APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Marvin Anthony Mathews, is currently serving a life sentence as an habitual criminal as a result of a larceny conviction. He filed for post-conviction relief, which petition the post-conviction court dismissed because of its untimeliness. The petitioner now appeals this ruling, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding the petition to be time-barred because the petitioner is serving an illegal sentence. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted this appeal to determine the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, in reviewing the denial of pretrial diversion, erred by considering evidence presented at trial and failing to limit its review to evidence considered by the district attorney general; and (2) whether the trial court applied the correct standard in reviewing the district attorney general’s denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authority, we hold that in reviewing the denial of pretrial diversion, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to limit its review to the evidence that was considered by the district attorney general and any factual disputes resolved by the trial court. We also hold that in considering the petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court failed to apply the proper standard of review, which requires that it determine whether the district attorney general has considered and weighed all of the relevant factors and whether there is substantial evidence to support the district attorney general’s decision. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court to apply the appropriate standard of review.

An abuse of discretion in denying pretrial diversion should be found only when the record
shows an absence of any substantial evidence supporting the district attorney general’s decision.
State v. Pinkham, 955 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 356
(Tenn. 1983). When the reasons cited by the district attorney general are sufficient to support the
denial of pretrial diversion, I would hold that there is no abuse of discretion in the district attorney
general’s failure to make specific reference to every non-statutory, judicially-imposed factor. I
continue to adhere to my separate opinion in State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 153 (Tenn. 1999), and
therefore must respectfully dissent.

The Defendant, Javon Webster, was convicted of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in the Department of Correction for the felony murder conviction. The trial court merged the Defendant's attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction with the felony murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the deceased, (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's request for a special jury instruction on duress, and (4) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police. The State also raises an issue on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by merging the Defendant's conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery into his felony murder conviction. We affirm the felony murder conviction and reinstate and remand for sentencing the especially aggravated robbery conviction.

The Defendant, George Langford, was convicted of first degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to life without the possibility for parole for the murder and to concurrent sentences of four, five, and two years for the other crimes respectively. The Defendant appealed his convictions and this Court affirmed the convictions and the sentences. Our supreme court granted the Defendant's application for appeal and also affirmed his convictions and sentences. The Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Defendant now appeals to this Court alleging that the trial court erred in denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of three counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and one count of simple possession of cocaine. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-six years. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentences were excessive and the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3.

Petitioner, Anthony Richardson, was convicted of first-degree murder in the Shelby County Criminal Court. This Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Richardson, 995 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Petitioner filed a petition for post conviction relief, which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. Petitioner challenges the denial of his petition, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court's comments during a witness' testimony deprived him of his sixth amendment right to a jury trial; (2) whether Petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to a jury trial when the trial court "forced" counsel to proceed to trial; (3) whether the prosecutor's biblical reference at trial constituted reversible error; and (4) whether there was a conflict of interest when the same judge presided at both his trial and post-conviction hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On March 12, 1996, the petitioner, James P. Stout, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced to forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner elected not to pursue a direct appeal of his conviction and instead filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff married her co-worker, and one of them was forced to resign pursuant to the company's anti-nepotism policy prohibiting concurrent employment of spouses. Plaintiff resigned and brought this action for wrongful discharge alleging her dismissal violated public policy favoring marriage and was due to her exercise of the fundamental right to marry. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Because Plaintiff has failed to show that a policy prohibiting concurrent employment of spouses violates a clear mandate of public policy, we affirm the trial court.

