a Rule 9 appeal from a judgment denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The issue is whether an insurance agent has the apparent authority to waive the conditions for issuance of a policy and the limitations on his authority as contained in the application for the policy. We hold that the agent has no such authority and therefore grant the motions for summary judgment.

Pursuant to the wife's motion under Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., the trial court amended the division of the husband's Navy pension contained in an agreed order of divorce. We reverse the trial court's judgment.

We accepted this extraordinary appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 10, to review certain pre-hearing actions of the Davidson County Criminal Court in this post-conviction case. Our grant of review extends to these issues: (1) whether a "next friend" may file a post-conviction petition on behalf of an incompetent prisoner; (2) if so, may the post-conviction court, sua sponte, order a mental evaluation of the prisoner or conduct other inquiries into the matter to determine whether the "next friend" petition was properly filed on the prisoner's behalf; and (3) whether the court below properly denied the petitioner's motion for recusal. We conclude that we improvidently granted extraordinary review in part, but we otherwise affirm the rulings of the lower court and remand for further proceedings.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Joseph Arbuckle, of one count of driving under the influence, one count of driving under the influence, per se, and one count of driving under
the influence, second offense. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but sixty days suspended. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test, (2) admitting the blood alcohol test results despite
incomplete evidence of the chain of custody, (3) admitting the blood alcohol test results despite a lack of relevance, and (4) finding that sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to find the Defendant guilty. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this wrongful death action, Plaintiff-Appellant Mary Kindred (Plaintiff), on her own behalf and as next of kin of Marcus Briggs, appeals the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Defendants-Appellees Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, Willie Anderson, and Raybon Hawkins (Defendants).

Appellant, Dr. Alexander C. Wells, was a professor at Tennessee State University ("TSU"). He was relieved of his teaching duties in 1992 and was asked to remove his property from the office and laboratory space he occupied at TSU. He moved some of his belongings in 1995. His remaining belongings were boxed and moved to the campus warehouse in 1996 because the space had been reassigned. When he retrieved his belongings in 1997, he found several items missing. Appellant then brought a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission asking the State of Tennessee to return his property or, in the alternative, give him monetary compensation for the lost items. The Commission held that TSU had not been negligent in the care, custody and control of appellant's property. Therefore, the State was not liable for the missing property. We affirm the decision of the Commission.

In this suit wherein the Plaintiff, Thomas a. Smythe, seeks damages against the Defendant, Donald Cowan, for willfully interfering with contractual relations between Mr. Smythe and Phil Jones, the Trial Court granted summary judgment because in his opinion the Statute of Limitations barred the claim asserted. We affirm.

The defendant appeals from his convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, resisting arrest and criminal impersonation. The only issue raised by the defendant is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault. Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that the co-defendant's conduct amounted to aggravated assault and that the defendant, as a party to the offense, was criminally responsible for that conduct. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a suit for damages against an insurance company for the alleged breach of a lawyer’s professional liability insurance policy. Plaintiff, Glenn McColpin, appeals from the judgment of the chancery court for the defendant, North Atlantic Casualty & Surety Insurance 2 Company, Inc. (hereinafter, “North Atlantic”).

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of CriminalAppeals erred by denying the petitioner’s motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. In hismotion, the petitioner asserted that new evidence establishes that he is mentally retarded and,therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203, which prohibits theexecutionof the mentally retarded. The petitioner also argued on appeal that the Eighth Amendmentto the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of mentally retarded individuals.

This appeal from the Washington County Chancery Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of an expert witness in accordance with a local rule. The Appellant, Jami Allyson Ross Carter, appeals the decision of the Chancery Court. We vacate the decision of the Trial Court.

With its decision today, a majority of this Court has effectively permitted a defendant, who was sentenced to death in 1989 for the brutal execution of a 74-year-old grandmother, an opportunity to escape the ultimate punishment for his actions solely because he has managed to obtain a lower score on a revised I.Q. test than he was previously able to do. Before today, the Constitution of this State has never been held to provide blanket capital immunity to a class of persons based only on the fact of low intellectual ability and deficits in adaptive behavior. Instead, the Constitution has barred such executions only when the defendant’s mental condition displaces the following capacities: (1) the cognitive capacity to appreciate that certain action will lead to the death of others; (2) the moral capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of murder; or (3) the volitional capacity to behave in a lawful manner.

The Defendant was convicted by a Bradley County jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; (4) that the jury considered extraneous facts during deliberation and that the trial court erred in the manner in which it conducted a post-trial voir dire of the jury concerning this matter; and (5) that he was improperly sentenced. Having reviewed the record, we conclude (1) that sufficient evidence was presented to support the Defendant's conviction for second degree murder; (2) that the trial court did not err by allowing the Defendant's statement into evidence; (3) that the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; (4) that the record does not support the Defendant's allegation that jurors in his case were influenced by extraneous information and that the manner in which the trial court conducted a post-trial voir dire of the jurors concerning this matter was not improper; and (5) that the Defendant was properly sentenced. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.