The petitioners, Hugh Peter Bondurant and Kenneth Patterson Bondurant, appeal the summary dismissals of their petitions for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal of right, each alleges that his sentence was illegally imposed. Because the judgments are facially valid, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellant, Donald Mays, appeals the verdict of a Shelby County jury finding him guilty of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Mays was sentenced to 30 years for aggravated robbery and to 60 years on each count of kidnapping. The kidnapping sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, but consecutive to the aggravated robbery sentence, for an effective sentence of 90 years. On appeal, Mays raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof; and (3) whether Mays' two convictions for kidnapping constitute double jeopardy. After review, we find Mays' multiple convictions for kidnapping violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, one count of kidnapping is dismissed. In all other respects, the remaining judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The defendant, who was charged with vehicular homicide and failure to yield right of way, filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review district attorney's denial of pretrial diversion. The trial court found that district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Edward Arnold Rivera, was indicted by a Hardin County grand jury on two counts of official misconduct, each a felony, and one count of misdemeanor theft. The Defendant submitted an application for pre-trial diversion which was denied by the District Attorney General. The Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Hardin County Circuit Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 38 for review of the denial of pre-trial diversion. The Circuit Court found no abuse of discretion, denied the petition, and granted the Defendant leave to seek an interlocutory appeal to this Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a). The Defendant contends on appeal that (1) the District Attorney General abused his discretion in denying pre-trial diversion and (2) the record does not support the denial. This Court granted the Defendant's application, and we now affirm the Circuit Court's denial of the petition.

In May 1999, a McMinn County jury found the Defendant guilty of the felony murder of one victim and of the criminally negligent homicide of a second victim. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to concurrent sentences of life in prison for the felony murder conviction and two years incarceration for the criminally negligent homicide conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction for felony murder; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to order the State to reveal the identity of a confidential informant; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the Defendant's co-defendant to testify against him at trial; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view a video tape of the Defendant's arrest; (5) whether the trial court allowed the jury to hear inadmissible hearsay testimony; (6) whether the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the entire written statement of the co-defendant; (7) whether the Defendant was denied a fair trial as a result of the State's failure to disclose exculpatory information; and (8) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion requesting individual voir dire of the potential jurors concerning pretrial publicity. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm the Defendant's convictions.

The Defendant, William Ray Collier, was convicted by a jury of two counts of possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver within one thousand feet of a school, one count of possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver, and three counts of driving on a suspended license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of seventy-one years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises three issues: whether the trial court erred in admitting certain expert testimony; whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; and whether his sentence is excessive. Finding no merit in any of the Defendant's contentions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to facilitation of the sale of cocaine greater than 0.5 grams for an agreed sentence of four years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant of one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of rape of a child. For the former the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years, and for the latter he received a sentence of twenty-three years. The trial court then ordered these sentences to run concurrently. Subsequently, the defendant brought an unsuccessful motion for new trial and now pursues the present appeal in this Court raising two issues. More specifically, the defendant avers that the trial court erred 1) by limiting defense counsel's questioning of the victim concerning her prior sexual experiences and 2) by improperly utilizing two enhancement factors in sentencing the defendant. Upon review of these issues, we find that neither merit reversal and, thus, affirm the convictions and sentences. However, we have noted error in the rape of a child judgment requiring a remand for correction thereof.

The Defendant, Michael Bikrev, was convicted of theft of property over $1,000.00 by a Williamson County jury. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction. The trial court suspended the sentence conditioned upon the Defendant serving one year in the Williamson County jail and completing four years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the State did not prove venue, (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a tacit admission made by the Defendant, and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher D. Lanier, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to incarceration for nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court's decision to not require a police officer who testified for the state to reveal the identity of a confidential informant. Finding no error warranting reversal, we affirm.

The appellant, Earl Dewayne Cole, was convicted by a Madison County jury of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to a term of seven (7) years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal the appellant claims the trial judge failed to adequately respond to a jury question regarding the need for unanimity in their verdict, that the written jury instructions showed the victim's name and weapon only under the main charge, and that the trial judge should have considered a lesser offense at sentencing. We find that all of these alleged errors have been waived by the failure of the appellant to enter a contemporaneous objection to them, by the failure to raise these issues in the motion for a new trial, and by the failure of the appellant on appeal to cite to any relevant authority supporting his arguments. Moreover, we find that none of these alleged errors constitute plain error. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.